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ABSTRACT 
“TO WEIGH THE WORLD ANEW”: POETICS, RHETORIC, AND SOCIAL 
STRUGGLE FROM SIDNEY’S ARCADIA TO SHAKESPEARE’S THEATER 
 
 
 
SEPTEMBER 2018 
 
DAVID KATZ, B.A., FLORIDA ATLANTIC UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor Arthur F. Kinney 
 
 
To Weigh the World Anew examines moments of rhetorical exchange in romances written 
by Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, William Shakespeare, and Mary Wroth, arguing that 
these texts portray formal oratory as either unethical or inefficacious, while 
simultaneously depicting poetic or theatrical discourses as productively intervening 
between interlocutors of diverse social statuses. These exemplary episodes show fiction 
successfully mediating between different classes and genders, creating a demarcation 
between poetry and competing forms of eloquence and participating in the emergence of 
the poetical from the rhetorical. Ultimately, the repeated depiction of poesis as an 
efficacious form of mediation in self-reflexive romance shows that modern conceptions 
of poetics partially emerge as a response to a set of rapidly changing social formations. 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... vi 
CHAPTER 
INTRODUCTION:  ACCOMMODATING ELOQUENCE AND SOCIAL STRIFE—
THE EARLY MODERN FANTASY OF POETIC EFFICACY…………………………8 
 
1. COUNTERFEITING RHETORIC: POETICS AND VIOLENCE IN SIDNEY'S 
ARCADIA AND THE DEFENCE OF POESY ...................................................................31  
 
2. THE BETTER OF THE ARGUMENT": ACCOMODATION, VIOLENCE, AND 
AUTHORITY IN BOOK FIVE OF THE FAERIE QUEENE…………………………...59 
 
3. "THEATRUM MUNDI": RHETORIC, ROMANCE, AND LEGITIMATION IN THE 
TEMPEST AND THE WINTER'S TALE……………..………………………………103 
 
4. "NOT MUCH TO BE MARKED, AND LESS RESISTED": MARY WROTH'S 
URANIA, ORDINARY SPEECH, AND THE END OF EARLY MODERN 
ROMANCE……….……………………………………………………………………130 
 
EPILOGUE: THE ROMANCE OF SOCIAL STRUGGLE ........………………………174 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………… ....197  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ACCOMMODATING ELOQUENCE AND SOCIAL STRIFE—THE EARLY 
MODERN FANTASY OF POETIC EFFICACY 
 
Should fantasy be driven out, judgement too, the real act of knowledge, is 
exorcised. 
—Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia  
 
I began this project with a question: why did early modern romances, in narrative after 
narrative, introduce representations of persuasion in close proximity to scenes of 
violence? These representations, reoccurring in texts authored by Philip Sidney, Edmund 
Spenser, William Shakespeare, Mary Wroth, and many others besides, portray oratorical 
exchanges sliding into brutality, often blurring the distinction between speech and 
physical harm. More troublingly still, these episodes almost uniformly feature 
communication and conflict between speakers of asymmetrical social statuses; they 
depict elite figures first speaking to and then attacking poor men and women. Even more 
strangely, these moments seem to call attention to elaborate poetic conceits and devices, 
foregrounding not only communication and discourse generally, but the specific status of 
poetics and exemplarity. What initially began as a single question soon spiraled into 
several lines of inquiry. Why did these violent tableaus cluster in a particular genre, 
romance? What was the relationship between these depictions of social strife and 
historically existing conflicts? Over time, I even began to wonder what these intensely 
self-reflexive portrayals of oratory indicated about rhetorical poetics. What did these 
depictions contribute to the development of modern literature?  
 “To Weigh the World Anew:” Poetics, Rhetoric, and Social Struggle, from 
Sidney's “Arcadia” to Shakespeare's Theater locates answers to these questions within a 
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tradition of hermeneutical accommodation central to Renaissance poetics. Throughout 
four chapters focusing on works composed by Sidney, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Wroth, 
I explore portrayals of oratory within Renaissance romance, showing that works in this 
still understudied genre depict formal persuasion either as failing or as a form of 
domination closely associated with violence, a depiction which contributed to the advent 
of modern poetics and—ultimately—of fiction. All of the texts studied in this dissertation 
focus either on the capacity of a speaker to adjust arguments to audiences, an adaption 
known in rhetorical theory as decorum, or on the ability of audiences to contextualize an 
argument ethically and correctly, a practice known in rhetorical theory as 
accommodation. In a still well-known formulation, Horace’s Ars Poetica memorably 
describes decorum as crafting voices appropriate for a character’s station, but ideas of 
propriety also had ethical and interpretive dimensions.1 As Kathy Eden has shown, 
rhetors and humanists analogized accommodation, a concept which acquired currency in 
the analysis of forensic oratory before being adopted by theology, biblical hermeneutics, 
and then finally by poetics, as a form of homecoming.2 To interpret a text 
accommodatingly means to render the unfamiliar familiar, to bring a piece of language 
into the home, or even to make an alien speaker or audience recognizable. As interpretive 
practice, an accommodating reading attempts to fairly and charitably contextualize 
discourse. This dissertation reveals that—faced with the political, religious, and 
economic upheaval of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—English authors 
responded to an increasingly diverse social landscape by portraying poesis, poetic 
making, as enabling this homecoming, frequently at the expense of oratory. Facing a 
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newly fractured and increasingly expanding world, early modern romances both intimate 
how audiences should respond to fiction and model a social role for literary texts. 
This project participates in a recent turn within Renaissance studies toward 
reconsidering the relationship between rhetoric and poetry. A just published monograph 
by Colleen Ruth Rosenfeld, for example, directs attention toward Sidney’s, Spenser’s, 
and Wroth’s use of stylistic elements which call attention to the artifice of poetic making: 
to conceits, figures, and devices which purposefully violate the principle of decorum in 
order to celebrate and advocate for an expanded conception of poetics.3 Rosenfield shows 
that modern literature, in part, emerges by strategically challenging elements of the 
rhetorical tradition. This dissertation provides the other side of this development, locating 
this change within historical circumstances, a move which shows that the demarcation of 
poetics from within rhetoric developed in reaction to a series of economic, social, and 
religious transformations. Rosenfield’s discussion, while not ahistorical, focuses on the 
formal content of literary texts; my intervention recalls the fact that both literary form and 
the interpretive categories which mediate this property possess their own historicity. As 
this introduction will demonstrate, attending to this historicity provides answers to many 
of questions I listed earlier.  
Throughout this introduction, I use either “accommodation” or “rhetorical 
hermeneutics” as umbrella terms to signify different concepts imported into English 
poetics from forensic oratory and the interpretatio scripti tradition. All of these concepts 
relate to audience participation, to attempts by readers and auditors to make a text’s 
meaning intelligible or have practical utility. My chapters are more specific when their 
subjects can plausibly be related to specific theories of interpretation: my first chapter, for 
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example, locates the suppression of a peasants’ revolt in Sidney’s Arcadia within the 
author’s well-documented engagement with scopus theory and within the paragone 
debates; my second chapter examines Spenser’s representation of Justice in Book Five of 
The Faerie Queene in light of biblical hermeneutics and within Renaissance theories of 
exemplarity; my third chapter focuses on Shakespeare’s representation of the 
performance of ethics in The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest; and my final chapter relates 
a depiction of beneficial persuasion in Wroth’s Urania to controversies over the status of 
formal eloquence against efficacious ordinary speech. Clearly, I am consolidating a broad 
array of interpretive approaches under a single banner, but accommodation’s association 
with readerly nostos makes it a particularly appropriate term for an argument about 
romance, a genre which frequently depicts voyages and journeys homeward. Romance, 
moreover, often links success to the capacity for social adaption. The Arcadia, The 
Faerie Queene, The Winter’s Tale, The Tempest, and the Urania all link a character’s 
triumph or failure to their capacity to respond appropriately to circumstances and 
audiences.  My use of accommodation suggests parallels between readers and the 
protagonists of romance narratives. Beyond the appropriateness of the term for a 
discussion of romance, “accommodation” possesses a social resonance; it connects 
representations of conflict to historically existing social ruptures, and it directs attention 
toward attempts to address these fractures within the texts this dissertation studies.         
Aside from summarizing my four chapters, the bulk of this introduction will 
provide a condensed and, by necessity, incomplete overview of Renaissance rhetoric, 
encapsulating a still widely accepted account of how poetics and eloquence intertwined 
while also demonstrating how a focus on accommodation complicates our picture of 
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vernacular literature in the period. This introduction signals some of my dissertation’s 
central interventions, predominantly my suggestion that attenuating to the emerging 
separation between rhetoric and poetics in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries can help explain why so many works of fiction from the period strike today’s 
readers—scholars, critics, literary historians, and students alike—as both profoundly 
troubling and yet also deeply provocative. Authors in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, I argue, adapted a set of closely related ideas about accommodation and 
exemplarity, concepts which originated in antiquity but were radically reformed 
throughout the Renaissance to both address the concerns of an emerging modernity and 
to appeal to a growing marketplace for secular, vernacular literature. For several reasons, 
both elite humanists and common readers valued morally complicated and intellectually 
challenging literary texts.  
 
I: Problematic Romance 
Renaissance intellectuals, in particular, viewed ambiguous moments from romance 
within the tradition of problemata, a reading practice which originated in a commentary 
on Homer by a certain Heraclitus who flourished circa the first century AD.4 Heraclitus’ 
Homeric Problems interpreted challenging moments from the Iliad and the Odyssey, 
particularly those incidents which were subjected to attacks from decriers of poetry like 
Plato, as allegorical. This early commentator construed episodes such as the Theomachy 
and the dalliance between Aphrodite and Ares as moral or philosophical statements 
which required readers to look beyond the literal sense of the Homeric text to discover 
pious and edifying meanings. Humanists, in their turn, saw Homer’s Odyssey as the 
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ancestor of romance, and they labored to identify moments requiring audience 
participation in Hellenistic texts by authors like Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles Tatius, 
Heliodorus, and others. They even used this framework to interpret modern epic 
romances by authors like Matteo Maria Boiardo, Ludovico Ariosto, and Torquato Tasso. 
For humanists, these attempts to make the design of a text cohere had clear affinities to 
accommodation: important intellectuals like Erasmus overtly connected the tradition of 
Homeric problemata to the broader theory of interpretive adaption.5 Other authors, 
particularly those invested in Protestant hermeneutics, followed a theory of reading 
inaugurated by Matthias Flacius Illyricus and Philip Melanchthon, categorizing these 
efforts as part of a reader’s duty to discover the aim of a book (scopus libri ).6 
These practices shaped the reception of romance. Figures as unalike as Simone 
Fornari and Sir John Harrington defended the genre using arguments descended from 
both Heraclitus and biblical hermeneutics throughout the sixteenth century. Harrington, 
for instance, claimed that Ariosto, like Homer, “did of purpose conceale these deepe 
mysteries of learning…to feed divers taste.”7 The discovery of these “mysteries” required 
“high conceited” readers interested in piecing together discontinuities in order to look 
through Ariosto’s surface content toward his authorial design. Barbara Reynolds, in her 
introduction to Orlando furioso, argues that humanist defenders of romance inscribed 
serious moral sentiments into the poem which were unintended by its author, but 
whatever Ariosto’s original authorial intent, these heady interpretations undoubtedly 
contributed to the decision made by Sidney, Spenser, and others, to explore the 
possibilities offered by the genre.8 Spenser, locating himself within this tradition, 
explicitly imitates Ariosto on numerous occasions. Going far beyond Heraclitus’ original 
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understanding of problemata as occulted allegories, early modern commentators viewed 
romanzo as a genre which featured problematic moments which required audience 
discernment in order to seek out the summa or intentio of an author.9 The fact that 
romances could be problematic was part of the genre’s appeal. The potential to exercise 
forensic judgement sold printed romances in bookshops. The same attraction conceivably 
drew men and women to the Globe theater.         
This description of problemata, then, partly explains why these ambiguous and 
disturbing portrayals of violence took place in Renaissance romance: challenging 
moments appealing to an audience’s judgment functioned as a generic convention. This 
introduction’s third section provides an additional explanation for why romance 
conveyed a fantasy of poetics and fiction addressing diverse audiences, an explanation 
rooted in the genre’s cultural status as a popular narrative form which also had an elite 
audience and an antique pedigree. The next two sections of this introduction, however, 
turn toward rhetorical theory, examining how self-reflexive portrayals of oratory and 
violence reflected changes within conceptions of rhetorical poetics, and how these 
changes in turn developed in reaction to shifting economic, religious, and political 
conditions throughout the early modern period. Because all four of my chapters focus on 
portrayals of oratory, the following section describes the canons, parts, and proofs of an 
oration; this description both establishes the norms romances interrogated and specifies 
how classical models were reconceived to fit the rapidly evolving print culture of early 
modern Europe.    
 
II: Poetry and Rhetoric 
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For their part, Renaissance rhetoricians recognized three branches of rhetoric, a division 
which had existed at least since Aristotle wrote his great manual on the subject. The first 
branch, deliberative, originally had a legislative purpose within the Athenian assembly 
and later the Roman Senate. Even in the Renaissance, this branch still maintained its link 
to participation in politics and courtly disputes. Yet while deliberative oratory always 
focused on exhorting or dissuading a person or group of people, it was never exclusively 
linked to overt political argument. The second branch, forensic, originally encompassed 
any discussion of past action and was specifically linked to judicial or legal argument. 
This branch included all persuasion that defended or accused a person, activity, subject, 
vocation, belief, or group, and it encompassed any form of argument which attempted to 
make sense of the past. The use of this mode of persuasion was very widespread within 
poetry and drama throughout the period. As Don Paul Abbot observes, “civic and 
forensic origins are almost always present in Renaissance literature. That is, literature, 
like rhetoric itself, is always argumentative and persuasive, never neutral.”10 Epideictic, 
the third and least commented-upon type of oratory, stands as it most enigmatic branch—
enigmatic because this category is nearly unrelated to the “forensic origins” referred to by 
Abbot. Even the well-informed Richard Lanham admits that it “has always posed a 
classificatory problem.”11 This confusion dates back to Aristotle, who notes that “In 
epideictic, there is either praise or blame,” but he then fails to address the subject with the 
same thoroughness with which he treats deliberative and judicial oratory.12 Yet poetry 
and epidictic rhetoric possess clear affinities, and theorists have even classified poetry as 
a subdivision of this branch of eloquence. In recent decades, Jeffery Walker has made the 
provocative suggestion that epideictic-poetic rhetoric, although often viewed today as the 
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black sheep among the three branches of eloquence, was actually central to the rhetorical 
tradition throughout antiquity and into the early modern period. If we miss this, according 
to Walker, it is because our focus on Aristotle has caused us to comparatively neglect the 
influential traditions embodied first by the sophists, then later by Isocrates, and even later 
by Cicero and Quintilian. For Walker, Isocratian epideictic does more than praise or 
blame: it “shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value and belief by which a society or 
a culture lives; it shapes the ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the 
individual members of the community identify themselves.”13  
The structure of an oration was as well-defined as the genres of rhetoric. The 
Rhetorica ad Herennium, probably the most influential rhetorical manual throughout the 
Medieval period and Renaissance, asserts that an oration has six parts.14 An exordium 
opens a speech in which the writer uses relevant generalities, anecdotes, quotations, or 
analogies to capture an audience’s attention, ultimately leading them into the specific 
topic and to the speaker’s argument. After finishing this introduction, the speaker 
succinctly states the main claim or claims of his or her argument, what the Herennium 
refers to as the narratio. The speaker then proceeds to a diviso, a moment which outlines 
the main points, reviews the debate to clarify what needs to be discussed further, or 
explains where the speaker and his or her opponent disagree. The next step, the 
confirmatio, sets out the arguments, usually three, which support the orator’s claims, 
including any natural or artificial proofs offered by the speaker. As this description 
suggests, this subdivision essentially functions as the oration’s body. A careful orator 
next attempts to refute any objections to his or her argument, an aspect pseudo-Cicero 
refers to as the refutatio, before concluding by summarizing his or her argument, 
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describing the urgency of his or her viewpoint, and sometimes even the actions that 
should be taken by the audience. Commentators explicitly mapped out every kind of 
discourse, including fiction and poetry, using the structures recommended in manuals like 
the Rhetorica. This categorization, however, did not preclude sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century authors from achieving complex or ambiguous affects. This pattern matters for 
this project insofar as every text I study portrays orators using this structure.  
Similar to the uniformity of the structure of an oration, until the emergence of 
Ramist pedagogy in the late sixteenth century, practically all rhetoricians agreed that 
rhetoric had five essential canons or parts: invention; arrangement; style; memory; and 
delivery. Among the most important concepts for poetics, the canon of inventio consisted 
of the discovery and elaboration of arguments or proofs. Aristotle recognized two kinds: 
non-artistic and artistic: the former consisting of phenomena such as physical evidence 
and eyewitness testimony and the latter consisting of arguments created by the orator. 
Aristotle sub-classified artistic proofs into three main types based upon their means of 
persuasion: ethos—the establishment of the character, expertise, or credibility of a 
speaker; pathos—moving an audience by generating an emotional response; and logos—
proving a case through rational argument, or at least the appearance of rational argument. 
Aristotle, oddly, considered non-artistic proofs outside the purview of rhetorical theory.15 
Other prominent rhetoricians, especially those with more pragmatic investments in 
oratorical efficacy such as Cicero, disagreed with this partition.16 The next canon, 
arrangement or dispositio, referred to the careful structuring of an oration’s six parts: my 
earlier description of the different parts of an oration serves as a condensed and obviously 
somewhat truncated account of this aspect of rhetorical theory. More significant for the 
11 
study of poetics, the canon of style or elocutio consisted of the proper use of figures and 
tropes in order to appropriately and effectively ornament discourse. Discussions of 
elocutio focus on definitions of devices, but also on how to craft a style appropriate for 
both occasion and audience. These discussions often bog down in the minutiae of 
classification and over-specificity, on vocabulary and the often-permeable boundary 
between figure and trope, but the theorization of style, at its best, was also impressively 
sophisticated, anthropologically thick, and highly conscious of the inseparability of 
discourse and culture.17  
Memorization and pronunciation, the final the canons of classical rhetoric, held 
important places in primarily oral or only partially literate societies. But in contrast with 
their focus on the other canons of rhetoric, humanists comparatively neglected 
pronunciation. Counterintuitively, even in the increasingly literate early modern period, 
authors and rhetoricians continued to hold the memory arts in great esteem.18 This 
discipline, which according to an account by Plutarch descended from Simonides of 
Keos, formed an elaborate and highly effective process of using mnemonic loci to 
combine information with mental copies of existing, often familiar, architectural bodies 
and with powerful, often shockingly taboo mental images to quickly facilitate the 
memorization and retrieval of arguments and other forms of data.19 This system persisted 
until the eighteenth century, but despite the esteem in which many intellectuals held the 
memory arts, the advent of print and the spread of literacy nevertheless altered the 
significance of this canon throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the 
words of Helmut Schanze, “with the invention of printing, public speaking and its written 
fixation (exemplary, poetical, and practical) undergo an increasing transformation from 
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pure and oral delivery…and become basically private manuscripts to this new mass 
medium. Rhetoric thus becomes in a completely new sense literary rhetoric.”20 Stated 
differently, printed rhetoric deemphasized pronunciation and memorization in favor of a 
renewed emphasis on elocutio. Yet despite the diminishment of these canons, all of the 
texts studied in this project portray the performance of oratory, including its verbal 
expression, in great detail. In the case of non-dramatic romances, these elements tend to 
be portrayed negatively, often as points of contrast with the conceits and devices I argue 
emblematize a participatory mode of poetics. Taken altogether, the eclipse of 
pronunciation and memorization by “literary” style correlates with the arrival of modern 
poetics. As elocutio became much more expansive, style became conceptual; as a 
category, it began to encompass not just virtutes eloctionis but also manners, situational 
ethics, and psychology.21  
The followers of Petrus Ramus—the Huguenot reformer who advocated moving 
invention, memorization, and arrangement from the province of rhetoric to logic, leaving 
rhetoricians with a reduced conception of eloquence interested only in style and 
pronunciation—took this emphasis on elocutio to its logical extreme.22 Earlier humanists 
such as Erasmus and Melanchthon followed Cicero in positing knowledge as mediated 
through language: inherently discursive, humanists viewed the reception of truth as 
contingent and socially constructed, even if truth itself was transcendent and universal. 
Ramism reversed this trajectory; rhetorical thinking became subordinate to logic which 
became the only reliable source of knowledge. A handful of influential scholars in the 
mid-twentieth century attempted to link Ramism with several developments in English 
literature: none of these arguments proved particularly convincing.23 Although 
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pedagogical works such as Abraham Fraunce’s Arcadian Rhetorike used Philip Sidney’s 
writing as a model for Ramist poetics in the vernacular, no direct evidence suggests that 
authors such as Sidney or Spenser themselves adopted Ramus’ ideas, despite Sidney’s 
close connections to Huguenot intellectual milieus and despite Spenser’s deep and 
abiding friendship with the Ramist, Gabriel Harvey. As Andrew Hadfield points out in 
his recent biography of Spenser, “The impact of Ramist reforms on the teachings of logic 
and rhetoric has probably been exaggerated, and it is clear that many humanists 
throughout Europe thought that Ramus’ methods were not sophisticated enough to deal 
with complex epistemological matters.”24 Ramism nevertheless influenced, albeit to a 
limited extent, conceptions of rhetorical poetics, and every major author in the period 
probably possessed at least a general familiarity with this reform movement.25 More 
broadly, while Ramism, due to its crudity, may not have posed a serious threat to the 
prestige of rhetorical poetics, its ideas did forecast the distant future. By the time of the 
Restoration, the expansive conception of rhetorical theory was under threat as the Latin, 
ratio, became the English, “reason.” 26 But rhetoric, like poetry, was controversial long 
before Ramus.     
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, eloquence, a category which 
included poetry and fiction as well as rhetoric, faced opposition and sometimes enmity 
from philosophers and intellectuals wary of idolatry and skeptical of secular creative 
endeavors. This hostility descended from Plato’s attacks on mimesis, the ancient 
philosopher’s belief that rhetoric and art encouraged moral and epistemic relativism, 
along with the associated argument that discursive technes were a kind of false 
counterfeiting because their practitioners either imitated observable reality or attempted 
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to convince auditors of the probability of unproved truth-claims.27 In early modern 
England, these concerns combined with the Protestant skepticism over icons, the fear that 
influencing others via images was akin to idolatry, to produce a renewed inimicalness 
toward mimesis. Oratory and poetry themselves were perennially linked to visuality 
through the ut pictura poesis tradition, through persuasion’s reliance on enargia and 
enargeia, and through the system of commonplaces.28 Protestant, and even what could be 
described as “Puritan,” attitudes toward visuality were both complex and constantly 
under negotiation, yet opposition to the discursive arts, even specific attacks on particular 
mediums such as antitheatrical tracts—Stephen Gosson’s Schoole of Abuse, for example, 
or William Prynne’s Histriomastix—clearly descended from this conflux of traditions. At 
the same time, eloquence had support from important classical figures such as Aristotle 
and Cicero, as well as from more contemporary authorities ranging from Erasmus to 
Melanchthon to Julius Caesar Scaliger.29 Rhetoric’s centrality to what Jacob Burckhardt 
and others would later term “the Renaissance” can hardly be overstated. The study of 
eloquence constituted the lion’s share of humanist education throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries: the discursive arts were effectively synonymous with the new 
learning.30 Despite this centrality, rhetoric and its associated discourses continued to 
function as spaces of contention and dispute up until the moment when the cultural 
authority of eloquence was shattered by the forces of the Enlightenment and modernity.  
 
III: Accommodation, Social Change, and Romance  
What is missing from this picture, this description made familiar by over thirty years of 
careful and exacting scholarship on rhetorical theory, humanist poetics, and classical 
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reception in the Renaissance? For starters, while this summation charts the contours of 
rhetorical poetics, explaining in detail how elements of rhetorical theory combined to 
serve as the atomistic units both of vernacular poetics and the actual composition of 
literary texts, it explains nothing about rhetoric as a theory of discourse. This portrait of 
Renaissance eloquence, moreover, only hints at how rhetoric and poetry functioned as a 
set of practices intended to facilitate social negotiation. While some classical rhetoricians, 
such as Aristotle, defined rhetoric as the study of argumentation, humanists in the 
Renaissance tended to favor a broader conception of the discipline in which the 
theorization of eloquence served as a model of interpretation as well as a method of 
persuasion. Only recently, however, due to important contributions like Kathy Eden’s 
study of Renaissance hermeneutics, Robert Stillman’s work on Philip Sidney’s poetics, 
and Lorna Hutson’s discussion of the origins of popular drama within forensic rhetoric, 
have literary historians begun to grasp how rhetorical theory developed into a 
participatory poetics in which audiences and authors alike were conceptualized as 
contributing to the construction of meaning.31  As late as 1994, Jean Grondin, in a text 
still often cited as the preeminent survey on the topic, confidently asserted that a 
philosophical tradition of hermeneutics did not exist prior to the nineteenth century. “The 
development of explicit hermeneutical reflection,” according to Grondin, “bears the 
signature of modernity…what distinguishes the modern world-picture is its 
consciousness of being perspectival.”32  Yet contrary to this narrative in which 
perspectival deliberation came into existence sometime between Schleiermacher and 
Nietzsche, rhetorical thinking contributed a foundation for a sophisticated theory of the 
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interaction between audience and text long before the birth of either Friedrich. As 
Nietzsche himself acknowledged, the beginnings of perspectivism lay much earlier.33 
  Perspectivism, however, does not equate to relativism: Renaissance humanists 
acknowledged the effect of perspective in shaping textual reception, but they also saw the 
principle of accommodation as constraining meanings by establishing normative 
boundaries, even if these limits were understood as historically contingent and 
ontologically arbitrary. For the humanists and Protestant reformers who followed the 
example of Augustine, correctly interpreting scripture required audiences to determine 
the purpose and meaning of a passage, whether a moment in the Old or New Testament 
was an allegory, a parable, or a representation of an actual historical event; readers, in 
this view, needed to read according to “the spirit” of the text and not according to the 
literalness of “the letter.” By the early sixteenth century, Erasmus could chide an 
opponent for failing to read him “charitably,” meaning that his reader was distorting the 
author’s meaning and committing violence against his text. These theories greatly 
influenced Protestant intellectuals. Flacius Illyricus’ historicist theory of reading—
interpretation as taking into account textual circumstances (circumstantiae) and context 
(contextus) so as to discover the scopus of a piece of discourse—imported conventions 
long familiar from discussions of rhetorical hermeneutics.34 
More than a theory of textual interpretation, humanists represented 
accommodation as a form of social adaption. The analysis of propriety supposedly 
encouraged ideals such as equity and prudence, as well as a tolerant and cosmopolitan 
mindset capable of empathetic perspectivism. Erasmus, in particular, portrayed 
accommodation as a form of irenicism in which speakers adapt their discourse and action 
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to one another in order to facilitate ethical social interaction.35 In the case of reading 
creative works, accommodation habituated readers into the world of a fiction even as it 
habituated fiction into something useful. Humanists, of course, understood that 
interpretation was a social action, and as a consequence, they viewed even less explicitly 
“textual” interactions as analogous to reading. The concept encouraged identification 
between speakers and audiences who may have had little in common beyond than their 
need to communicate. Given the intense strife in post-Reformation Europe, this concept’s 
immense appeal throughout the period needs little explication. Yet the Renaissance’s 
most abundant references to accommodation as mediation for discord occur not in public 
oratory but in humanist polemic. Jessica Wolfe has recently described how intellectuals 
such as Erasmus, Lorenzo Valla, Guillaume Bude, and Thomas More represented 
interpretive adaptation as a tool to arbitrate disputes between scholars in the aftermath of 
the Reformation and Counterreformation. Embracing figures as diverse as Saint Paul and 
Homer’s Odysseus as models for adapting to diverse or hostile audiences, these authors 
attempted to use the ancient practice to differentiate between the fecund and destructive 
aspects of Eris.36  At the same time, humanists like Erasmus valued accommodating 
authors such as Homer, not just because their poetry provided models of decorous 
speakers such as Odysseus and Nestor, but because they saw works like the Odyssey as 
accessible to readerly participation. In his Adages, Erasmus praises Homer’s language as 
open to detorqueri, twisting, turning, or bending.  Making practical use of ancient texts, 
Erasmus claims that the ‘process of accommodation “allows Homer’s ‘words [to be] 
stretched [detorseris] to give a vastly different sense,’ and new meanings infused into the 
most familiar Homeric lines” (CWE 35:282).37  Erasmus’ example makes it clear that the 
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distinction between accommodation as social mediation and accommodation as a theory 
of literary interpretation did not merely blur throughout the Renaissance; for humanists 
interested in rhetoric and eloquence, this division simply did not exist.   
This turn to accommodation partially explains why, again and again, in text after 
text, Renaissance authors depicted scenes of conflict between representatives of different 
classes, conflict between men and women, and conflict between members of different 
cultures and even races. These episodes test the limitations of oratory, representing 
conventional models of persuasion as either failing or as unethical when faced with the 
challenge of mediating between speakers and auditors of varying social statuses. 
Simultaneously, these self-reflexive tableaus often model the success of poetic conceits 
or discourses closely related to—or emblematic of—fiction as bridging the divide 
between heterogeneous interlocutors. These moments remove accommodation from the 
body of rhetorical theory for the benefit of poesis, representing poetry and fiction as 
better at adapting to diverse audiences and readerships than rival forms of eloquence. 
Borrowing a term from Rosemond Tuve, who long ago established the link between 
theories of decorum and the ability of images and metaphors to affect audiences in 
Renaissance literature, I want to suggest that scenes of social conflict from sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century romance attempt to “prove” the superior “rhetorical efficacy” of 
poesis, often at the expense of competing branches of eloquence, and most specifically, 
oratory.38  
 
IV: Romance and Social Fracture 
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The fact that the fantasy of poetic efficacy repeatedly played out in permutations of 
romance is hardly a coincidence. I have already discussed the practice of conceptualizing 
romance within the tradition of Homeric problemata, but this interpretive scaffolding is 
only one reason why the genre could be used to explore social discord. Romance had 
long established conventions which were compatible with the representation, not just of 
social struggle, but of discursive accommodation. Standard features of romance, such as 
depictions of voyages to exotic lands; positive depictions of love affairs, both licit and 
illicit; portrayals of conflicts between warring nations; and a traditional focus on female 
interiority, all made the genre uniquely capable of expressing the anxieties of an age 
characterized by renewed religious warfare; economic centralization in urban areas at the 
expense of rural locations; an emerging globalized marketplace; the first stirrings of 
modern colonialism; and a host of secondary changes attendant upon these social 
disruptions. Romance’s many fantastic elements provided a plausible distance from the 
direct representation of politically dangerous content while also imbuing representations 
of familiar social problems with a kind of alienation effect.  
As significantly, romance’s appeal to both elite and popular tastes made the genre 
an ideal medium to explore social fracture in the contexts of a post-Reformation Europe 
forever altered by the advent of print. Although the subjects of my chapters differ insofar 
as they react to different social changes, each text analyzed in this dissertation addresses 
the predicaments and opportunities created by an increasingly diverse audience. Two of 
the authors I discuss, Spenser and Wroth, worked closely with printers to see their 
romances published and distributed. Yet—due an expanding print culture—a text’s 
reception could no longer be guaranteed by the circulation of manuscripts across 
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relatively homogenous, relatively familiar, readerships. The fact that print theoretically 
placed literary works into the hands of any man or woman capable of purchasing and 
reading a book created a preoccupation with scenes of exchange between unalike 
speakers. Paralleling the effect generated by circulation of printed books, the popularity 
of London’s commercial theater made divergent reactions to a staged performance a 
virtual inevitability. Some playwrights, such as Ben Jonson, recoiled at this possibility; 
The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest, conversely, show Shakespeare transforming this 
qualified openness into part of the cultural value of theater. As Shakespeare’s example 
shows, across mediums, the pervasiveness of using romance to address issues of 
reception operated according to a particular generic logic. Romance was a natural place 
to examine social exchange because this category of literature was at once stereotyped as 
addressing a female and lower-class readership and yet had an elite origin, a lineage 
which gestured toward prestigious sources such as Heliodorus’ Aethiopica and Homer’s 
Odyssey. The genre occupied a unique cultural space where it simultaneously functioned 
as a humanistic and a popular medium.   
 
V: Conclusion—Four Chapters about Fantasy  
My opening chapter examines the representation of deliberative oratory throughout the 
suppression of a peasants' revolt in the third book of Philip Sidney's Arcadia, showing 
that this episode enacts the traditional critiques against mimesis only to contain these 
attacks within Sidney's representation of oratory and visual art. Sidney creates a 
demarcation between the visual efficacy of romance and competing discourses, a 
differentiation rooted in poetry's capacity for mediating gendered and classed relations. 
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Although this Arcadian intervention establishes the terms of contention between rhetoric 
and romance examined throughout my four sections, what each chapter’s intervention 
entails depends upon the forces and events each text responds to. My second chapter, for 
example, situates The Faerie Queene’s depiction of Artegall's debate with the Egalitarian 
Giant within the tradition of forensic hermeneutics and in relation to Tudor colonialism in 
Ireland. Edmund Spenser represents both Artegall and the Giant as unaccommodating 
interpreters of one other’s language. The Knight’s debate with the Giant eventually 
develops into a diorama of social disruption caused by indecorous speaking, a violent 
tableau which ultimately justifies Book Five’s portrayal of English colonialism while also 
calling attention to the perilously thin line between persuasion and the expression of 
power.  
Moving forward in time, my third chapter shows that William Shakespeare's late 
tragicomic-romances model metatheatrical devices speaking to and for an increasingly 
heterogeneous and cosmopolitan audience. The Winter's Tale and The Tempest 
appropriate rhetoric's cultural authority for commercial theater, offering a fantasy about 
the efficacy of dramatic persuasion appealing to an audience containing men, women, 
merchants, servants, nobles and lawyers—in short, members of every category of person 
found in seventeenth-century London. Confronted by an audience drawn from an 
increasingly pluralistic city with a newly global reach, The Winter’s Tale and The 
Tempest transform problematic representations of social strife into a commodity, offering 
playgoers a position of forensic detachment with which to view the events performed on 
stage. Responding to a different aspect of the Jacobean settlement, Mary Wroth ‘s 
Urania, the subject of my final chapter, focuses on courtly intrigue and the conditions 
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which render participation within political life possible. Unlike Sidney’s Arcadia, 
Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, or Shakespeare’s late tragicomic-romances, Wroth’s great 
romance does not contrast oratory with poetic conceits in order to justify or legitimate 
fiction. Instead of making an argument about poetics and rhetoric, Wroth highlights 
discourses which bridge the chasm between personal expression and public utility. The 
portrayal of persuasion in the opening of the Urania subverts the conventions of romance 
after Sidney, preparing readers to accept the public circulation of particular forms of 
female language. Despite its differences from the previous subjects discussed in this 
dissertation, the Urania ultimately serves as a final instance of early modern romance 
establishing in relief the contours which will later be followed by the novel. 
In the end, the early modern depiction of poesis as supra-accommodation 
functioned as a fantasy: it is highly unlikely that romances contributed to social cohesion 
in practice. This fantasy, moreover, works to obscure the actual roles played by creative 
writing within social relations. None of the texts I discuss depict poetry or performance 
altering the conditions causing the conflicts represented in their narratives, even if these 
texts do usually resolve the particular dispute scaffolding their plot. Yet in accruing 
authority for themselves, in legitimizing poetic making as the solution to strife, these 
romances do not, as in most ideological fantasies, directly gesture toward salving 
anxieties. True to the tradition of Homeric problemata, every episode I examine 
throughout this dissertation ends ambiguously and uncomfortably. By offering a 
discursive solution beyond the level of plotting or narrative, these texts invite audience 
participation, calling attention to the insolvability of social in-cohesion. The Faerie 
Queene represents the murder of the Leveling Giant as a startlingly violent act of 
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avoidance; the Arcadia depicts Pyrocles’ speech before the marauding peasants as 
contributing to the violations of order and hierarchy the prince’s oration condemns; and 
both The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest end ambiguously, with strategically placed 
silences creating a vacuum in place of expected reconciliation. By advocating a 
participatory poetics, by inviting an audience’s judgment, these moments defer the 
pleasures of resolution and provoke questions about the connectivity of social relations, 
discourse, and audience discernment. These texts are products of the early modern 
imaginary, but they are also highly interrogative representations of social fracture which, 
seen from the right angle, can help us, in Adorno’s vocabulary, “establish that relation 
between objects which is the irrevocable source of all judgement.”39 Stated in a different 
vocabulary, in the language Artegall uses to describe the Egalitarian Giant, these 
portrayals of eloquence provide a balance with which “to weigh the world anew” 
(V.ii.34.1).  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
COUNTERFEITING RHETORIC: POETICS AND VIOLENCE IN SIDNEY’S 
ARACADIA AND THE DEFENCE OF POESY 
 
The question of why the Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia includes an episode in which 
its protagonists ferociously clash with a peasants' revolt has long puzzled Sidney's 
readers.40 The extraordinarily detailed and surprisingly violent imagery found in the 
suppression of the rebellion, the descriptions of limbs hacked off, faces disfigured, and 
poor men brutalized for what appears to be comedic affect ruptures the generic modes of 
Sidney's romance, acting like a gash across the narrative, dissevering generic and tonal 
expectations just as the blows wrought against the peasants inflict wounds on their 
bodies. Understandably, critical attention on this subject has focused on Sidney's attitude 
toward popular rebellion, the relationship of the Arcadia to its social contexts, and the 
situation of this uprising within early modern resistance theory.41 Sidney's narrative, 
however, complicates such evaluations by encouraging readers to see the rebellion not as 
a revolt springing from specific grievances, but as a consequence of a seditious speech 
delivered by Clinias, a lower-class orator acting as an agent for a foreign and hostile 
power.42 Adding to this emphasis, the skirmish terminates with a sophisticated but 
devious political oration delivered by the disguised and cross-dressed Pyrocles. The 
uprising, then, both begins and ends with morally suspect acts of persuasion spoken by 
figures from different ends of the class hierarchy.43 So while the purpose behind the 
uprising's inclusion in the Arcadia remains far from obvious, the cause both of the 
rebellion and its termination is made perfectly clear: deliberative oratory.44 With its focus 
on the two orators and the response they generate in their audience, the text foregrounds 
25 
issues of communication and social order, inviting readers to ask about the connection 
between the eloquence and carnage inflicted upon the peasants—and about the 
association of violence with language more generally. 
 But why would Sidney portray oratory in this unflattering way? Poetry and 
rhetoric, after all, possess deep affinities, and despite recent work on the emergence of 
poetics in the Renaissance, historians and critics still often take for granted that sixteenth-
century writers made little distinction between poetical and rhetorical theory.45 Don Paul 
Abbot, for instance, observes that "the rules of a classical oration were applied to every 
kind of discourse ... There is no very clear demarcation between rhetoric and poetry in the 
Renaissance."46 This chapter attempts to show that such declarations oversimplify a 
complex relationship, that the conclusion to the peasants' uprising represents eloquence 
as manipulation and as a kind of violence against auditors and the larger social body. At 
the same time, the episode's highly self-reflexive imagery, particularly a vivid description 
of the maiming of an artisan painter that echoes the vocabulary of Sidney's Defence, 
indirectly calls attention to the role, not just of rhetoric, but of poetry and visual art: three 
forms of discourse almost always linked together in Renaissance-era rhetorical and poetic 
theory. Given Sidney's inherently visual theory of poetics and given the presence of a 
painter on the scene, this moment's focus on ekphrasis, the vivid description of a work of 
art embedded in a larger text, hardly surprises. Yet Aristotle, Cicero, and others identify 
the figure with the revelation of ethos, associating ekphrastic description with presenting 
a model of the world which clarifies the relationship between individual and communal 
history—as the description of Aeneas' shield portraying the glorious future of the hero's 
descendants in the Aeneid, or the portrayal of the tapestries encountered by Britomart in 
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Book III of The Faerie Queene both attest to.47 In spite of this tradition, Sidney's artisan 
painter functions as an emblem of passivity. Unlike Sidney's ideal poet in the Defence, he 
attempts to use art to delight without teaching any sense of social good. The painter's 
mutilation, which prevents the artisan from actually fulfilling the promise of ekphrasis 
that his presence intimates, grotesquely embodies the deficiencies of mimesis uselessly 
imitating a fallen world. 
 While Sidney clearly invokes the association of rhetoric and art with poetry, using 
commonplaces that tie the three forms of image-making together, he doesn't simply 
marry his romance to either oratory or painting. Sidney instead uses this episode to 
manifest the precepts of the Defence within the Arcadia, creating a demarcation between 
poetry and other forms of eloquence. His narrative diligently, albeit implicitly, contrasts 
the deliberative oratory used by Pyrocles and the passivity of the maimed painter against 
the scope of Sidnean poetics as embodied in the descriptive language of the Arcadia 
itself, a conceptualization of art enacting a different kind of ekphrasis which participates 
in the emergence of the poetical from the rhetorical. Ultimately, the engagement with the 
rhetorical tradition in the New Arcadia and the Defence of Poesy establishes the terms of 
the ut pictura poesis debates in English, a controversy which has persisted from Sidney's 
time to our own. 
 
I: Rebellion, Violent Language, and Painting 
Sidney links the uprising to evil language well before introducing the oratory of Pyrocles 
or Clinias. In the disguise of Dorus, Musidorus severs a rebel's limbs from his body, 
making "his arms and legs go complain to the earth how evil their masters had kept 
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them."48 The cross-dressed Pyrocles likewise cleaves the head of an insubordinately 
speaking butcher who had been "calling Zelmane all the vile names of a butcherly 
eloquence" so that "she left nothing but the nether jaw, where the tongue still wagged" 
(281). A drunken miller begs for life before being "thrust through ... from one ear to the 
other; which took it very unkindly, to feel such news before they heard of them, instead 
of hearing, to be put to such feeling" (282). The Arcadia's narrator mocks the peasants for 
their class position and occupation, but nearly all of these jibes also concern their 
communication, and most of the narrator's language even describes violence as though it 
were a form of expression. The description of "butcherly eloquence" contrasts the paucity 
of the peasants' verbal ability with Pyrocles' aristocratic, learned, and extremely effective 
formal oratory, showing the measure of the Arcadia's noble characters against the 
buffoonery of "churls and villains," consequently naturalizing both class positions. But 
this language also prepares readers to associate eloquence with violence. 
 The presence of the artist at the skirmish, the final victim of the brutal and 
inglorious tumult, merely represents the most obvious connection between Renaissance 
rhetorical theory and the Arcadia's violent tableau. But while not unique, Sidney still 
hazards a danger in introducing the painter. Sidnean poetics justifies its existence through 
its ability to act as "a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight" (219-22). 
According to the Defence, the persuasiveness of imagery depends upon energeia, ocular 
vividness, and enargeia, lively narration or description—both of which impress 
themselves upon the minds of audiences in order to reveal "Ideas" or "fore-conceits," 
matrices of notitiae which grant the "knowledge to lift up the mind from the dungeon of 
the body to the enjoying of his own divine essence" (306-8).49 Adapting the ancient 
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commonplace of ut pictura poesis, the Defence and the Arcadia both associate poetry 
with visual images, and whether through ekphrastic description or through the 
emblematic depiction of characters and scenes, when Sidney refers to visual art, he 
simultaneously calls attention to poetry: in the case of the mutilated artisan, a deficient 
kind of poetry, or at the very least, a deficient kind of image-making closely associated 
with Sidney's "unelected vocation."50 
 The artisan painter only attends the conflict between the two princes and the 
peasants in the first place so as "to counterfeit the skirmishing between the Centaurs and 
the Lapiths," the very specificity of his subject and its similarity to the uprising signaling 
that his presence inadvertently comments on the action he witnesses (282). Yet as 
ekphrasis, this attempted "counterfeiting" should be highly resonant. The figure, after all, 
traditionally does more than comment on identity. Page DuBois points out that ekphrasis 
in poetry from Homer to Edmund Spenser chronicles a vision of a larger cultural history 
in which "man's reading of the past" becomes "part of the attempt to control the present 
and shape the future of the human community."51 But in sharp contrast to both classical 
and early modern uses of the figure, the painter models an antisocial and useless 
counterfeiting, one that neither moves nor persuades, and may even be a form of 
deception in the sense that his adaption of a "real life" conflict into a distant mythical 
fantasy removes the uprising from its social context, from the framework that makes it 
explicable as an event. As the narrative progresses, the passivity of the maimed painter, 
like the amoral oratory used by Pyrocles and Clinias, becomes more and more linked to 
violence—though unlike its sister examples, a violence actually inflicted upon the image-
maker himself. The moral logic of the Arcadia punishes and mocks the artisan because he 
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detaches eloquence from the specific capacity Sidney sees as distinctive of true poetry: its 
ability to reproduce an image that exists beyond the immediately perceivable, what the 
Defence refers to as the "golden" world, but which post-romantics might think of as the 
ability to imagine a different reality, a better set of circumstances and conditions. 
Because the painter cannot conceive of anything except an image that resembles the 
grotesque circumstances he witnesses, these circumstances victimize him. 
 Although the painter's attempted art almost lacks content, the Arcadia's own 
speaking-picture describing his maiming draws on and participates in a well-known and 
highly resonant locus communis the late sixteenth century had inherited from the classical 
period. The description of the maiming directly imitates, not Plato or Aristotle as might 
be expected given the subject matter, but a similar moment from Statius' Thebaid, 8.551-
2, transformed, however, in a number of significant ways from its ancient model.52 
Statius' epic describes a brutalized singer, explicitly an "ante comes Musis,” 
 a former companion of the muses, a poet, who "cupit ille tamen pugnasque uirosque / 
forsitan ut caneret," desired to witness a battle, perchance to find the subject of a song.53 
Statius' initial designation of the artist as a "former companion of the muses" holds the 
figure's exact identity in suspense until announcing his intention to write a song based on 
the battle. But in the Arcadia, the maimed artist does not desire a model to base his verse 
on at all. Instead of being a composer of songs without any qualification, he merely bears 
a certain resemblance to a poet. Sidney's translation of the poet into a painter occults the 
sentence of this passage slightly—what it means as opposed to what it literally says—
shaping it into a multivalent analogy. The transformation of the poet into an artist also 
calls attention to the role played by visual proofs in persuasion, directing readers to the 
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"speaking pictures" so important to Sidney's poetic theory, to the right kind of 
"counterfeiting." Finally, the victim's identity as a painter and not specifically a poet has 
the advantage of allowing the connotations of this emblematic figure to extend backward 
to the oratory that is the matter of this episode, and forward to its sentence as a complex 
and self-reflexive work of meta-fiction. 
 Regardless of Sidney's borrowings from his model in Statius, the painter 
simultaneously exists within an additional discourse that Sidney engages with throughout 
his Defence: the ancient war between poetry and rhetoric, on the one hand, and 
philosophy, on the other. Nearly every attack on the mimetic arts from Plato to Stephen 
Gosson invoked the comparison between painting and oratory or painting and rhetoric, 
alongside the use of the word "counterfeiting" or its equivalent; but the defenders of 
literary arts, including Sidney in his own treatise on poetics, also made extensive use of 
this locus communis. Using an avowedly Aristotelian terminology, Sidney directly calls 
poetry a "mimesis," or "a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth" (220-1). Because 
Sidney's critical theory relies so thoroughly on ocular power for its efficacy, the Defence 
and the Arcadia both take great care to differentiate "the speaking picture" of true poetry 
from its rivals in imitation, image makers—connected to rhetoric through Sidney's 
digression—who fail to "teach and delight." This designation includes inferior versifiers 
whose art resembles the oratory and painting depicted throughout the revolt's 
suppression. The three general kinds of poets in the Defence, for instance, differ based 
upon how they create images, what exactly these images imitate, and for what purpose 
these imitations are performed: nearly the same set of distinctions I have been tracing in 
my discussion of the maiming of the artist and the two orations that frame the peasants' 
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uprising. Seeing the battle as a source of entertainment, the unfortunate painter never 
harnesses the power of images for anything except amusement: "being delighted to see 
the effects of blows," he in turn expects to give delight through the reproduction of what 
he sees and nothing more (281). Unlike the artisan, Clinias moves his audience to take 
action but has no higher ambitions (the Arcadia does not directly portray his initial 
oratory, but readers can infer this from its effects). Pyrocles, the most effective image-
maker within the narrative, both delights and moves the peasants; but far from teaching 
his auditors, he manipulates them into taking an action beneficial to his self-interest but 
arguably harmful to the larger community, first deceiving and then causing the peasants 
to turn violently against one another. Seen together as models of discourse brought before 
the judgment of the Arcadia's reader, these three illustrations of "counterfeiting" are 
limited at best, and malicious at worst. 
 The Defence, on the other hand, argues for a poetry without a horizon. Writing 
that "[t]he chief, [poets] both in antiquity and excellency, were they that did imitate the 
inconceivable excellencies of God," Sidney uses antanaclasis, his troping "excellency" as 
preeminence into "excellencies" as a title of honor, to present the rhetorical 
accommodation characteristic of the best image makers as boundless, even capable of 
mediating a theophany for its audience (223-4).54 Presumably, when Sidney writes that 
King David "maketh you, as it were, see God coming in his majesty," he groups the 
psalm-writer within this category of poet (141). Rendering the inconceivable observable 
may at first seem paradoxical, but as Robert Stillman points out, Sidnean accommodation 
extends beyond an audience's adaptation of content into meaning. Poetry's primacy as the 
architektonike science rests, in part, on its capacity to accommodate divine notitiae into a 
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form comprehensible for its audience, its "ability to give substance to Ideas innately 
unknowable apart from their exemplification.”55 
 In contrast to true poets, the second, inferior kind of versifier resembles the 
philosopher and historian because of the similar objects they imitate—things and people 
that have the disadvantage of historical existence. Because of this limitation, Sidney even 
hedges his bets on whether the second type of versifier really counts, properly speaking, 
as a poet, quipping, "whether they be poets or not, let grammarians dispute" (244). In 
cataloguing these types of imitators, Sidney immediately settles for an analogy between a 
bad poet and a painter who merely copies the objects available to his senses. According 
to the Defence, between the greater and lesser types exist  
such a kind of difference, as betwixt the meaner sort of painters, who counterfeit 
only such faces as are set before them, and the more excellent, who having no law 
but wit ... most properly do imitate to teach and delight, and to imitate, borrow 
nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be, but range only reined with learned 
discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be.56 (245-55) 
 
The painter's inclusion in the skirmish, unnecessary as a matter of plotting or 
characterization, highlights the Arcadia's own status as a kind of discourse, stressing the 
difference between the romance and the language it portrays. With the traditional 
arguments leveled against art confined to oratory and naive realism, the romance 
indirectly represents poesy as a more accommodating method of influencing an audience, 
usurping rhetoric's traditional place as the social force which first creates and then 
cements communities and nations together. Isocrates, to cite a familiar example of this 
kind of justification, memorably describes the rhetorical ideal that Sidney transfers to 
poetry:57  
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Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to 
make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of 
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and 
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man 
which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. For this it is which has 
laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honourable and base; 
and if it were not for these ordinances, we should not be able to live with one 
another. 
 
The Defence makes a nearly identical argument, but substitutes the civilizing function of 
rhetoric with poetry (3-16; 66-77). Something similar occurs in this episode when Sidney 
provides readers with a glimpse of what social relations look like when this ideal fails. 
 Of course, portrayals of the failure of the Isocratian ideal verge on ubiquity 
throughout the period. Rhetoric, controversial since its inception, has perennially been a 
target of suspicion. This moment's significance lies in how clearly and self-consciously it 
manifests the precepts of the Defence within the Arcadia, and what this tells us about the 
emergence of the poetical from the rhetorical in the English Renaissance. Since Plato, 
rhetoric and poetry have both been attacked as false semblances of reality, as second-
order counterfeitings. Sidney responds to the traditional accusations made against 
eloquence by delineating between inferior simulacrums of a fallen reality and a speaking 
picture which imitates notitiae, adapting these "divine ideas" into a form comprehensible 
to readers while relying on audiences' own innate capacities to enter into and participate 
in the world of a fiction.58 Because the Arcadia models the various forms of 
counterfeiting, the speaking picture of the peasants' uprising makes concrete the abstract 
principles of Sidney's treaty while also demonstrating what it adopts and where it differs 
from conventional rhetoric. Sidney scholars, often underestimating the participatory 
character of the exchange between text and readers in the period and often assuming the 
necessity of embodying exempla in morally attractive characters, sometimes struggle to 
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explain how the Defence's theories on exemplarity relate to the Arcadia's practice. The 
peasants' revolt, however, effectively models a form of accommodating image-making by 
using painting and oratory as foils. 
 
II: Demarcations 
In light of these divisions, Abbot's claim about a lack of distinction between rhetoric and 
poetry in the Renaissance needs to be qualified.59 Insofar as rhetoric acts as a general and 
comprehensive theory of communication, Abbot's statement remains both representative 
and accurate. Renaissance poetics inherited a vocabulary almost entirely derived from 
classical rhetorical theory (this, of course, holds true for contemporary literary studies as 
well—as any English major who has ever noticed a metaphor, simile, synecdoche, trope, 
or any similar concept can tell you). Regardless, this picture of Renaissance poetics as 
unreservedly identical with rhetoric obscures the extent to which early modern authors, 
particularly authors associated with the Sidney circle, labored to distinguish the two 
sciences as different modes of interaction. While William Scott, for instance, as an 
inheritor of the Scaligerian-Sidnean tradition, sees rhetoric as containing poetry 
conceptually in the same way that natural philosophy contains medicine, Scott still 
differentiates poetics from rhetoric "as an art of imitation, or an instrument of reason ... to 
feign or represent things, which delight to teach and to move us to good."60 Sidney, to 
give an even more pertinent example, very actively establishes a boundary between 
spoken-oratory and written-poetry, even if the relationship between the two arts is 
successionary, with poetry taking rhetoric's traditional function as a civilizing influence 
but not wholly divorced from its sister art. Within the Defence, rhetoric and theology are 
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the only realistic candidates for architectonike science not directly dealt with in Sidney's 
divisio, confirmatio, or refutio proper, despite the fact that in most humanist programs, 
the study of eloquence would have been the leading aspirant for the title of queen of the 
sciences.61 Sidney instead handles rhetoric in a digression prompted by a discussion of 
the different kinds of poetry. Sidney's seemingly cheeky apology for this aside, his claim 
that he deserves to be "pounded for straying from poetry to oratory," but that "both have 
such affinity in the wordish consideration that I think this digression will make my 
meaning receive the fuller understanding" (1454-55), becomes more resonant upon 
recognizing that Sidney here alludes to rhetoric's place next to poetry as a similar but 
inferior kind of image-making. 
 Sidney conceptualizes poetry as semi-self-contained and self-referential, yet not 
wholly autonomous nor divorced from historical contingency. The accommodation of 
text to readers, readers to text—ideas into speaking pictures which are then received by 
audiences—anchors artifice to moral and even political purposes. The practices of the 
Arcadia's painter and rhetoricians operate noticeably differently. The artisan painter 
limits his counterfeiting to purely aesthetic goals. Nearly the painter's antitheses, Pyrocles 
and Clinias exemplify a form of social engagement which has great efficacy but no 
ethical basis. Taken altogether, the romance's unfavorable depiction of deliberative 
oratory stresses the social dimensions of Sidney's own medium, offering a fantasy of 
language-use which can do what the speeches in this episode fail at: mediate 
benevolently between interlocutors of different classes and genders. 
 
III: Pyrocles and the Well-Skilled Painter/ Poetry and the Body Politic 
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The plot of the second half of the Arcadia hinges on an interrogation of categories. The 
conflict between the peasants and the Arcadia's aristocratic protagonists, in particular, 
stems from a series of violations: contraventions of gender and hierarchy—breaches of 
ethical norms figured by the text in this moment as bodily injuries. Sidney portrays even 
the speeches of Pyrocles and Clinias as analogous to the physical maiming of the 
unfortunate artisan. Yet the painter's attempted subject, his counterfeiting "of the 
skirmishing between the Centaurs and the Lapiths," also points unflatteringly toward the 
romance's protagonists, with the hybridity of the centaurs discomfortingly alluding to the 
compromised identities of the disguised princes, and principally to the cross-dressed 
Pyrocles, who in this version of the Centauromachy is both the order-restoring Theseus 
and the dissolute centaur, Eurytion.62 Emblematically, Pyrocles as Zelmane and 
Musidorus as Dorus use disguise, the former as a member of the opposite gender and the 
latter as a member of a different class, in order to violate Duke Basilius' daughters, just as 
Eurytion attempts to rape Pirithous' bride in the Centauromachy. If comparing the 
princes' activity to sexual violence seems to go too far in describing what eventually 
develops into an elopement, recall that the Musidorus of the Old Arcadia actually does 
attempt to rape Pamela. 
 The New Arcadia's references to gendered conflict in this moment derive, in part, 
from the original of the narrative tableau the artisan painter hopes to render literally 
visible: Ovid's description of the Centauromachy in the twelfth book of the 
Metamorphosis (the artisan seems unaware of Ovid's description, but Sidney's text clearly 
alludes to the Roman poet's description of the mythological battle).63 Ovid frames the 
disrupted wedding within an account of gender performance, transformation, and sexual 
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violation—all of which further point to Pyrocles' morally dubious behavior and speech. 
Ovid's narrator for this episode, the elderly and garrulous Nestor, bookends his 
description of the battle with a story of the final victim of the centaurs' desolate rage, the 
female rape-victim turned male warrior, Caeneus/Ceny. According to Nestor, when 
provided a boon by Poseidon after the god brutally ravaged her while she walked by the 
sea, "Ceny" asked to become a man so that she would never again endure sexual 
predation. Newly transformed into "Caeneus," the warrior roamed Thessaly, seeking 
heroic adventures before being killed at the conclusion of the Centauromachy, a course of 
events which startlingly parallels and reverses Pyrocles' activity.64 Before perishing in an 
attempt to preserve the sanctity of a wedding, Caeneus transforms from a wronged 
woman into a male hero in a failed attempt to escape further patriarchal violence. 
Pyrocles, the inverted mirror-image of his ancient counterpart, adopts the identity of a 
woman in order to enable his own masculine prerogatives, sparking a set of troubling 
resonances which strongly color his interactions with the peasants. 
 The prince's speech, moreover, directly harms his audience and indirectly harms 
the state of Arcadia. The prince begins his oration before the surviving rebels by 
employing philophronesis, the pacification of an adversary by use of mild speech or 
promises: Zelmane's (Pyrocles') insistence that "she had something to say unto them, that 
would please them," followed by his flattering remarks about his comfort in speaking in 
front of such a valorous and sensible assembly (283). Defined as a gentle speech that 
either attempts to assuage an auditor's anger or as language that fosters a friendly 
relationship between speaker and audience, philophronesis becomes useful, according to 
Henry Peacham, when an orator needs "to appeaseth the malice of enemies, molifieth the 
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cruel hearts of tyrants, saveth the life of innocents, and preventeth the destruction of cities 
and countries."65 Yet philophronesis possesses ambivalent connotations. The figure can 
advance civic good, but contemporary rhetorical manuals also cite it as a favorite device 
of the dissembler and hypocrite. Peacham's Caution warns that bad orators use this tactic 
to deceitfully advance their own personal goals, telling readers to beware false 
acquiescence, "the counterfeit submission of hypocrites" which "is opposed to the true 
use of this figure."66 A liar uses this device, according to Peacham, not to supplicate 
humbly for mercy or gentleness, but to create the false image, "the counterfeit" of true 
supplication in order to evade consequences. 
 Pyrocles roots his assuaging, appeasing language in this type of deception, 
inventing a ruse dependent upon the counterfeiting of a false identity. A country farmer 
initially convinces his fellows to listen to "Zelmane" because of physical attraction, 
having become ensnared "in a little affection ... hoping by his kindness to have some kind 
of good of her" (283). The narrative later even states that he only helps the faux-Amazon 
so "that he might have Zelmane for his wife" (284). While well-meaning, Pyrocles uses 
impersonation as a form of seduction, allowing him to ingratiate himself first with 
Basilius' court and then with the peasants. In both cases, the prince gains entrance into 
others' confidences by virtue of the attraction they feel for him, an attraction that blends 
categories, defying social divisions in order to infiltrate spaces that otherwise would 
remain closed. More still, as Helen Cooper points out, Zelmane's behavior sharply 
contrasts with the modesty of the actual Zelmane, the doomed young woman who 
perished without revealing her love to Pyrocles: "She had continued to be restrained by 
her feminine self-enfacement and modesty; he continues to behave with all the self-
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confidence of a man. His cross-dressing never amounts to an assumption of social 
gender."67 To Cooper's point, I would add that Pyrocles' activity also contrasts with his 
model in the Metamorphoses: Caeneus. 
 Despite the moral dubiousness of Pyrocles' impersonation, the prince's exordium 
constructs an ethos of a female speaker and foreigner compelled to speak out because of 
the unnaturalness of the peasants' rebellion: "An unused thing it is, and I think heretofore 
unseen, O Arcadians, that a woman should give public counsel to men; a stranger to the 
country people" (285). Opening his oration by referring to his (temporarily assumed) 
gender immediately captures the attention of his audience, calling their focus to his body 
and physical attractiveness while setting the stage for a speech in which the faux-Amazon 
tropes on what it means to be effeminate and strange, gradually convincing the enraged 
peasants of the decorum of a foreigner and woman speaking to an assembly of male 
citizens. Pyrocles turns apparent weakness, his status as a woman and a stranger, into a 
strength, stymieing any objections to his presence by telling the assemblage that "the 
strangeness of your action makes that used for virtue which your violent necessity 
imposeth" (285). In order to show the appropriateness of a woman addressing a group of 
men, Pyrocles packs three closely related figures into two dense sentences, all anchored 
by his use of the word "strange": polyptoton, the repetition of a word in a different form; 
antanaclasis, multiple uses of a word in at least two of its senses; and conduplicatio, the 
repetition of a single word or words throughout a paragraph. Taken together, the figures 
change "strangeness" from a property inherent within Pyrocles to a quality located within 
his audience. "Strangeness" becomes associated with femininity, unnaturalness, and the 
inability to govern oneself, attributes Pyrocles locates in the rebelling subjects as well as 
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in his (her) own person, establishing an affinity between his gendered (female) body and 
the rebels' actions. Masculinity, in turn, becomes linked to self-government, itself 
connected to obedience as the prince tells his auditors that "a woman may well speak to 
such men who have forgotten all manlike government; a stranger may with reason 
instruct such subjects that neglect due points of subjection" (285). An Amazon can, in 
short, speak to the rebels as equals without violating decorum because they have 
effeminized themselves through their rebellion against Basilius. 
 Not all of Pyrocles' argumentation explicitly depends upon his status as a woman, 
but his assumed gender always underscores the effect of his logic. For instance, the 
prince offers his listeners the familiar commonplace of the family unit's dependence upon 
obedience to the monarch:  
Do you think them fools that saw you should enjoy your vines, your cattle, no, not 
your wives and children without government? And that there could be no 
government without a magistrate and no obedience where every one upon his own 
private passion may interpret the doings of the rulers? (286) 
 
Recognizable as a third order enthymeme, Pyrocles' proof gives his listeners the first 
premise: no government without magistrate; and the second premise: no magistrate 
without obedience; but he leaves his listeners to add the logical conclusion: without 
obedience, no government. The use of anadiplosis and incrementum makes his logic 
seem inevitable; magistrate seems to naturally derive from government and obedience 
naturally from magistrate, but much of this proof's strength also comes from Zelmane's 
ethos itself. "She" seems to have authority to speak of the value of hierarchy because 
"she" appears to have nothing to gain from its maintenance. As a woman and foreigner, 
Zelmane possesses lower status than the people she persuades. Her own proofs group her 
with cattle and vineyards, material possessions dependent upon government for their 
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availability to the all-male peasants. Pyrocles adopts female disguise without discarding 
his privilege as an aristocratic male, ventriloquizing a female speaker endorsing her own 
subjugation. At this juncture, given the reader's privileged access to knowledge of 
Pyrocles' duplicity, Sidney's representation of rhetoric and painting encourages a form of 
accommodation which very much resembles an ideology critique of Zelmane's speech. 
 Although the text only indirectly alludes to princes' activity through the painter's 
proposed subject, the connection between art and oratory itself would have been obvious 
to a sixteenth-century reader. Rhetorical theorists throughout the period frequently 
compared the beauty of a well-formed and proportionate oration to both the body of a 
person and the body of the community held together through language. Philip 
Melanchthon, for example, makes the analogy in his famous defense of rhetoric. 
Referring to the role played by ornamentation, he explains that an orator is eloquent when 
his speech is harmonious, "just as in fashioning bodies one finally obtains elegance when 
all members harmonize with one another in just proportion."68 Melanchthon relates the 
construction of orations to creating visual artworks, specifically the imitation of the 
human body by painters. William Scott uses the same analogy to describe poetry, noting 
that the "proper duty of the poet is ... to frame a well-proportioned body," with beauty in 
verse arising from "an apt and graceful featuring and disposition of the parts and 
members between themselves to the composing of the whole."69 The word "members," in 
both Melanchthon's and Scott's phrasings, simultaneously refers to body parts and to the 
elements of persuasion, suggesting the analogy between auditors, participants in a 
community constructed through language, and limbs fashioned onto the body politic by 
the chisel of an orator's or poet's words. Unfortunately for Sidney's artist, his maiming 
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reverses the trajectory of Melanchthon's comparison. While passively observing the 
battle, his hands are stricken off when Dorus mistakes him for a rebel: "[T] he painter 
returned well-skilled in wounds, but with never a hand to perform his skill" (282). 
Sidney's trope on "skilled" changes the word's usual definition of "competence" to its 
secondary meaning of "knowledge," mocking the artist by assigning him the very quality 
he sought at the skirmish. He now both knows what a wound looks like and has 
knowledge of how it feels to receive one, but cannot convert one kind of "skill" into the 
other. 
 Sidney's play on words originates in the artist's original purpose in witnessing the 
uprising. Recall that the painter, "needing a model" to base his work on, "had been very 
desirous to see some notable wounds, to be able to more lively express them" (282). In 
light of the emphasis in the Defence of Poesy on the importance of imitating ideas and 
fore-conceits instead of the perceptible world, the desire to copy something already 
existing is a damning attribute. In choosing historical reality as his model, the painter 
sacrifices art's utilitarian purpose of leading men and women to virtue in favor of a vulgar 
form of naive realism. "To express" is a synonym for bleeding out, of course, which the 
painter does upon being attacked by Dorus; but the term also hints at conveying meaning 
through words and gestures while suggesting graphic representation. Like 
"counterfeiting," then, the connotations of "express" and "model" extend both to poetics 
and to rhetoric, connotations that link the different kinds of communication to the human 
body portrayed through art. But the analogy goes further than these connotations suggest. 
 Melanchthon links the integrated body of the state and the physical body 
portrayed by painting. Arguing against opponents of rhetoric who claim that a true 
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method for communication does not exist, he asks, "Can a painter correctly imitate a 
body if he has no system for manipulating his pencil, his hand is moved by chance, and 
his lines are drawn without art?"70 Melanchthon's description once more ironically 
shadows the fate of Sidney's artisan painter who, "well-skilled," has the knowledge 
needed to imitate, but without his hands is literally incapable of manipulating his pencil 
or drawing out his lines. The theologian isn't just affirming that painting and oratory are 
similar because both arts require method to be "skillful," however. For Melanchthon, 
painting and oratory are both mimetic and, like painting, oratory is a kind of visual 
performance. The orator influences an audience by creating a picture either of how things 
are (epideictic), should be (deliberative), or were (forensic), and all of these categories 
are similarly available to painters. But Melanchthon also follows Cicero and Aristotle in 
asserting that truly eloquent speaking hides its status as oratory. When rhetoric calls 
attention to itself, it doesn't function as mimesis; it instead becomes "disproportionate" 
and "completely monstrous and absurd."71 Oratory, according to Melanchthon, should 
teach while hiding the fact it is doing so behind the auditors' natural delight in language. 
As in Sidney's view of poetry, Melanchthon's understanding of eloquence is traceable to 
the same canard adapted in the Defence, the idea that a good orator should "instruct, 
delight, and move the minds of his audience."72 Neither Pyrocles nor the painter, 
unfortunately, pay any heed to this ancient commonplace. 
 The art of Pyrocles and the painter instead resembles another famous description 
of rhetoric that links oratory to painting in Plato's Phaedrus and Sophist. In the former, 
Plato's Socrates, reflecting on a written speech by the sophist Lysias, claims that both 
painting and writing are imitative arts. More still, Socrates tells Phaedrus that painting 
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and writing are analogous because "they stand before us as though they were really alive, 
but if you question them they maintain a most majestic silence."73 Writing and painting 
have a kind of superficial permanence, "but if you ask them anything ... from a desire to 
be instructed, they go on telling you the same thing for ever."74 In short, they fail to 
instruct because of their passivity, their lack of adaptability, and their divorce from the 
reality they so poorly copy. Written orations and painting seem to impart information, but 
their status as imitatio prevents the dissemination of true knowledge, associated by Plato 
and his followers with dialectic. In the Sophist, the Stranger goes even further, stating 
that rhetoricians are actually controversialists, not truth tellers, and for them, debating is a 
kind of making. To the Stranger, rhetoric is the art of constructing spoken images of all 
things, and this imitation has two forms: likeness-making and apparition-making, the 
making of true and of distorted images—the latter, of course, being synonymous with 
illusions. The aural equivalent of a painter, rhetoricians "cheat the ear, exhibiting images 
of all things in a shadow play of discourse, so as to make ... [audiences] believe that they 
are hearing the truth."75 
 Against this conception of rhetoric as a kind of false counterfeiting, defenders of 
eloquence such as Cicero and Melanchthon could always point to their art's utility, its 
ability to civilize and inculcate morality in listeners who lack either the capacity or 
leisure to engage in dialectic or philosophic discourse. Yet both Pyrocles and the painter 
sever their image-making from this social function. Like Pyrocles before his captivated 
audience, the painter's morally ambiguous art dissembles. In Plato's terms, it provides the 
appearance of truth without teaching. In a different vocabulary, one used by William 
Scott to contrast visual art with poetry, the painter's art imitates "the dead and tongueless 
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shapes set out in colours only."76 Sidney's narrative highlights an amoral disconnect 
between naive imitation and morality by repeatedly emphasizing the painter's passivity. 
When Dorus kills a miller, for instance, "the blow astonished quite" the "poor painter 
who had stood by with a pike in his hands" (282). Dorus' final victim does not even 
intentionally join the mad rush to attack Basilius; instead he "is carried by the stream of 
this company" (282). The painter's inactivity, his inertness in the face of a chaotic 
situation, partially illustrates (and for poetry, at least, ultimately exorcizes) the Platonic 
insistence on the disconnect between reality and mimesis—but his passivity also 
markedly contrasts with the participatory and accommodating poetics endorsed by 
Sidney. 
 
IV: Sidney and Rhetoric 
Sidney participated in a tradition of Scaligerian rhetorical poetics throughout his literary 
career. While at Oxford, he reportedly translated the first two books of Aristotle's 
Rhetoric from the Greek.77 More famously, the Defence argues on behalf of poetry by 
taking the form of a judicial oration, even as its digression slyly differentiates between 
poetry and rhetoric as competing modes of discourse. Likewise, The Lady of May clearly 
exists within a tradition of participatory oratorical debate. Nearly as obviously, Sidney 
fills the Arcadia with oratorical display. Yet throughout the romance's many depictions of 
eloquence, Sidney often portrays oratory (a subject not entirely identical with rhetoric) as 
either effective but morally dubious or as moral but inefficacious. Book One of the New 
Arcadia, for instance, contains a set piece which superficially resembles the peasants' 
revolt: the Helots' uprising against the tyrannous Lacedaemon king. The two uprisings 
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contain obvious formal and schematic similarities. Like the peasants' revolt, the Helots' 
rebellion is a popular insurrection that Sidney's princely protagonists become involved 
with. In each case, a disguised Pyrocles temporarily resolves the conflict using oratory: 
an oration before the peasants ends their uprising; a series of speeches puts a stop to the 
battle between the slaves and their Spartan oppressors. In spite of the Arcadia's portrayal 
of the Helots' revolt as more legitimate than the peasants' uprising, Pyrocles' eloquence 
again harms his audience. Although the Helots express reluctance to accept peace terms 
of dubious favorability, Pyrocles' "general orations" overcome this initial resistance (42). 
However, the later books of the New Arcadia reveal that as soon as the prince departs, the 
Lacedaemon ruler breaks the truce and the conflict resumes. Pyrocles' powerful but 
misleading eloquence undoes the good he accomplishes in leading the rebellion.78 
 Not every depiction of rhetoric in the Arcadia solely relates to lower-class 
rebellion. In a moment thematically related both to the Helots’ revolt and the peasants' 
uprising through its discussion of social hierarchy, Cecropia debates Pamela on the nature 
of order in the cosmos in Book Three. This episode contains two dazzling representations 
of oratory, but neither speaker convinces the other of her views, despite the 
remarkableness of Cecropia's description of an epicurean universe, and despite ultimately 
how moved the wicked queen is by Pamela's contrasting vision of an ordered and moral 
cosmos (354-64). Similarly, the Old Arcadia ends with the trial of Pyrocles and 
Musidorus for treason and murder, the figurative interrogation of rhetoric that runs 
throughout the romance transforming into a series of literal judicial orations—all of 
which prove ineffective or morally problematic as the princes, faced with the 
consequences of their actions, cannot convince even a sympathetic audience to acquit 
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them. This failure leads to a guilty verdict which the text portrays as legally correct but as 
lacking in mercy and out of accord with the principle of equity. Taken altogether, both 
the New and Old Arcadias contain set pieces which represent rhetorical exchanges 
between socially unequal interlocutors as problematic. The distinctiveness of the 
peasants' suppression rests on the pressure the episode places on the Horatian ideal of the 
inseparability of poetics and eloquence, on a distinction created by the Arcadia at this 
juncture between fiction-making and oratory. 
 
V: Conclusion—Poetry at a Crossroads 
The Arcadia's portrayal of the peasants' suppression isn't a straightforward apology for or 
condemnation of mimesis. Sidney's tableau acknowledges the traditional criticisms 
leveled at the literary arts, but it strategically contains this critique within its unfavorable 
portrayals of oratory and naively mimetic painting. This moment reveals how Sidney 
solves the problem of how poetry functions, what it does, and how it differs from other 
arts and eloquences. Later poets indirectly inherit Sidney's fascination with using 
depictions of visual artwork as models for how poetry relates to the world. Yet unlike 
much of the later art it prefigures, Sidney's poetics make an unambiguously social 
intervention: his image-making explicitly mediates gendered and classed relations. The 
Defence alerts us to how Sidnean exemplarity functions, but the fallout around the 
peasants' uprising shows us how this exemplarity relates to the human community. 
 Sidney's solution to the problem of distinguishing poetry from other forms of 
eloquence would not last—not entirely, anyway. As poetry began to more fully emerge 
from rhetoric, it lost characteristics inherited from classical oratory while maintaining, 
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reemphasizing, and eventually strengthening its supposed autonomy from the real world, 
an autonomy which culminates in the now familiar interiority of lyric poetry throughout 
the nineteenth century. Ironically, this section of the Arcadia, fixated on demonstrating 
the superiority of poetry to rhetoric, paradoxically also points toward the now-forgotten 
relation of the sister arts and toward what one form of eloquence derives from the other. 
The conclusion to the peasants' revolt highlights elements Sidney appropriates from a 
tradition he at once belonged to and yet critiqued, a tradition which captivated him which 
he nevertheless interrogated. Sidney's understanding of poetry as a better form of 
exemplification is not, despite this ambivalence, a mere midway point between receding 
and emerging conceptions of poetics. It is a product of and a response to the crises of the 
Reformation, the European wars of religion, and a rapidly changing and unstable 
economic landscape, a situation which made the possibility of a form of communication 
capable of mediating between diverse speakers and audiences highly desirable. While it 
is unsurprising that elements of Sidney's solution, his fantasy about poetry's mediating 
efficacy, dissipated once the set of crises he responded to subsided or were resolved, to 
be replaced with different responses to different needs, it may be more salutary to think 
of Sidney's poetics, not as a halfway point to an already determined destination, a figure 
which uncritically privileges present over past formations, but as a highly significant 
crossroads, which taken in one direction leads to the present locale and environs, but 
which at one time held the possibility of leading in a number of different directions  
entirely. 
 
VI: A Bridge: Rhetoric and Romance into the Future  
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Sidney never finished revising his romance, but the conclusion of the Old Arcadia sees 
the narrative’s heroes and heroines rescued by the resurrection of Basilius, a once-bad 
ruler seemingly changed by his burial and rebirth: an appropriate ending, a final triumph 
of the golden world over oratory, with the failure of rhetoric redeemed through a 
convention of romance, a topos of fiction preserving what the topoi of rhetoric would 
have lost. This redemption of language in the Arcadia is not an outlier. I have been 
arguing that Sidney portrays poetry as efficacious and ethical by contrasting his own 
romance with the oratory it depicts. I now add that the New Arcadia's many 
representations of persuasion point toward the treatment of oratory in the other works 
studied in this dissertation. 
 My focus on romance and oratory is not arbitrary. Although (at least in Sidney’s 
example) abstractly imitative of ideas or fore-conceits, romances make no claims toward 
realism, and as a genre, they de facto admit their own fictiveness, their status as fabulae, 
as works of poesy separate from the mundane world of the everyday. This is especially 
true of texts written after the witty and sophisticated subversions introduced into the 
genre by Ariosto and Boiardo a generation before Sidney composed the Arcadia. In 
Orlando furioso, especially, the mimesis of romance ceases to be conventionally 
imitative and becomes "redescriptive," as in Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the concept: 
a sequence of interpretive processes self-consciously situated in symbolic practices and 
discursive repertories such as stories, myths, and doxa.79 The justification offered by the 
authors studied in this dissertation, the argument that poetry addresses heterogenous 
audiences ethically and efficaciously, is an ideological fantasy, but the expression of this 
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fantasy within romance significantly differentiates this figuration from apparently 
comparable symbolic constructions.    
English romances following Ariosto—highly self-referential, often commenting 
on their own status as fiction—make use of the Tudor-Stuart imaginary like no other 
genre, but they usually do so interpretively, not passively, and this is nowhere more true 
than in second-order depictions of discourse, a category which includes representations of 
oratory. Unlike fiction, successful oratory does not call attention to its status as 
eloquence; the example of Gorgias and the sophists aside, theoreticians of persuasion 
from Aristotle to Cicero all recommend a style that imitates the way men and women 
naturally speak. The naked artificiality of romance, on the other hand, points to its own 
constructedness. Portrayals of oratory, embedded in such an auto-referential medium, de-
naturalize discourse, calling attention both to the artificiality of doxa and to its 
containment in ideological frames of reference. Yet romance shares traditional rhetoric's 
investment in the social and the political. Despite its association with escapism, the 
genre's many fantastic elements, improbable plotlines, unexpected revelations, sudden 
reversals, wonder-inducing conventions, emblematic figures, and exotic locations and 
characters, place many demands on readers. Across mediums, whether in prose, in 
poetry, or on the stage, Renaissance romance used the fantastic to defamiliarize subject 
matters, creating a distancing effect which invites audiences to analyze what they read or 
see, and to relate fictional events and scenarios back to contemporary political and social 
concerns. All of the works discussed in this dissertation have in common the fact that 
they use fantasy as a way to portray difficult issues, not to avoid the historicity of the 
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problems they reference. At the same time, these texts all look at the world askew—they 
approach issues by reframing their immediate vantage point, by changing angles.    
Defamiliarization depends upon recontextualization: either making something 
initially strange into something familiar, or, as in Shklovsky's original use of the term, 
presenting something familiar in a way that causes the viewer to see it anew. While 
Renaissance poetics did not have a term equivalent to "defamilarization," it did possess 
the vocabulary of rhetorical decorum and interpretive accommodation, a set of 
hermeneutical strategies which frequently come very near this model of reading.80  The 
moments I am interested in wrest accommodation from its original home in oratory, 
offering poetic fictions as the type of language most capable of adapting itself to, and in 
turn, drawing forth complex and ambivalent responses from, audiences.81  
The subject of my next chapter, the conflict between Artegall and the Egalitarian 
Giant from Book Five of The Faerie Queene, resembles Pyrocles' confrontation with the 
rebelling peasants from the Arcadia in a number of respects. Both episodes portray a 
privileged speaker duplicitously lecturing lower-class rebels on the importance of 
hierarchy, and both narratives closely relate persuasive speech to violence. Spenser's 
verse differs from Sidney's prose, however, in the fact that Spenser is much more overtly 
concerned with interpretation than his precursor. Spenser not only dramatizes the 
consequences of speech between interlocutors of different social statuses, he shows the 
disastrous costs that accrue when orators and auditors fail to accommodate one another.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
CHAPTER 2 
 
“THE BETTER OF THE ARGUMENT”: ACCOMODATION, VIOLENCE,  
AND AUTHORITY IN BOOK FIVE OF THE FAERIE QUEENE 
 
Early in the Second Canto of Book Five of The Faerie Queene, Artegall, the Knight of 
Justice, encounters “a mighty gyant” standing upon a rock, holding a “huge great paire of 
ballance in his hand” (30.1-3).82 Attracting a crowd by proposing an ambitious program 
of cosmological, geographical, and ultimately social, political, and economic reform, the 
Titan boasts that he will use his balance, a symbol of equity parodying and paralleling 
Artegall’s own patron, Astraea, to level all distinctions, or as the narrator memorably 
phrases it, to “reduce vnto equality” (V.ii.32.9). Artegall responds to the Giant’s 
provocative claims with a defense of order and hierarchy couched in biblical cadences 
and allusions, all delivered in the form of a ten-stanza long, classical oration. Despite the 
impressive oratorical display, this speech fails to have the effect intended by Artegall; the 
Giant responds to the oration but interprets it too literally. Prompted to weigh the 
unquantifiable elements encompassing ordered creation, he attempts to measure 
Artegall’s words, to weigh “the right or wrong,” using his balance to determine what “is 
false or else the true” (V.ii.44.6-7). Artegall continues, offering proofs showing the folly 
of titanic radicalism, culminating in an invitation to weigh singular truth against 
wrongness, the heft of verity against negation. The Giant again starts to reject these 
exempla, but before he can do so, Artegall’s traveling companion, Talus, takes the 
initiative: “He shouldered him from off the higher ground/ And down the rock him 
throwing, in the sea him drowned” (V.ii.49.8-9). 
What can be made of this? The most obvious response is to see the Giant as 
modeling a bad reader, his inability to comprehend the figurative dimensions of 
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Artegall’s rhetoric being analogous to an unfit exegete of The Faerie Queene itself. An 
old historicist reading, of course, might place the threat posed by the Giant within early 
modern challenges to the social order. Two-thirds of England’s population, after all, lived 
in poverty at the time of the poem’s composition, and the possibility of mass starvation 
ensured that lower-class rebellion menaced the imagination of elites throughout the late 
sixteenth century.83 Only a year before Spenser published the second edition and second 
half of The Faerie Queen, food riots swept through London, South-East, and West, and 
continued to occur in East Anglia, West Country, and Kent throughout the next year and 
a half. The so-called “Oxfordshire Rising” of 1596, for example, took place when a small 
group of impoverished artisans tried to seize weapons and march on London in a much 
publicized but completely inefficacious attempt to foment rebellion.  
Stephen Greenblatt notes that the Giant’s eloquence resembles the narrator’s in 
Book Five’s proem but also claims that Talus’ murder of the Giant “exorcizes the 
potentially dangerous social consequences — the praxis — that might follow from 
Spenser’s own eloquent social criticism.”84  A more rhetorically conscious critic, Michael 
Dixon, also picks up on the similarity between Artegall’s and the Giant’s topoi, 
identifying the Giant’s eloquence as a refutatio for Spenser’s inventio. Using Spenser’s 
own enthymemes, the Giant’s eloquence simulates the objections of Spenser’s opponents 
which are in turn countered by Artegall who retakes his proofs, forcing “the Giant to 
prove with his own instrument, that right and wrong cannot be weighed in balance: no 
quantity of wrong on one scale...will balance right on the other.”85 However convincing 
these readings are on their own terms, neither fully takes into account the nuances of the 
text, its complications, its messiness, its level of self-awareness. There are several 
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questions which these approaches, one historical, the other essentially formalist, fail to 
answer. Why, for instance, if Spenser wants the Giant’s sudden death to foreclose the 
threat presented by his eloquence, is the Titan killed while disputing peacefully instead of 
engaging in a less symbolic mode of violence?86 If Spenser wanted to present Artegall 
unambiguously, to merely affirm his status as the embodiment of justice, he could have 
easily invented a different scenario and used clearer arguments, less ambiguous proofs, to 
affect his readers.87  
Spenser, after all, had a variety of alogical and artificial proofs available for use in 
his project of fashioning a gentleman.88 Proof through ethos, which I have been arguing 
is disrupted here, occurs by impressing readers with the performance or character of a 
virtue’s advocate. Persuasion though pathos, a tactic dependent upon gaining the reader’s 
consent by evoking emotion, also becomes problematized by this sudden violence. The 
third proof, logos, although usually thought of as deductive reasoning, includes 
demonstrative proofs, including exempla intended to support enthymematic assertions. 
Spenser persuades through logos insofar as he derives examples from history, scripture, 
and most obviously, fabulae — positive or negative models taken from fictional 
narratives. It seems intuitive to claim that Spenser’s argument serves as his plot with its 
narrative sequence acting as this argument’s dispositio. While this scheme coherently 
explains how persuasion works in The Faerie Queene, it fails to account for the elements 
presented here — ironically given this episode’s explicit concern with persuasion. Yet the 
poem never unambiguously establishes the rhetorical affect of the competing speakers 
even as a matter of plot. While Dixon may be correct that Artegall gets the better of the 
Giant in their debate, on the literal level of The Faerie Queene’s narrative, Artegall 
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confounds his enemy, but his proofs fail to convince a single auditor. The narrative defers 
the hostile reaction of the debate’s audience, the response of the men and women who 
have gathered to hear the disputation, until after the Giant’s murder.   
This moment, I argue, places pressure on the moral and instrumental efficacy of 
communication and persuasion. The Faerie Queene’s depiction of the conflict between 
Artegall and the Giant, this chapter shows, invites readers to contrast the Knight’s 
argument with the accommodating and nuanced moral instruction offered by Spenser’s 
poem, an instruction that, unlike Artegall’s inefficacious and troubling oratory, exposes 
the conceptual and practical limitations of partial portrayals of justice, placing into relief 
the nostos of poetry against the domination of rhetoric.89 Spenserian accommodation, the 
readerly counterpart to the principle of decorum — the concept whereby an orator or 
writer adapts genres, strategies, and styles for particular audiences and circumstances — 
encourages readers to “bring home” Book Five’s discussion of justice, to adapt their own 
interpretation to make the text coherent and conceptually legible.90 Yet Book Five never 
becomes a wholly open work.91 One of the points I make in this chapter is that The 
Faerie Queene leads its readers to a particular conclusion: while the poem represents the 
Giant as arguing for a dubious political program, it also portrays his claims about change 
and the decline of terrestrial justice as more accurate than Artegall’s description of a 
hierarchical cosmos in a state of stasis — a set of affairs thoroughly contradicted both 
throughout the poem and in Spenser’s unprinted but widely circulated dialogue, A View 
of the State of Ireland.  
Because this set of claims touches on reader response to The Faerie Queene, the 
first section of this chapter examines the Spenserian archive, illustrating that Book Five’s 
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Giant has traditionally been read in a variety of ways as different readers have 
pragmatically used Spenser’s poem for their own purposes. Although interpretations of 
the Giant and Knight’s conflict differ, sometimes radically, readers throughout the 
seventeenth century and beyond understood Spenser’s poem through the twin practices of 
interpretive accommodation and poetic exemplarity. The second section of this chapter 
offers a close reading of the Second Canto of Book Five of The Faerie Queene, 
illustrating how this episode formally evokes this variety of responses while detailing 
what the poem models about communication and persuasion. Finally, this chapter 
concludes by suggesting that Spenser’s support for colonialism in Ireland often takes the 
form of a critique of class relations, that The Faerie Queene’s depiction of Artegall’s 
interaction and conflict with the Giant supports New English settlement in Ireland by 
attacking Irish, Old English, and even elements of domestic English social practice. 
Although a poor reader generally, the Giant correctly describes the influence of terrestrial 
mutability on institutions of justice. In the end, Spenser justifies the Tudor conquest of 
Ireland, but he renders this support equivocally.  
Admittedly, this last part of my argument seems counterintuitive. Even recent 
discussions of Book Five tend to resemble Ciaran Brady’s now thirty-five year-old claim 
that The Faerie Queene’s narrative simply acts as a vindication for the program 
expressed by Irenaeus in A View of the State of Ireland. Spenser, in this outlook, “not 
only defended the violent conduct of his former patron Lord Grey, but attempted, through 
the adventures of Artegall, and his iron-clad steward Talus, to provide the moral 
justification for the relentless use of force and terror.”92 There have, of course, been 
voices of dissent.93 Nevertheless, these perspectives on the poem, however persuasively 
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expressed by Annabel Patterson, Judith H. Anderson, and, most recently, Andrew 
Hadfield, remain relatively marginalized, usually offered as an “against-the-grain” 
interpretation available to modern readers, but not a viewpoint actually accessible from 
within the hodiernal circle of the author himself. As Hadfield laments, “Spenser is still 
often thought of as a slavishly sycophantic poet, read in terms of ancient critical 
orthodoxies, a representative of the old Renaissance of Arthur Lovejoy, where each knew 
his or her place in a rigidly stratified hierarchy: it is a model of belief that no other writer 
is assumed to share any more.”94 Yet even Hadfield, one of the most persuasive readers 
of this episode elsewhere, in his recent and comprehensive biography of Spenser, 
straightforwardly equates Artegall with Lord Grey, engaging in a surprising fit of 
literalism in assuming a simple identification between a historical and allegorical 
figure.95 The ambiguity of the Knight’s conflict with the Giant, however, resists attempts 
to pigeonhole its representation of Artegall as an endorsement of Spenser’s patron, even 
if it is clear that there are a number of moments in Book Five which shadow both Lord 
Grey’s bloody campaign during the Second Desmond Rebellion and this conflict’s 
troubled reception in the English court. The Knight of Justice simply has more semiotic 
ambiguity than equating him with Lord Grey acknowledges.96  
Examining how Spenser manipulates interpretive accommodation avoids 
literalism while still accounting for the political resonances postcolonial critics and new 
historicists have located, hopefully in the process bridging formal and cultural approaches 
to reading The Faerie Queene.97 More still, locating the argument between Giant and 
Knight within a tradition of interpretation which initially arose from analyzing and 
critiquing forensic oratory can show how Spenser creates authority for his description of 
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the Irish crisis elsewhere in the poem.98 After all, the encounter between Artegall and the 
Giant raises the question of who legitimately possesses the authority to forensically 
determine the just and equitable. This section of the poem resembles a trial, positioning 
readers to act as a kind of judge both for Artegall and the Titan.99 This positioning, 
however, frames the eloquence of The Faerie Queene as superior, more capable of 
representing political and religious problems for its audience’s discernment than the 
forms of eloquence it enacts and critiques. In performing the role of the seemingly 
benevolent, apparently neutral observer of a morally complex argument and conflict, The 
Faerie Queene establishes an ethos as a reliable source for explaining and accounting for 
the sections of the poem explicitly concerned with the colonial project. This part of Book 
Five, then, has an ideological and rhetorical function very similar to the display of justice 
in “the real world.” Just as the appearance of an apparently impartial trial grants 
legitimacy to the state, the appearance of a sophisticated and complexly rendered 
representation of problematic justice lends authority to Spenser’s poem. In this case, a 
critique of one kind of discourse, institutional-supporting oratory, legitimizes another 
form of discourse, the poem’s representation and description of the situation in Ireland 
along with the greater geopolitical conflict between Catholic Spain and Protestant 
England in which Spenser situates his colonial intervention.  
Although the dialogue remains a key source, one that I refer to throughout this 
chapter, I want to avoid repeating interpretations that see Book Five of The Faerie 
Queene as an extension of A View of the State of Ireland. At the same time, I am also 
dissatisfied with explanations that fall back on the canard of meaning in the poem always 
culminating in an aporia, a capitulation which fails to account for the complicated affects 
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the poem generates in readers. What I think is needed is an approach that mediates 
between ideological critique and a rhetorical reading which attempts to gauge and 
explicate the response this episode generates in its audience.100 As such, this chapter is 
not a direct analysis of Spenser’s representation of class relations, but rather an 
examination of how he constructs the poetic sphere — a location posited as valuable 
because it acts as a site of fruitful and non-coercive persuasion between speakers and 
audiences of different social statuses.101 Canto Two of Book Five of The Faerie Queene 
portrays justice as a concept that is socially constructed, functioning to legitimize forces 
that are already socially hegemonic. The question becomes whether this is a liberatory 
gesture or a move toward naturalizing a system in which power creates truth. 
  
I: Accommodating Readers and the Spenserian Archive  
Both because of its complex history and ubiquity throughout the Renaissance, 
accommodation is easer to demonstrate than define. As a consequence, aside from better 
illustrating what I mean when I refer to the hermeneutical practice, examining the records 
left by The Faerie Queene’s earliest readers serves as the simplest way to show how 
Spenserian poetics relies on adaption. Many of the examples in this section go far afield, 
but I highlight them to call attention to two forms of readerly practice relevant in 
Artegall’s conflict with the Giant: interpretation as extending meaning to increase a text’s 
utility via interactions with examples; and the adaption of making something initially 
strange into something familiar and useful. Even a quick and partial glimpse at Spenser’s 
reception history reveals how variously The Faerie Queene has been interpreted and used 
by different parties with diverse purposes and agendas; stated differently, Spenser’s 
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romance drags a long trail of accommodating interpretations. Significantly, this seeming 
pliability depends on the relationship between readers and narrative example. The nearly 
ubiquitous identification of textual exempla throughout the Renaissance was not seen as 
indistinguishable from accommodation, but the two habits were, at least in practice, 
inseparable; early modern readers figured each mode as a form of readerly participation, 
an interaction which made a text useful without committing violence against the spirit 
intended by its author.  
 For an example, I need only turn to one of the most famous portions of the 
Spenserian archive, a 1617 edition of the poet’s works owned by Carew Ralegh, Sir 
Walter’s son, featuring extensive marginalia attributed to Elizabeth Throckmorton 
Ralegh, Sir Walter’s widow and Carew’s mother.102 Unlike the other readers mentioned 
in this section, Elizabeth did not annotate the debate between Artegall and the Giant, but I 
begin with her here as an illustration of the practice of following examples throughout a 
fictional narrative. Elizabeth scrawled the names of family and acquaintances throughout 
the book’s margins next to Spenser’s characters, making personal associations between 
her life and The Faerie Queene’s narrative, seemingly connecting her late husband and 
herself to figures from the long-deceased poet’s writing.103 The very specificity of these 
notes, and their frequent disconnect from historical actuality, have troubled literary 
historians.104  Certainly many of her “identifications” are more plausible than others. 
Elizabeth links Timeas to her late husband; Serena with herself; but she also claims to be 
Colin’s mistress in Colin Clouts come home againe, a character which, as Andrew 
Hadfield points out, the poem “later reveals is Rosalind, a figure of Spenser’s wife.”105  
In Book Six of The Faerie Queene, Elizabeth sensibly identifies Colin Clout with the 
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poet, but also links Calidore with Sir Walter.106 With some justification, Andrew Zurcher 
notes that Elizabeth “made a number of annotations, the most interesting of which are 
interesting because they are so uninteresting.”107 As the issue is usually seen, the 
significance of this copy of the 1617 folio lies in the fact that it reminds us of how 
invested Spenser’s contemporaries were in sussing out the topical allusions behind the 
poet’s allegory. It seems that discovering who shadowed what was so tempting that 
readers evidently reached dubious and implausible conclusions, interpretations totally 
unsustainable when pressed by any halfway careful interrogation. 
 I want to stress two qualifications about this marginalia, however, that are 
frequently overlooked in the critical conversation about this famous case study. Firstly, 
relating fabulae to one’s personal life was a common reading practice throughout the 
period. Readers were expected to extrapolate moral precepts from fictional stories, and 
these precepts were intended to be applied to specific situations, just as an orator invited 
audiences to compare fabulae to events from court cases.108 Authors, critics, publishers, 
anyone involved with books at all, commonly assumed that readers would adapt lessons 
from fables and allegories for moral and personal uses within their daily lives. In the 
Renaissance, men and women read stories for practical and ethical purposes as well as for 
entertainment.  
 Secondly, Elizabeth Throckmorton Ralegh’s identifications are potentially more 
sophisticated than are generally presumed. Her ascriptions are, I want to suggest, not 
necessarily literal confusions between historical and fictional characters. Consider, for 
example, the note recognizing Calidore as Sir Walter Ralegh. In this particular instance, 
Oakshott defends the note’s historical veracity, observing that “a plausible case can be 
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made for the identification: particularly in light of Ralegh’s withdrawal from court.”109 
Against this, it can be objected that there are also a great many aspects of Calidore’s 
emplotment that do not align with Walter Ralegh’s life in any fashion whatsoever, and 
contra some modern critics, Elizabeth was almost certainly not so disconnected from her 
husband’s affairs (and from reality) to assume that Book Six of The Faerie Queene was 
about her late husband, although she plainly understood that parts of the poem concerned 
or alluded to him. In fact, the marking in Carew Ralegh’s text merely places the initials 
“Sr.W.R.” next to the name “Calidore.”110 This scrawling in no way signifies how the 
two figures are related or whether the connection is one Elizabeth is inferring from the 
book’s content or one she is making for her own potentially idiosyncratic purposes. 
Likewise, simply because Elizabeth Ralegh made identifications between herself and 
virtuous female personages from Spenser’s work does not necessarily imply she 
mistakenly believed she was the model for these characters. The annotations in pencil, 
particularly the traditional pointing-hand marks (manicules) ascribed by Oakshott to 
Elizabeth found next to passages concerned with Belphoebe and Florimell, show that she 
followed these characters throughout The Faerie Queene’s complex and winding 
narrative — not that she mistook them as ciphers for her own person. Rather than 
assuming the characters were modeled after her, she may have thought they were useful 
models for her.111  Far from displaying Elizabeth Ralegh’s ignorance, her annotations 
demonstrate one way in which The Faerie Queene’s author intended his epic to be read.   
 That Spenser understood his poetry would be viewed in this fashion is implied 
both in his “Letter to Ralegh” and in A View of the State of Ireland. Discussing the role of 
bards in Irish culture, Eudoxus notes that poets have a “speciall reputation, and that (me 
63 
thinkes) not without great cause; for...they have always used to set foorth the praises of 
the good and vertuous, and to beate down and disgrace the bad and the vitious” in order 
to stir listeners “up to affect the like commendations.” For his part, Irenaeus agrees, 
praising authors who “labour to better the manners of men, and thorough the sweete baite 
of their numbers...steale into...young spirits a desire of honour and vertue,” but he objects 
that the bards accomplish the opposite of this Horatian principle because they present the 
wicked, not the good, as models to be emulated.112 Although it is impossible to fully 
ascertain in this instance, it would not at all be surprising if a female reader was 
interested in locating female exempla. Elizabeth Throckmorton Ralegh almost certainly 
was not deriving her reading habits from Isocrates or Cicero, from ancient manuals on the 
interpretation of forensic oratory, from early-modern paraphrases of Saint Augustine’s 
biblical hermeneutics, from Erasmus’ many discussions of the subject, or from whatever 
learned and famous source I could name here, but she was reading Spenser in a tradition 
that very much descended from these milieus. Like most educated readers during the 
Renaissance, she read rhetorically, which is to say she adapted The Faerie Queene for her 
own purposes. In this sense, at least, she was indeed a typical reader for her time and 
place.  
 My next example, although it directly concerns Artegall’s conflict with the Giant, 
is not quite as exemplary as the Raleigh marginalia. At the very least, I would argue that 
Elizabeth Throckmorton’s use of Spenser did less violence to The Faerie Queene than a 
simple excerption made by an anonymous propagandist who republished Artegall’s 
confrontation with the Egalitarian Giant in a 1648 pamphlet entitled The Faerie 
Leveller.113 Printed at the height of the Second English Civil War, the pamphlet’s 
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Royalist editor appropriates Spenser’s work, casting the Elizabethan poet as a prophet 
predicting Charles I’s forthcoming and inevitable defeat of the tyrannical and Titan-like 
Oliver Cromwell.  A “key” to Spenser’s epic prints the names of Book Five’s characters 
in italics. Next to Spenser’s characters, printed in contrasting roman type, lies their Civil 
War-Era analogue. This key flattens Spenser’s text, avoiding ambiguity by outright 
informing readers that “Arthegall Prince of Justice” is “King Charles”; “Talus his 
Executioner with his Yron flave. The Kings forces”; “The Gyant Leveller. Col. Oliver 
Cromwell.”114  
 This dubious appropriation accomplishes a number of effects, some readily 
apparent, others that get to the heart of how literary exegesis is influenced by historical 
contingency. One obvious benefit of linking The Faerie Queene with Royalist victory is 
that it allows the editor to assume Spenser’s laurels as a great poet for Charles I’s cause. 
The King’s defeat of Cromwell is “graphically described by the Prince of English Poets 
Edmund Spenser, whose verses then prophetical are now become historicall in our 
dayes.”115 Drawn by the sympathy of one paragon for another, the prince of poetry comes 
to the defense of an actual prince. Apart from its conscription of Spenser, the text makes 
a relatively precise threefold argument. First of all, The Faerie Leveller raises Royalist 
spirits by framing Spenser’s poem as prognosticating the King’s victory over the 
rebelling Roundheads. Secondly, the editor subsumes Artegall’s dazzling though 
problematic defense of hierarchy for the Royalist cause. And finally and most 
importantly, this pamphlet not only connects Cromwell to Spenser’s communist Giant, it 
actually links the King’s enemy to the historically existing Levellers, the famous political 
movement that endorsed popular sovereignty, suffrage, and equality before the law.116 
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Cromwell, of course, opposed the Levellers, famously executing mutineers connected to 
the movement in May 1649, as well as imprisoning several Leveller leaders in the Tower 
of London (admittedly, these acts of suppression largely took place after The Faerie 
Leveller’s publication). Nevertheless, this pamphlet gamely attempts to implicate 
Cromwell by tying him to radical factions within the New Model Army, regardless of the 
military leader’s actual attitude to popular democracy. Both this publication’s reading of 
Spenser and its insinuations about Cromwell stretch credulity; facing a string of defeats 
throughout 1648, it is doubtful The Faerie Leveller served as a particularly effective 
boost for Royalist morale. The pamphlet is nevertheless worthy of note because it reflects 
seventeenth-century readers’ willingness to adapt Spenser for political purposes, even if 
its appropriation of The Faerie Queene violates the dictum against uncharitable 
distortion.   
 In any case, applying Spenser for political ends was not confined to Royalists; 
Parliamentarian propagandists also enlisted Book Five’s topoi for their cause. Oliver 
Cromwell himself admired Spenser so greatly he recommended returning the Kilcolman 
estate to the poet’s grandson, citing, in part, the author of The Faerie Queene’s “eminent 
deserts and services to the Commonwealth” as justifications for this recommendation.117 
The republican who engaged most thoroughly with Spenser’s topoi of justice and virtue, 
however, was John Milton. In his Areopagitica, the later poet directly invoked his 
sixteenth-century predecessor to defend the role played by the freedom of the press in 
shaping a reader’s virtue: 
 He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, 
 and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is 
 the true warfaring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, 
 unexercised, unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks 
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 out of the race where that immortal garland is to be run for, not without dust and 
 heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity much 
 rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is by what is contrary. That virtue 
 therefore which is but a youngling in the contemplation of evil and knows not the 
 utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not 
 a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental whiteness; which was the reason why 
 our sage and serious poet Spenser, whom I dare be known to think a better teacher 
 than Scotus or Aquinas, describing true temperance under the person of Guyon, 
 brings him in with his palmer through the cave of Mammon, and the bower of 
 earthly bliss that he might see and know, and yet abstain.118 
 
Milton does not directly refer to accommodation in describing how Spenser’s poetry arms 
“warfaring” Christians with the experience necessary to confront evil, but his vocabulary 
and metaphors strongly suggest that he is referring to this interpretative theory. Milton 
advocates for a reader who can “apprehend” and “consider” the differences between vices 
and virtues and also “distinguish” and “prefer” the better. He figures reading as a form of 
travel, as a competitive race, as a trial, and — through his description of Guyon’s 
adventure in the Bower of Bliss — as a kind of homecoming in which the reader begins 
in a state of “blank” virtue, an “excremental whiteness,” only to leave this ersatz 
innocence to confront temptation in order to return to a virtue newly strengthened by 
experience. Although she does not use the Greek term, Kathy Eden has shown that 
reading as nostos, the returning home from a long journey, was among the earliest 
metaphors in the tradition of interpretatio scripti, one that was thoroughly carried over 
into Christian humanism.119 
 Like the author of The Faerie Leveller, Milton’s discussion of Spenser is 
significant because it details how early modern readers saw adaption functioning in the 
relationship between literary texts and their audiences. More still, Milton’s commentary 
highlights the social dimensions of accommodation. According to Erasmus, to be an 
accommodating reader was to read something sympathetically, attempting to understand 
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a text’s spirit without distorting its meaning with evil intentions. But accommodation also 
had ethical valences in addition to being a theory of reading.120 Going far beyond stylistic 
formalism, the interpretation of rhetoric was thought to promote important values such as 
equity and prudence, an emphasis that increased as rhetorical theory came to inform first 
the interpretation of scripture and then became a guiding ethos for the interpretation of all 
forms of eloquence. Erasmus’ ideal is a form of irenic tolerance in which men and 
women adapt themselves — their words, their actions — to each other and their 
circumstances.121  Accommodation as an interpretive act, however, becomes an 
interdependent act of reading intended to “bring into one and the same household” and 
make a text “feel like one of the family,” what Robert Stillman summarizes as becoming 
“at home in the world of a fiction.”122 Readers, in this theory of interpretation, 
“reconstruct the conceptual design” of “a fictional landscape in order to profit.”123 They 
also adapt a text to suit their own needs. As an act of discovery, accommodation becomes 
the readerly counterpart to inventio. 
 Despite their political differences, Milton’s commentary can help contextualize 
The Faerie Leveller’s intervention. The pamphlet could never be accused of seriously 
attempting to reconstruct Spenser’s conceptual design, but it does adapt the text for its 
own purposes and profit. And while its claim about Spenser’s “prophetic” authorial intent 
is certainly suspect, the publication does ostensibly make an argument about how readers 
should interpret the poem’s meaning. Unlike Milton, the pamphlet’s editor is not self-
consciously locating his perspective in a humanist and Protestant milieu of scriptural 
interpretation, but his vocabulary, along with his emphasis on practical utility and profit, 
evidences how securely this use of Book Five exists within a tradition of reading 
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practices developed alongside a rhetorical hermeneutics. The pamphlet’s editor even 
directly entices by promising that Spenser’s allegory has been “culled out by it selfe, and 
set forth for present use,” an evocation of visual efficacy familiar from the ut pictura 
poesis tradition.124  
 Milton, too, makes “present use” of Spenser’s allegory. Reversing the stance 
taken by the editor of The Faerie Leveller, his Eikonoklastes adapts Book Five’s 
arguments against King Charles, casting the monarch as a tyrant rebelling against God’s 
law, akin, in a sense, to the Egalitarian Giant.125 Faced with the recently executed King’s 
crimes, Milton longs for an easy solution that punishes the monarch without implicating 
Parliament in his death; he desires “a man of iron, such as Talus, by our Poet 
Spencer...fain’d to be the page of Justice, who with his iron flaile could doe all this, and 
expeditiously, without those deceitful formes and circumstances of Law, worse then 
ceremonies in Religion.”126 Milton indirectly wishes Parliament had the distance Talus 
gives to Artegall in enforcing laws; he acknowledges the “deceitful formes and 
circumstances of Law” used in executing the King, but insists on their necessity because 
mediating figures like Talus simply do not exist outside of fiction: if they did, “I say God 
send it down, whether by one Talus or a thousand.”127 Milton’s implication, of course, is 
that the Giant’s execution is also an evil — but a necessary one, like the deceits and 
violence practiced by the Parliamentarians.128 Unlike The Faerie Leveller, Eikonoklastes 
borrows The Faerie Queene’s invention without obviously warping the poem’s design; as 
King points out, “his generalized application of the text resists the extreme topicality of 
the Royalist interpretation.”129 And as I will show in the next two parts of this chapter, 
Milton correctly identifies the need to ameliorate the pangs of necessary but “deceitful 
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formes and circumstances of Law,” as being of paramount concern throughout the 
confrontation between Artegall and the Giant. Milton is both a better rhetorician and a 
better expositor of rhetoric then the editor of The Faerie Leveller, but both Eikonoklastes 
and the Royalist pamphlet exist on the same spectrum of readerly engagement: the works 
of both propagandists illustrate that the inventio of Spenser’s Allegory of Justice, 
including Artegall’s debate and conflict with the Giant, were a site of contention for early 
readers.130  
 Unsurprisingly, the episode’s implications remained disputed well into the 
nineteenth century and beyond. In particular, the Giant was a favorite subject for several 
of the canonical poets associated with English romanticism.131 William Wordsworth, 
having rejected the ardent radicalism of his youth in favor of a wary conservatism, could 
adopt a paraphrase of Artegall’s warning to the Giant as a personal motto: “Perilous is 
sweeping change, all chance unsound.”132 Radicals, predictably, differed from 
Wordsworth in embracing the murdered Titan. In a copy of The Faerie Queene he was 
annotating for Fanny Brawne shortly before his death, John Keats composed an alternate 
ending for the defeated Giant. After the Titan is murdered by Talus, a sage, 
“Typographus,” refits the Giant’s shattered and broken body, “And made him read in 
many a learned book.” Emancipated and refined through the power of print, the newly 
empowered Giant again confronts Artegall and Talus: “The one he struck stone-blind, the 
other’s eyes wox dim.”133 Thomas Love Peacock reports that Percy Shelley went further 
than even Keats by claiming that “the Giant has the better of the argument; Artegall’s 
iron man knocks him over into the sea and drowns him. This is the usual way that power 
deals with opinion.” When Peacock protested to Shelley that this was not the lesson 
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Spenser meant to impart, the poet replied, “Perhaps not...it is the lesson which he conveys 
to me. I am of the Giant’s faction.”134 
 As Peacock’s objection illustrates, Wordsworth’s reading of the poem, the 
identification between Artegall’s argument with Spenser’s, had long since become the 
accepted interpretation of the episode. Shelley admits that while the text generated a 
particular response in him as a reader, this affect was independent of the design of The 
Faerie Queene itself. Shelley and Keats, in short, saw themselves as reading against the 
grain. However much they sympathized with Spenser’s Giant over his Knight, neither 
poet located this sympathy in the poem’s conception or in its author’s intention. Yet as 
The Faerie Leveller and Milton show, readers have both wrestled with and struggled to 
control the significance of this depiction of eloquence and violence practically from the 
second half of The Faerie Queene’s publication. Audiences freely adapted Spenser to 
make sense of his allegory and to make his poem personally and politically valuable. The 
text is, I think, constructed in order to be read in this way. Allegory, despite its modern 
reputation for narrow pedantry and straightforward messaging, invites this kind of 
interpretive supposition. In Greek, allegoria translates to “other speaking,” and the mode 
requires audiences to bridge the gap between what is expressed and what is intended.135 
Although he is writing about Philip Sidney, Robert Stillman’s observations about 
allegory in the Arcadia are applicable to The Faerie Queene: “allegory’s enstrangement 
of familiar words...is enabled by a complimentary enstrangement of familiar narrative 
patterns. The strangeness of allegory depends...on the narrative’s persistent violation of 
our familiar sense of time, place, and the casual connections that traditionally link one 
part of the story to another.”136 As a trope, this “other speaking” depends upon audiences 
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actively participating in making something out of all these discontinuities. 
 Artegall’s encounter with the Giant compounds this strangeness through its 
repeated violations of genre and readerly expectations. Not only does this section of Book 
Five not make literal sense, it fails spectacularly to resolve itself in a way that satisfies 
audience anticipations based upon the heroic conventions of romance as a form.137 This 
conceptual rupture attracts scrutiny, even suspicion; it calls for a much greater 
interpretive investment than most narratives. Attempting to make Spenser’s text cohere, 
to make its strangeness into something familiar, necessitates looking closely at the seams 
holding together both Artegall and the Giant’s eloquence. Shelley disassociated the affect 
created by this episode from Spenser’s intentions, but I will argue that the response 
generated in Spenser’s nineteenth-century successor (and many other readers besides) has 
as much to do with the poem’s own mode of persuasion as it does with any previously 
existing sympathy with “the Giant’s faction.” The literal-minded Giant is the very 
antithesis of the accommodating reader. He is a negative exemplum, one which 
demonstrates how to read The Faerie Queene by modeling how not to read the poem. 
Artegall himself directly points to the Giant’s inability to read accommodatingly when he 
warns, “of words, the which be spoken, / The eare must be the balance to decree / And 
iudge, whether with truth or falsehood they agree” (V.ii.47.7-9). Yet the Giant does have 
“the better of the argument,” at least in the sense that his account of cosmic disorder in an 
unjust world and an imperfect political settlement closely approximates the description of 
the state of justice described elsewhere in Book Five. Shelley’s point about power’s role 
in dealing with “opinion” is also apropos; this episode foregrounds the relationship 
between force and truth. While Spenser’s attitude toward policing discourse may differ 
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from Shelly’s, and even from Milton’s, the Elizabethan poet nevertheless highlights the 
connection between the topoi of justice and suppression, just as the later poets suggest. In 
foregrounding the connection between power and persuasion in this way, Spenser 
establishes his own ethos as a decorous poet, as a creator of a discourse capable of telling 
“hard truths” about language and justice without inflicting violence — the subject his 
poetry analyzes — on his audience. The next section of this chapter fleshes out how 
Spenser accomplishes this. 
 
II: Spenser’s Portrayal of Rhetoric  
As I suggested in my introduction to this chapter, far from bolstering Artegall’s status as 
an agent of justice, the Knight’s conflict with the Egalitarian Giant undermines both his 
authority and the authority of Book Five’s narrator, in the process removing the 
evaluative prerogative from something located in the oratorical contest’s audience and 
reinscribing this privileged space within the readership of the greater poem itself. By and 
large, The Faerie Queene achieves this affect by distancing its reader from its narrative 
voice, an estrangement reflected in the similarities between the Proem’s and the Giant’s 
arguments. The majority of Book Five’s commentators have noticed these similarities, 
but have explained the issue away by asserting that the episode is actually about the 
difficulty in distinguishing between Artegall’s “authentic” quest to restore justice and the 
Giant’s somehow less ontologically justified plans for social and cosmic reform.138 Yet, 
putting the motivation of each actor aside for the moment, Artegall’s vision of cosmic 
stasis, his assertion that justice on earth mirrors and flows from the unchanging, unerring 
“haeuenly justice” of the Ptolemaic universe, is plainly untrue. If it were true, there 
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would be no need for Artegall to restore Astraea’s reign in the first place. While The 
Faerie Queene’s interrogation of justice frequently draws upon a neo-platonic framework 
of virtues having ideal forms to compare their earthly embodiments with,139 the poem 
does not represent existing social relations accurately reflecting or carrying out these 
otherworldly models. Contrary to what the Knight argues before the Giant and his 
audience, The Faerie Queene depicts both justice and human relationships as socially 
produced, malleable, and subject to change. This gulf between Artegall’s claims and the 
poem’s portrayal is unlikely to be a continuity error on Spenser’s part, unlikely to be a 
neglectful lapse made in the service of achieving a particular affect or allegorical 
argument: the restoration of a fallen terrestrial justice, after all, is the raison d’etre of 
Artegall’s quest in Book Five.  
With the conceptualization of justice already out of balance, the initial problem 
presented by the Giant’s claims and the secondary problem created by his murder draw a 
response that acts as a dark warning to The Faerie Queene’s readers, an illustration of the 
dangers of argument between socially unequal interlocutors, a demonstration almost 
crudely underscored by the terrible fate of the Giant’s hapless audience. As I brought up 
in my introduction, this unfortune collection of auditors, perhaps surprisingly, remains 
silent throughout the whole affair, neither commenting on the Giant’s nor the Knight’s 
claims, only reacting after the Giant is murdered, at that moment collectively responding 
in defense of their executed champion only to be themselves routed in a disquieting bit of 
crowd control. Talus, again acting as a surrogate for Artegall, uses his flail to repel the 
multitude: “He like a swarme of flyes them ouerthrew” (5.ii.53.6). The narrator insists on 
the imminent danger the crowd poses, but this simile reduces the audience to insects, 
74 
undercutting their threat and reinforcing how strongly the power dynamic favors the 
Knight and his servant. In a surprising reversal, Talus assumes gigantic proportions while 
the titanic radicalism of the Giant’s outraged followers becomes diminutive, even 
threatened. The Giant is an unaccommodating reader, but Artegall is equally titanic: an 
indecorous speaker unwilling to adapt himself, a Giant swatting insects who prefers to 
use hard and soft force instead of genuine persuasion.   
Despite this reversal’s moral complexity, throughout both the debate and the 
battle that follows, the narrator rigidly insists on the rightness of Artegall’s action and the 
wickedness of his enemies, explicitly stating of the Giant that “it was not the right, which 
he did seek; / But rather stroue extremities to way, / Th’one to diminish, th’other for to 
eek” (V.ii.49.1-3). Yet, contra the narrator, the Giant seems authentically puzzled by 
Artegall’s claims. By weighing the Knight of Justice’s commitments on his balance, the 
reformer attempts to judge the ideals he opposes by the standards of his own titanic 
radicalism, but he is nevertheless sincerely evaluating them.140 More still, the Giant’s 
own claims rest on his belief that “Th’one to diminish, th’other for to eek” is precisely 
the “right” course of action: the giant, after all, is convinced that his project of social and 
cosmological reform is a just program. Rather than dismantling the logic behind the 
Giant’s radicalism, the narrator’s condemnation rests on a common tautology: the Giant’s 
claims are wrong because the Giant’s claims are wrong.141 Likewise, the narrator frames 
the reaction of the debate’s audience upon seeing the Giant’s “sudden desolation” as 
deriving from lawlessness and moral turpitude. But these attempts to frame and 
determine reader response are so clumsy that the distance between what is represented 
and how it is described again becomes ironic, as was earlier true in regards to the 
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situational and generic inappropriateness of the Giant’s murder. The narrator repeatedly 
undermines his own authority by revealing his complicity in framing events.142 While the 
narrator’s attempts to shape the perspective of The Faerie Queene’s readers do not 
necessarily create sympathy for the Giant and his audience, the contradictions raised by 
these attempts complicate the episode — and raise the uncomfortable possibility that the 
narrator’s audience, too, could fall victim to this blurring of persuasion and violence, that 
the routed audience’s relationship with the Knight could serve as an analogue for the 
relationship between The Faerie Queene’s speaker and its interpreters.  
These heavy-handed manipulations gesture toward paralleling and reinforcing the 
effects of Artegall’s oratory, but as the episode progresses, the text’s many exposed 
faultlines render the commentator’s eloquence ineffective. Like the oratory the poem 
portrays, these intrusions would be coercive if the distance between the speaker’s 
commentary and the action it describes did not allow readers to disassociate themselves 
from its perspective.143 In place of influencing readers, this simulacrum of narrative 
contributes to the episode’s foregrounding of the connections between bad-faith 
persuasion and violence, making it clear that an unwillingness to accommodate links the 
two auditors to the narrator. Seen from this vantage point, one plausible explanation for 
why both Artegall and his opponent are presented so ambiguously is because, like the 
narrator before the poem’s audience, neither speaker seriously attempts to persuade the 
other at all. Each speaker limits his proofs to arguments drawn from the same 
unconvincing sources: authority supported by the threat of violence. This whole episode 
is structured around a series of doublings and a blurring between, on one side, Artegall 
and a narrator that, according to Harry Berger, “provides readers with a virtual or fictive 
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depiction of discourse, one that the poem actively represents and subtly criticizes,”144 
and, on the other side, a Giant whose arguments The Faerie Queene encourages its 
readers to view suspiciously. Apart from these doublings, the most significant mechanism 
by which Spenser implicates Book Five’s protagonist are the reversals I have been 
tracing since this chapter’s introduction, reversals which see the Egalitarian Giant 
growing more and more diminutive while Artegall and Talus become more and more 
Giant-like. The Giant and Knight become mirrors of one another as they interact. The 
final reversal, in which a now giant-like Talus swats his increasingly insect-like 
opponents, only completes a transfer that has been operating below the text’s surface 
throughout the duration of the conflict.  
Yet the literal monstrousness, the titanic proportions of the Egalitarian Giant, are 
never definitively established at all. When Knight and squire first encounter their 
opponent, he is standing “vpon a rocke, and holding forth on hie” (V.ii.30.2), suggesting 
the possibility that the so-called “Giant” is short enough to need to stand upon an object 
in order to be seen by the crowd he is addressing. This is confirmed when Talus 
shoulders him from the cliff. The poem tells us that Talus approached “nigh unto him 
cheeke by cheeke” (V.ii.49.7), with the clear implication being that the squire and Giant 
are roughly the same height. This contradiction raises two mutually compatible 
possibilities. The first is that this is a moment in which Spenser exposes an inconsistency 
or impossibility to his readers in order to invite them to look past the literal meaning of 
his poem’s content and to its status as allegory: the traditional function of an 
accommodating reader when confronted with the trope. The second (related) possibility is 
that the designation of Artegall’s opponent as a giant is an imposition on the narrator’s 
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part, a prejudiced designation not necessarily supported by the poem itself, a hostile act 
of naming which attempts to situate the leveler’s threat to the social order within a long 
history of classical and biblical traditions which associate giants with tyranny — in this 
case, the tyranny of the multitude.145 The narrator’s designation frames the Giant’s action 
as monstrous, unnatural, and tyrannical, but the poem again and again cuts away at the 
distinction between the radical’s interest in social justice and Artegall’s ostensibly more 
natural attempt to bring the long-departed Astraea back from her retreat amidst the stars.  
Structurally, the initial resemblance between the Giant’s claims and the Proem’s 
description of Astraea’s departure prepares readers to notice the similarities between 
Artegall and his opponent. According to the Giant, social relations in the golden age 
represent the original, correct order of things, and current social, political, and economic 
inequalities are inherently unnatural degenerations from this primal state. Although 
adapted to justify radical ends, these are exactly the same topoi invoked in the Proem, 
even if the narrator locates the problem around an erosion of justice on earth while the 
Giant focuses his complaints on the establishment of unnatural hierarchies.146 Moreover, 
both arguments, the Giant’s and the Knight’s, are similarly derived from tradition which 
they each support solely with the threat of force. Judith H. Anderson has described 
Artegall’s arguments, his collage of biblical testimonies and proverbial wisdom, as 
“frozen statements,” “words in ritual having little explanatory power.”147 Like the 
Giant’s references to the tradition of the golden age, his claims are rooted in the ritualistic 
repetition of culturally sanctified narratives about the past. Conversely, while Artegall’s 
arguments have no persuasive power, unlike the Giant, he certainly has the physical and 
institutional strength necessary to enforce his account of history. 
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At this point, it is worth noting that a sophisticated and lengthy discussion of 
justice found in A View of the State of Ireland refuses to figure society as unchanging and 
imposed by celestial edict. As it is characterized in Spenser’s dialogue, the state of affairs 
in Tudor-occupied Ireland resembles the description made by The Faerie Queene’s 
narrator and the Egalitarian Giant, not Artegall’s inventio of a frozen commonwealth. 
Irenaeus observes that, although laws were initially ministered to a nation for its benefit 
in the same way a doctor gives medicine to a patient: 
 neverthelesse we often see, that either thorough ignorance of the disease, or 
 through unreasonablenesse of the time, or other accidents comming betweene, in 
 stead of good, it worketh hurt, and, out of one evill, throweth the patient into 
 many miseries. So the laws were at first intended for the reformation of abuses, 
 and peaceable continuance of the subject; but are sithence either disannulled, or 
 quite prevaricated thorough change and alteration of times, yet they are good still 
 in themselves; but, in that commonwealth which is ruled by them, they worke not 
 that good which they should, and sometimes also that evill which they would 
 not.148   
 
Laws, according to Irenaeus, are subject to corruption, and their effectiveness is 
contingent upon the historical conditions from which they were created. Adding to this, 
the goodness of a law is situational, the socially constructed product of a particular time 
and place. Divorced from its context, a law makes no sense and can potentially serve as 
an obstacle toward good governance. The connections to forensic oratory, and to 
decorum and accommodation, are palpably obvious.  
 Contradicting its conservative reputation, A View of the State of Ireland advocates 
particular social and legal reforms, and Irenaeus’ voice often very much resembles the 
Giant’s. He critiques Brehon law, for instance, as designed specifically “for the defence 
and maintenance of their [the Irish] lands in their posteritie, and for excluding all 
innovation or alienation thereof unto strangers, and specially to the English.”149 Irenaeus 
79 
even extends his critique to the island’s social structure: “they reserued their titles, 
tenures, and seigniories whole and sound to themselves, and for proof alledge, that they 
have ever sithence remained to them untouched, so as now to alter them, should, (say 
they) be a great wrong.”150 Irenaeus’ other contention about Irish law is even more Giant-
like: he objects because it favors the titled and propertied Irish while exploiting the poor 
and marginalized. As Eudoxus summarizes his friend’s position, the Irish upperclasses 
“delight...to leane to their old customes and Brehon lawes, though they be more unjust 
and also more inconvenient for the common people.”151 One might expect that A View of 
the State of Ireland codifies Irish law as unnatural and exploitive while endorsing English 
law, but to the shock of Eudoxus, Irenaeus explicitly denies this possibility, observing 
that “not only the common law, but the Statutes and Actes of Parliament” are completely 
inappropriate for Ireland: “For lawes ought to be fashioned unto the manners and 
conditions of the people, to whom they are meant, and not to be imposed on them 
according to the simple rule of right.”152 English law may suit the conditions of England, 
but it, too, is unnatural, and its effectiveness merely corresponds to its suitability for the 
particular social conditions it was written under.  
 Ironically, Artegall’s arguments against his opponent are largely opposed to A 
View of the State of Ireland’s conclusions. Even the Knight’s famous dictum, “All change 
is perillous, and all chaunce vnsound” (V.ii.36.7), is echoed in A View, yet not by 
Spenser’s spokesman, but by Eudoxus, who nearly repeats Artegall’s retort by stating that 
“all innovation is perillous.” Irenaeus, however, the more authoritative speaker within the 
dialogue, strongly refutes this notion, asserting that this only holds true “where the 
affaires stand in such sort, as they may continue in quietness, or be assured at all to abide 
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as they are. But in the realme of Ireland we see much otherwise.”153 The increasingly 
murky allegoric topography Artegall traverses can hardly be described as quiet, peaceful, 
and likely to carry on as such. By the standards of Irenaeus, the situation described by 
The Faerie Queene calls for some kind of reform, even if we elect to preclude the radical 
solutions proposed by the Giant as outside the possibilities that Spenser would endorse. 
Artegall’s arguments, far from disentangling the Knight’s conception of justice from the 
Giant’s, inadvertently minimize the differences between the two speakers, a detail which 
should fail to surprise given how the sentiments expressed by Artegall differ from those 
expressed in A View of the State of Ireland.  
 Even Talus’ bloodshed does not enable the Knight to reappropriate justice’s topoi 
from the Giant; rather, this violence only further links Artegall to his opponent. The Giant 
bases his plan of reform on his physical agency, his ability to level the cosmos through 
his titanic violence: “He sayed he would all the earth uptake, / And all the sea, devided 
each from either: / So would he of the fire one balaunce make” (V.2.31.1-3). Talus’ 
shouldering the Giant off the cliff enacts this cosmological violence upon the Giant’s 
own body. As in the Giant’s designs, the narrator’s epic simile blends the elements, 
comparing the dissolution of the radical’s corporal form to a shipwreck whose “shattered 
ribs in thousand peeces rives” (V.2.50.3). But the obvious unnaturalness of comparing a 
corpse to a wracked ship points toward the human agency involved in enforcing laws 
Artegall describes as essentialist characteristics of the cosmos. And because the Knight 
has been so closely linked to the Giant’s mode of persuasion, this moment’s irony 
strongly reflects back on Artegall, a detail further highlighted by the canto’s violation of 
generic convention. It is worth repeating that in romance the heroic knight is supposed to 
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slay the monster in lawful combat, not have a subordinate sneak behind him and shoulder 
him off a cliff while distracted and peacefully debating his point.  
 The first half of The Faerie Queene saw Spenser radically revising and 
reappraising the familiar conventions of heroic romance. This moment, moving beyond 
even these previous generic revisions, pushes the cavaliere errante tradition past 
reappraisal into outright subversion, a detail further highlighted by the simile comparing 
the Giant’s corpse to a shipwreck, an image related to one of Spenser’s preferred 
analogies to his own poetry. In keeping with the ancient tradition of figuring the 
accommodation of writing and reading as a form of travel, Spenser regularly and 
routinely represents both his composition and the process of reading The Faerie Queene 
as a journey. As a case in point, Book One closes with an extended nautical metaphor 
comparing the poem to a ship, its characters to passengers, and the poet’s intentions for 
his epic to a “long voyage whereto she [the poem as ship] is bent” (I.12.42.1-9). 
Startlingly, the simile comparing the Giant’s demise to a shipwreck inverts the outcome 
of the “weather-beaten ship arriu’d on happy shore” that carried Red Cross and Una to 
safe harbor (II.1.2.9).  Seen in context, aside from making literal the violence implicit in 
Artegall’s oratory, this moment shockingly embodies the ferocity of coercive language 
through the broken form of the Giant himself, and even provides readers with an emblem 
of narrative failure.  
The image of the wracked Giant, moreover, combines two important analogies 
from Renaissance political theory: the comparison between the human body to a nation 
and the metaphor that likened the state to a ship at sea. The commonplace equating the 
state to a human body clearly captured Spenser’s imagination, and he frequently used the 
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analogy as a way to theorize political and social situations. In A View of the State of 
Ireland, for instance, Irenaeus compares the creation of laws to giving medicine to a 
patient, the use of a Marshall to stamp out an unjust military practice to a surgeon 
amputating an “unsound or sicke part of the body,” and the change in policy from one 
Lord Deputy to another to two physicians prescribing different treatments for the same 
sick body. When pressed about the problems with Catholicism in Ireland, he even objects 
that authorities cannot address the issue until the nation’s civil strife is resolved, 
comparing the situation to the need to administer to a sick man’s body before seeking his 
spiritual salvation in a pragmatic (though theologically dubious) analogy.154 Similarly, 
both Eudoxus and Irenaeus describe Ireland in turmoil as a ship in a storm. After having 
been brought up to date regarding the recent conflicts, Eudoxus asks his friend whether 
there have “beene any more such tempests...wherein she,” meaning Ireland, “hath thus 
wretchedly beene wracked?” Irenaeus likewise describes Ireland’s state after Lord Grey’s 
removal from the Lord Deputyship as having left “the realme...like a ship in a storm, 
amidst all the raging surges, unruled, and undirected of any.”155 The metaphor describing 
the Giant’s murder, therefore, has a number of alarming resonances relating to the 
disintegration of social order.  
Compounding this sense of societal collapse, Artegall’s language-as-violence 
echoes a number of troubling segments from within Book Five and throughout The 
Faerie Queene. The Giant, in other words, is not the only double confronting Artegall: 
the Knight’s language repeats the vocabulary used by many of Spenser’s most prominent 
villains. As James Holstun points out, Artegall’s arguments before the Egalitarian Giant 
contradict the claims he makes while arguing against Munera and Pollente — figures 
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closely related to the avarice associated by Protestants with the Catholic Church — 
earlier in the very same canto.156 At this juncture, Aretgall becomes dangerously similar 
to the foes he has just dispatched. Likewise, nearly every critic who has examined this 
episode has noticed the similarity of the statements made by Artegall to Despair’s 
seduction of Red Cross in Book One.157 The rhetorical topoi adopted by Artegall place 
him in bad company indeed, and these similarities should cause readers and giants alike 
to question the violence he uses once communication fails.  
Joseph Campana, tracing the stakes behind Spenser’s representations of cruelty, 
argues that the first edition of The Faerie Queene acts as a meditation on vulnerability, 
that the poem articulates “an ethical imperative to investigate those limiting fantasies of 
invulnerability defined as forms as masculinity or the heroic. The Faerie Queene...makes 
a signature intervention in heroic poetry, one that, perhaps counterintuitively, explores 
vulnerability rather than violence.”158 According to Campana, the first half of Spenser’s 
poem attempts to reform masculinity by acknowledging bodily vulnerability and the pain 
of others. The second edition of the poem, however, influenced by Spenser’s involvement 
with the colonial project and by a growing concern with the effects and ethics of shame, 
becomes a work which “excavates the dark underside of vulnerability and the intersection 
of violence and justice.”159 The 1596 Faerie Queene, as such, documents the 
consequences that follow the failure of Spenser’s earlier investment in an ethics of 
vulnerability. To this I would add that Artegall’s inability to emphasize with the Giant 
perfectly encapsulates this failure. The Giant’s mutilated corpse, broken and despoiled by 
Talus, becomes representative of the impossibility of locating political solutions in an 
awareness of one’s own and other’s physical vulnerability. In this episode, Spenser’s 
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representation of oratory renders visible the problems inherent within social relations 
when empathy comes into contact with economic and political disparity. The Knight can 
afford to disregard the Giant’s perspective, personal feelings, and receptivity to pain. 
When the Giant does the same to Artegall, the consequences are fatal.  
The poem’s narrative grasps for a solution to the “excavation of justice” manifest 
in a conflict between speakers with unequal power, but fails to find it in oratory. Neither 
the Giant nor Artegall provides a positive example of how language can be used to 
persuade another person, to heal a community, or to constitute a shared sense of social 
obligation. The complete failure of rhetoric at this juncture, its total lack of instrumental 
efficacy or ethical propriety, I would argue, differentiates this rhetorical display from its 
predecessors in classical, medieval, and early modern epic, in Hellenistic or Renaissance 
romance, and even from portrayals of oratory in ancient histories. Obviously, Homer, 
Virgil, Herodotus, and countless others have portrayed persuasion as unethical or as 
ineffective, but rarely has rhetoric failed so spectacularly while simultaneously seeming 
so immoral. Depictions of persuasion failing are so common that they do not need to be 
mentioned here. Plato, of course, famously considered rhetoric to be dangerously 
relativistic, juxtaposing the sophistic technique to his preferred dialectic, but his 
preoccupation with attacking oratory is also a kind of unwilling concession to its social 
effectiveness. The same holds true for unflattering depictions of persuasion closer to 
Spenser’s time. Ulysses’ speech on order in Troilus and Cressida, for example, or 
Pyrocles’ speech on the same subject in Sidney’s Arcadia, are as manipulative as 
Artegall’s oration to the Giant, but although amoral or even immoral, these speakers are 
at least extraordinarily successful in achieving their purposes.  
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The conflict between the Knight and Giant strips rhetoric both of the fantasy of 
eloquence’s unerring successfulness and the civilizing functions ascribed to the discipline 
by its ancient and humanist proponents.160 What Spenser creates in this moment is a 
meta-discourse portraying and critiquing another form of discourse. Yet the existence of 
this portrayal does not necessarily imply that The Faerie Queene condemns all varieties 
of eloquence. In some respects, this moment recalls Red Cross Knight’s confrontation 
with the book-spewing Error in Book One (i.20), but it reverses the trajectory of the 
earlier episode by privileging the written, or at least the written form of The Faerie 
Queene itself, at the expense of oral communication. In the final tally, embedding a text 
such as a formal oration (or two) into another text as self-consciously as Spenser does 
here centers the conflict between Knight and Giant around language itself: this section of 
Book Five becomes about discourse’s relationship to justice. The negative model 
presented by Artegall highlights Spenser’s own eloquence, the simulacrum of a rhetorical 
exchange acting as a contrast to the participatory, collaborative, relationship between The 
Faerie Queene and its audience. The debate and battle call attention to Spenserian 
discernment, to the ways in which the author invites readers to bring home the poem’s 
depiction of justice, to become a kind of judge charged with adjudicating arguments, 
motivations, and the social relations that underlie actions and words. 
 
III: Spenser’s Audience, A View of The State of Ireland, and Social Struggle         
The critical axioms surrounding Book Five largely revolve around Spenser’s inability to 
non-problematically portray the Tudor colonial project in Ireland. Richard McCabe, for 
example, in one of the first studies to comprehensively discuss the poet’s interaction with 
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Gaelic culture, points to the linguistic and political complexity of Spenser’s 
representation and to The Faerie Queene’s failure to fashion the Irish as wholly “other,” 
as totally distinct from the English settlers. McCabe describes the poem’s habit of 
defining cultural, ethical, linguistic, and political standards through comparison with their 
“savage” Irish antithesis as “notoriously hazardous” because “intended contrasts collapse 
all too easily into unintentional comparisons.”161  This collapse certainly occurs 
throughout Artegall’s confrontation with the Giant, but describing this as “unintentional” 
overlooks both the interrogative character of Spenser’s engagement with his troubling 
Irish experience and the centrality of problemata to Renaissance romance. Instead of 
awaiting deconstruction, the topoi blurring Artegall with his opponent reside near the 
poem’s manifest content; Spenser’s depiction of the Giant tenaciously breaks down the 
difference between the virtuous knight and the monster he slays, and by extension, the 
difference between Irish and English. In the allegorical logic of the poem, this collapse of 
identity complicates the conceptual boundary between a virtuous sense of justice and the 
forces that threaten it. Faced with this characteristically ambiguous problemata, A View 
of the State of Ireland becomes useful because of the information it provides about how 
Spenser relates class to England’s colonization of its neighbor, and because, as a 
humanist dialogue, A View serves as a point of contrast between persuasion in The Faerie 
Queene and competing forms of eloquence. 
Neglecting the dialogue, literary historians have traditionally located the Giant’s 
claims in the records of European peasant rebellions or in the still-powerful specter of 
Münster’s apocalyptic communism, a communal-sectarian government which continued 
to haunt Elizabethans’ view of Anabaptists and other radical Protestants into and beyond 
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Spenser’s lifetime.162 This episode, however, like the majority of Book Five, repeatedly 
refers to Ireland. Both the Giant and the rock he stands upon are strongly resonant of A 
View of the State of Ireland’s explanation for Folkmotes, sites initially described by 
Eudoxus as “a place of people, to meete or talke of any thing that concerned any 
difference between parties and towneships,” a custom which he approves of, describing 
the practice as “very requisite.”163 Right at the first, Eudoxus establishes Folkmotes as 
sites of conversation and dialogue, places open to a myriad of possibilities facilitated 
through the responsible use of civic language. Yet, as is also true of Book Five’s 
portrayal of justice, time has a way of degenerating originally beneficial institutions. 
Once again sounding like the Giant, Irenaeus explains, “howsoever the times when they 
were first made, might well serve to good occasions...yet things being since altered...the 
good use that then was of them, is now turned to abuse.”164 What was once a useful 
custom has been corrupted by Irish parochialism, and has become a site of resistance to 
English rule. According to Irenaeus, “dangerous are such assemblies, whether for cesse 
or ought else, the Constables and Officers being also of the Irish; and if any of the 
English happen to be there, even to them they may prove perillous. Therefore for 
avoiding such evill occasions, they were best to be abolished.”165 Irenaeus here uses the 
same phrase to describe Folkmotes that The Faerie Queene’s narrator uses to describe the 
Giant’s audience. The Irish “make great assembles together upon a Rath or a hill,” he 
tells Eudoxus; likewise, Artegall and Talus witness “Full many people gathered in a 
crew; / Whose great assembly they did much admire” (V.ii.29.5-6).166  
A further detail cements the ties between Irish Folkmotes and the Giant’s 
gathering: the two speakers of A View relate legendary stories about how meetings came 
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to be held on “huge stones” or on cliffs or “high hills.” The Egalitarian Giant, of course, 
stands on a rock overlooking a cliff when he first encounters Artegall and Talus. Eudoxus 
compliments his friend’s description: “You have very well declared the originall of their 
mounts and great stones incompassed, which some vainly terme the ould Giants Trevetts, 
and thinke that those huge stones would not else be brought into order or reared up, 
without the strength of gyants.”167 Seen in this context, the connection between Spenser’s 
Giant and the legendary Irish giants become obvious; more still, the ambiguity that 
adheres to A View’s description of folkmotes also adheres to the Giant’s gathering in 
Book Five. As Annabel Patterson has pointed out, the custom is never categorically 
condemned; Eudoxus’ satisfaction with his friend’s description pertains to Irenaeus’ 
narrative of the folkmotes’ “sociohistorical construction, the work of many hands in the 
service of cultural identity; he continues to insist on the value of places and occasions for 
self-government.”168 Neither speaker discounts the custom outright, and even the anti-
Irish Irenaeus again ends up sounding much more like the Giant than Artegall.  
Recognizing the Giant's gathering as a Folkmote provides an anchor into The 
Faerie Queene's representation of class and hierarchy. I have already mentioned the 
parallels between Book Five and A View’s discussion of change’s effect on customs and 
laws, but references to economic exploitation surprisingly also abound throughout 
Spenser’s dialogue. I would go so far as to claim that A View of the State of Ireland 
comes close to being preoccupied with class conflict. Significantly, Irenaeus sees both the 
English and Irish as exploiters. Only a moment after describing Folkmotes and relating 
the legend of the giant’s stone, Irenaeus complains to Eudoxus about the practice of 
cesse, “the obligation to supply the soldiers and the household of the lord deputy with 
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provisions at prices ‘accessed’ or fixed by government,” which he sees as deeply harmful 
to the common people of Ireland — and an understandable cause of discontent:169 
 it is most hurtfull and offensive to the poore country, and nothing convenient for 
 the souldiers themselves, who, during their lying at cesse, use all kinds of 
 outragious disorder and villany, both towards the poore men, which victuall and 
 lodge them, as also to all the country round about them, whom they abuse, 
 oppresse, spoyle, and afflict by all the meanes they can invent, for they will not 
 onely not content themselves with such victuals as their hostes nor yet as the place 
 perhaps affords, but they will have other meate provided for them, and aqua vita 
 sent for, yea and money besides laide at their trenches, which if they want, then 
 about the house they walk with the wretched poore man and his silly wife, who 
 are glad to purchase their peace with any thing. By which vile manner of abuse, 
 the countrey people, yea and the very English which dwell abroad and see, and 
 sometimes feele this outrage, growe into great destination of the souldiours, and 
 thereby into hatred of the very government, which draweth upon them such 
 evills.170 
 
Spenser, speaking here through his surrogate Irenaeus, explicitly figures the burden 
placed upon the lower classes by soldiers as a form of oppression, actually using the verb 
form of the term to criticize both the Queen’s government and her lord deputies — one of 
the most direct and riskiest criticisms of Elizabeth’s rule made in the dialogue.  
 Nor does Spenser spare the Irish equivalent of his own class of landowners, 
landlords, and free-holders. Irenaeus goes into great length about how they 
 set out their land in farme or for the terme of yeares, to their tennants, but onely 
 from yeare to yeare...to racke their tennants, laying upon them coigny and livery 
 at pleasure, and exacting of them (besides his covenants) what he pleaseth. So that 
 the poore husbandman either dare not binde himself to him for longer tearme, or 
 thinketh, by continuall liberty of change to keep his land-lord the rather in awe of 
 wronging him.171  
 
Spenser critiques local practices, drawing a distinction between the colonizers and 
colonized by portraying English social relations as more equitable than the relations 
practiced by the “othered” Irish (although the passage at least suggests that English 
settlers are adopting these oppressive habits and are contributing to the problem). But the 
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fact that Spenser is willing at all to figure class exploitation as a problem in the Irish state 
speaks to his capacity to entertain claims similar to the Giant’s. Unlike the Giant, 
Spenser’s speakers insist on “reformation,” not violent rebellion, but both Irenaeus and 
Eudoxus admit that social and economic oppression contributes to unrest. Oppression of 
the lower orders is at once a plague on the colonial government and a justification for its 
existence. 
Although Irenaeus does not consistently sympathize with the Irish poor, he 
frequently focuses on how the ephemerality of material conditions foments violence: “the 
tenement being left at his liberty is fit for every occasion of change that shall be offered 
by time: and so much also the more ready and willing is he to runne into the same, for 
that hee hath no such coste imployed in fensing or husbanding the same, as might 
withhold him from any such wilfull course, as his lords cause, or his owne lewde 
disposition may carry him into.”172 Irenaeus is likewise careful to insist that organized 
rebellion in Ireland is always a top-down affair, that the lower order’s resistance to 
English rule is actually another form of exploitation, telling Eudoxus that “all the 
inferiour sort are brought under the command of their lords, and forced to follow them 
into any action whatsoever. Now this you are to understand, that all the rebellions which 
you see from time to time happen in Ireland, are not begun by the common people, but by 
the lords and captaines of countries.”173 The superficially democratic implication is that 
rebellion against the English lacks legitimacy because it is not based upon actual 
grievances from the Irish people, but is instead caused by the nobility’s “wilfull obstinacy 
against the governement.”174  
Expressing skepticism toward conceits naturalizing hierarchy makes sense given 
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the Tudor propensity to locate the excellence of the English state within its supposedly 
mixed constitution, and given Spenser’s own position as a figure “self-fashioned” 
through ambitious gambits dependent upon market forces. As Jean Feerick — one of the 
few readers of A View to account for the dialogue’s attacks on feudal relations and the 
English center — notes in regards to the New English, “the majority of settlers were not 
high-ranking aristocrats but rather midlevel administrators, men who had never known 
and yet, we might speculate, had always envied the privileges of their social 
superiors.”175 Nevertheless, with the exception of Feerick, the critical literature on A 
View’s relationship to Book Five’s Giant essentially ignores the dialogue’s concern with 
class relations, largely, I think, because it does not obviously conform to notions about 
how a colonial apologist like Spenser should conceive of the connection between class 
and imperialism. Due to his status as a significant landowner, the expectation exists that 
the author should make or endorse ideological justifications for hierarchy, just as Artegall 
does in his encounter with the Giant and his followers. Meeting these expectations, 
Irenaeus’ language is at times dotted with disdain for his social inferiors. He speaks of 
“unrulie people” attempting to use popular aggression to affect law, that “in the violence 
of that furie, tread downe and trample under foote all both divine and humane things, and 
the lawes themselves they doe specially rage at, and rend in peeces, as most repugnant to 
their libertie and natural freedome, which in their madness they affect.” Eudoxus agrees, 
remarking, “It is then a very unseasonable time to plead law, when swords are in the 
hands of the vulgar, or to thinke to retaine them with feare of punishments, when they 
looke after liberty, and shake off all government.”176 But for the most part, these 
comments are exceptional and not at all characteristic of Spenser’s attitude toward non-
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elite members of Irish society. 
 I refer to A View throughout this section as an illustration of the horizons of 
Spenser’s thought, or more precisely, its relative lack of horizon when discussing the 
Elizabethan social order. It is still commonly assumed that the feelings of readerly unease 
created by Artegall’s oratory, and by the execution of the Giant and the murder of the 
debate’s audience, is an anachronistic response, unrelated to the poem’s conceptual 
design, that Spenser could not have possibly intended for readers to feel sympathy for 
Talus’ victims and horror at their brutalization. Nevertheless, while Spenser was 
obviously bounded by his historical circumstances, A View demonstrates that he had 
access to (and frequently used) two related sets of loci communes, the first concerned 
with exploitation and oppression and the second concerned with the harm caused by the 
degeneration of originally beneficial traditions. Even putting aside the content and formal 
attributes of Book Five discussed in the third section of this chapter, the focus on class in 
A View strongly suggests a receptivity toward several of the topoi used by the Giant — or 
at least an appreciation for the root causes that lead to his rebellion. The Giant is foolish, 
temperamentally unbalanced, but Artegall, too, lacks self-control. As Hadfield has 
recently argued, “there seems to be no mean — or balance — between the extremes of 
rebellion and mass slaughter. The most plausible reading is not that Spenser sympathizes 
strongly with one side rather then the other, but that things have gone badly awry and that 
there is a lack of equilibrium.”177 If this episode portrays English response to Irish 
resistance, it is a portrayal of colonial mismanagement.  
 A View of the State of Ireland, of course, is not a magical key that unlocks the 
political allegory of The Faerie Queene. The dialogue is nevertheless a useful touchstone: 
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even its differences from Spenser’s epic, its focused argument contrasted against the 
poem’s semiotically rich fabulae, is illustrative. Obviously, The Faerie Queene and A 
View of the State of Ireland are generically dissimilar texts; perhaps less obviously, they 
do not resemble one another as examples of persuasion. A View is a sophisticated work of 
Tudor humanism, and dialogues are, by definition, multi-vocal.178 Nevertheless, a single 
voice dominates the text: while Eudoxus is portrayed as well-meaning and intelligent, he 
is also admittedly ignorant of the situation in Ireland, and he regularly defers to Irenaeus, 
a well-informed and pragmatic representative of the New English settlers. Eudoxus 
interrogates his friend, asking questions to which Irenaeus replies at great length. 
Irenaeus’ responses frequently contain extensive digressions, and despite the fact that 
Eudoxus usually asks and Irenaeus answers, the latter speaker controls the dialogue. 
Eudoxus accedes to and at times even accepts corrections from Irenaeus. Taken as a 
whole, the argument of A View of the State of Ireland is Irenaeus’ argument: violent, 
unsentimental, and clearly directed at convincing readers to adopt his scorched-earth 
policy of reform. 
 Unlike the dialogue, The Faerie Queene portrays arguments as much as it enacts 
them, providing the carefully curated illusion of an Archimedean point from which to 
witness how persuasion and language can obscure the truth about social relations. The 
Faerie Queene moves and influences, achieving a set of affects, operating through the 
complex sets of “identifications” that, in Kenneth Burke’s sense of the term, make any 
act of reading possible in the first place.179  Book Five obviously seeks to alter its 
readers’ understanding of justice, and the poem also makes a number of explicitly 
political “claims.” Unlike A View, these are largely arguments about representation: they 
94 
are assertions about the correct way to depict a particular situation and a particular locale. 
The exchange between Artegall and his listeners throws into relief the relationship 
between The Faerie Queene and its audience: it encourages readers to judge what they 
witness in the poem’s narrative. Spenser’s ability to articulate voices as diverse as 
Artegall’s, the Giant’s, and the poem’s narrator — the creation of a seemingly objective 
impression that, to recall Andrew Hadfield’s words, “things have gone badly awry and 
that there is a lack of equilibrium” — all allow Spenser to assume the authority 
bequeathed by an apparently impartial distance from the events he describes. Taken as a 
whole, the invitation to collaborate is the hook that draws The Faerie Queene’s reader 
along. As the romance progresses, it teaches its audience how to read itself, correcting 
first impressions without becoming violently intrusive. This participatory model of poetic 
accommodation, however, also constructs the poem’s ethos as a trusted guide; it obscures 
the fact that the poem can not really be as impartial as it plays at being. 
 The forensic detachment of Artegall’s debate with the Giant, along with the 
poem’s ostensibly non-coercive mode of eloquence, becomes a performance of justice in 
and of itself. It prepares readers to accept Book Five’s allegories concerning the situation 
in Ireland and Protestant England’s conflict with Catholic Spain. If, as the depiction of 
the conflict between Artegall and the Egalitarian Giant seems to imply, Book Five’s 
mimesis can adequately represent such thorny subjects as the distortion of justice caused 
by unequal social and economic statuses, it can surely represent religious and political 
controversies as well. 
 
IV: Conclusion—Interpretation and Conflict 
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Aretgall’s debate with and murder of the Giant and his audience accrues authority for 
Spenser’s poem at the expense of the traditional attribute usually delegated to oratory: its 
civilizing function. That is to say, the episode strips oratory in order to enrich poetry. The 
murder of the Giant, his shattered body analogically associated with the fractured 
political state Artegall’s language fails to repair, points to the efficacy of Spenser’s own 
eloquence, its ability to epitomize the journey of justice in an imperfect and fallen world, 
including the poem’s ruminations on Ireland. Yet, because the moment is so completely 
concerned with what occurs when readers fail to adapt to the language they interpret, 
finally, the episode serves as a warning. The conflict with the Giant sanctions both the 
poem’s shadowing of English imperialism and its depiction of Irish resistance to this 
conquest. But the Giant’s fate also serves as a stark reminder of the thinness of the line 
between rhetoric and oppression, between language and violence, and between eloquence 
and propaganda. Even as the poem works to persuade and to influence, the episode of the 
Egalitarian Giant acts as an incomplete but still-useful fragment of a phenomenology of 
reading, one which acknowledges the hazards of communication, suggesting how the 
historicity and contingency of arguments, their relation to the social and the economic, 
determines which perspectives are ultimately triumphant and which voices are dashed on 
the sharp rocks of time’s ocean.  
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 CHAPTER 3  
 
THEATRUM MUNDI: RHETORIC, ROMANCE, AND LEGITIMATION IN THE 
TEMPEST AND THE WINTER’S TALE 
 
As with all forms of poesis, Renaissance humanists categorized drama as a sister 
discourse to oratory. Pedagogues used dramatic texts, particularly those containing 
portrayals of persuasion, as storehouses for commonplaces and examples. Justifications 
for theater, meanwhile, exploited the same Ciceronian arguments about the civilizing 
power of exempla as other forms of fiction.180 John Webster’s 1615 pamphlet, An 
Excellent Actor, to cite one example, compares players to the Hercules Gallicus emblem 
depicting the Greek hero dragging a chain of men attached to his tongue, a representation 
of rhetorical efficacy famous from Alciati’s Emblemata. According to Webster, 
“whatsoeuer is commendable in the graue orator” is “most exquisitly perfect” in the 
actor.181  Theater, moreover, had a more reciprocal relationship to rhetoric than other 
forms of poetry: oratory, particularly the canon of delivery, clearly possessed 
performative elements. More importantly, rhetoricians frequently compared the ethical 
inculcation supposedly instilled by eloquence to the self-reflexivity of dramatic 
representation. Theorists, especially those with a background in stoic philosophy, 
explicitly conceptualized ethical behavior as a kind of moral role-playing, relating a life 
well lived to an actor embodying the role of a virtuous personage in a comedy. Still, the 
longstanding connection between the two arts did not ensure that dramatizations of 
oratory flattered rhetoricians. Shakespeare’s The Tempest and The Winter's Tale, the 
subjects of this chapter, provide audiences with a clinic on the different ways oratory can 
fail.  
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These tragicomic-romances depict conventional eloquence as ineffectual when 
forced to confront patriarchal rulers whose speech and actions exceed the measured self-
control that traditionally served as a justification both for masculine authority and for the 
subjugation of the lower orders by their social superiors. The Winter's Tale depicts the 
enraged and delusional Leontes as incapable of responding rationally to reasoned 
argument. The Tempest represents Prospero as unaffected by attempts at persuasion—
ironically given that the exiled duke repeatedly associates himself with humanist 
practices. Although presented ambiguously or negatively throughout much of their plays, 
both Prospero and Leontes conclude their character arcs by gesturing toward reformation, 
repentance, and forgiveness. In both cases, these circumscribed, conflicted, and deeply 
troubled gestures are effected, not through oratory, but via artifices directly related to 
theater: the masques and songs of The Tempest which calm Prospero's rage and help him 
accept his mortality and Paulina's statue trick in The Winter's Tale, a device which 
facilitates the play's comic ending. These tragicomic-romances, I argue, contrast the 
efficacy of metatheatrical conceits with the problematic response generated by formal 
argument, linking persuasion to masculine domination, constructing a gendered and 
classed divide between the two forms of eloquence. 
 Theatrical artifice succeeds in The Tempest and The Winter's Tale by adapting the 
comparison between moral and theatrical acting, by offering a model of ethics that 
encourages men and women to conceptualize morality as pragmatic performance, as a 
form of role-playing dependent upon critiquing oneself as though one were an actor in a 
play.182 The inventio of The Tempest and The Winter's Tale literalizes the locus 
communis of the world resembling a theater (theatrum mundi), turning the ancient 
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analogy inside out, refracting moral performance on the world-stage through its 
representation in theatrical performance. Usually traced to Petronius, the theatrum mundi 
commonplace actually originates in stoic doctrine.183 Cicero's De Officiis, for instance, 
refers to Panaetius' teaching about the unity of morality by making an analogy with 
acting. Cicero stresses the importance of seeking out the good, but since most men lack 
the capacity for philosophic reasoning, and since even philosophers fail to agree on what 
constitutes the good, a person who desires to be virtuous should imitate their idea of how 
a virtuous person behaves. Cicero admits that the men we live with lack ideal wisdom, 
but insists they still have the capacity to seek out a simulacra virtutis, a simulacrum of 
virtue.184 For Cicero, this imitation of perfect morality has a social component, what the 
orator-statesman refers to as "decorum."185 In relation to oratory or poetry, decorum 
implies adapting one's language to circumstances or audiences, or in the case of fiction, 
endowing characters with a voice and vocabulary appropriate for their person.186 Placed 
in this ethical context, the concept becomes performative in a different way: a person 
who wants to exhibit fortitude, for example, should act in a way that seems virtuous and 
proper.187  This, as Jamey E. Graham notes, collapses moral and aesthetic judgments: "If 
we are actors performing what we ought to be, then deciding what is right in a given 
instance will mean deciding what is attractive or fitting in our role."188  
 Paulina’s and Ariel's use of theater as persuasion works, then, because it 
transforms Leontes and Prospero into better actors and better readers of their own 
behavior. This turning of the theatrum mundi commonplace back on itself does more than 
depict drama as superior to oratory: this figuration actively participates in a fiction about 
the relationship between London's commercial theater and its audience, enacting a 
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fantasy of theater speaking to and for women and the lower orders. On the one hand, this 
cultural inheritance refines the humanist ideal of eloquence fostering social mobility and 
cultural cohesion.189 On the other hand, this legitimizing narrative allows popular theater 
to justify itself as an accommodating force facilitating exchanges between the different 
strata of Jacobean society. As examples of stage-romances, The Winter's Tale and The 
Tempest portray their own medium as capable of expressing and mediating complex 
social dynamics. Of course, outside the realm of ideals and theory, theatrical efficacy 
always depends upon on-stage embodiment. As Vin Nardizzi has recently pointed out, 
“theater’s success in its humanist task is contingent….on the actor in performance.”190  
But I do not suggest that Shakespeare’s theater actually possesses the kind of efficacy 
assigned to it in The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest. Instead I claim that these 
tragicomic-romances make an argument about their own efficacy; they model particular 
forms of visual performance having success. Shakespeare’s late works offer a portrayal, a 
second-order mimesis, of benevolent persuasion that would appeal to the consumers who 
attended his plays. London’s commercial theater resided in an increasingly cosmopolitan 
city developing amid an emerging marketplace where commercial drama had to appeal to 
a variety of persons.191 As Jean Howard points out, Renaissance drama’s apparent self-
reflexivity partially responds to cultural and economic changes, including a heightened 
social mobility which encouraged men and women to conceptualize their identities as 
though they were actors in a self-scripted theater. Drama, according to Howard, 
participated in the “struggles surrounding the social changes coincident with the 
emergence both of antitheatrical polemic and a dramatistic sense of life.”192 Unlike Ben 
Jonson, who attempted to manage and negotiate market expectations, Shakespeare turns 
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the need to entertain a popular audience into an argument for the transformative power of 
theater—and it is this argument which is traced throughout this chapter.193  
 The first section of this chapter introduces the most widely disseminated early 
modern description of the theatrum mundi commonplace, John Alday’s 1566 translation 
of Pierre Boaistuau’s Le Théâtre du monde. I begin with this treatise, not because I 
believe Shakespeare directly draws upon Alday, but because this text elucidates how 
early modern intellectuals used the theater/world analogy while also suggesting how 
Shakespeare’s staging of the commonplace bends tradition in order to affirm the social 
purpose of playacting. My second section shows that The Winter’s Tale initially portrays 
Leontes as fixated on the visual and unable to use rhetorical accommodation to interpret 
the events around him. I then argue that Paulina draws upon religious commonplaces to 
effect a performance of redemption from the bereaved Leontes, in the process using the 
theatrum mundi analogy to exemplify theatrical efficacy. Turning next to The Tempest, I 
examine how the romance-tragicomedy’s representation of political instability disturbs 
traditional justifications for hierarchy, a crisis in legitimation only navigated when Ariel 
causes Prospero to recognize the performativity of ethical and social relations. I conclude 
by arguing that, in portraying morality and rank as performative, The Winter’s Tale and 
The Tempest validate both theatrical efficacy and the ethos of romance while also 
figuring social and political formations as forms of poesis—as unnatural but not 
necessarily inefficacious artifacts. Even as these plays reshape drama as commodity, 
because of their emphasis on the performativity of self-control, they interrogate 
traditional legitimations for order and patriarchal rule, an interrogation pressuring but not 
necessarily undermining justifications for hierarchy. As I will show, Shakespeare’s late 
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tragicomic-romances not only portray personal behavior as performance, they represent 
political, civic, and gendered formations as complex forms of socially constructed 
artifice.  
 
I: Theatrum Mundi:  Boaistuau, Alday, and Romance  
The analogy between life and theater received its best-known early modern formulation 
in the works of the French humanist, Pierre Boaistuau. In 1558, Boaistuau published a 
pamphlet in French and Latin titled Le Théâtre du monde, divided into three sections 
concerned with, among other subjects, life's miseries, the vanity of ambition, and the 
felicity of virtue. The first part of the book compares humans to beasts, showing that 
people are inferior to them in many respects; the second part discourses on misery; and 
the third describes how adversity eventually leads to the knowledge of God. All three 
sections pillage exampla from classical, ecclesiastical, and biblical sources, shaping a 
diverse body of quotations and citations into a long piece of epideictic rhetoric.194 
Although little read today, the book proved to be an international bestseller, quickly 
running through several editions. The Elizabethan scholar, John Alday, translated it into 
English in 1566 as:  
Theatrum Mundi, The Theator or rule of the world, wherein may be sene the 
running race and course of euerye mans life, as touching miserie and felicity, 
wherin is contained wonderfull examples, learned deuises, to the ouerthrowe of 
vice, and exalting of vertue.195  
 
As with Boaistuau's original, the work proved to be a popular success, going through 
three editions by 1581, quickly becoming an influential source for the ancient topos. The 
book's dedication to James Beaton, the Archbishop of Glasgow, notes that despite 
everything he has achieved, "man is so masked and disguised, that he knoweth not 
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himselfe. He is the Heraulde, beginner and foreshewer of things contayned in the circute 
of this worlde, and yet he is blinde and dumbe in his owne doings."196 Having addressed 
mankind's vanity, Boaistuau explains how his program encourages self-reflection: 
 In consideration wherof (my good Lord) I haue vnto him addressed this   
 Rule, by the which he may contemplate and aduise, without being drawen   
 beside him selfe, his infirmitie and miserie, (to the ende) that making an   
 anotamie or foreshewing of all the partes of his life, he be the sooner   
 moued to detest & abhorre his vile and corrupt liuing. And if we would be  
 equitable Iudges of humaine actions, what is this worlde, anye other than a  
 Rule, circle or compasse, where as some play the handicraftes men, & of   
 base condicion, others represent Kings, Dukes, Earles, Marquesses,   
 Knights, Barons and others constituted in dignities, and notwithstanding,   
 assoone as they haue layde downe their maskings and disguisings, and that  
 death cometh, which maketh an ende of this bloudie Tragedie, then they   
 knowe themselues to be all men, and wretched sinners, and then the Lorde  
 God which is in heauen, laugheth at their foolish enterprises.197 
 
Here Boaistuau (translated by Alday) describes the examples provided by his book as a 
"Rule," meaning a measure or a standard of discrimination, while also using the term in 
the sense of "condition," as in a description of the state of the world.  His syntax, in fact, 
unites the two meanings in claiming that the theatrum mundi analogy provides readers 
with an "anotamie," a model of life which invites analysis and contemplation, a view or a 
conspectus of human behavior. 
 Boaistuau reduces earthly ranks to parts assumed in a tragedy, dismissing the 
importance of hierarchy while potentially discouraging contemplation about social 
relations. The author does not deny the existence of injustice in terrestrial affairs, but he 
personalizes and individualizes the problems of inequality as vice and sin. For Boaistuau, 
conditions, dignities, and ranks serve only as inessential masks, personas taken off at 
death. The device of the Theatrum Mundi, according to its author, enables readers to 
judge the virtue of men and women without reference to social status, and through 
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reflection, to scrutinize their own behavior, to see themselves in the examples provided 
by its text. In a dedicatory poem prefacing his translation, Alday makes both this purpose 
and the Ciceronian origin of the commonplace explicit, stating that his book presents the 
"finall scope, the totall ende, / the wandring steps wherein / Humanum genus seemes to 
tende."198 As in Philip Sidney's Defence of Poesy, "scope," adapted from the Greek, 
skopos, refers to the target or purpose of a piece of persuasion, the goal of learning.199 
Like many classical and early modern theorists, Alday conceptualizes the scope of 
reading as a journey, as wandering, and as nostos. But true to the title of the book he 
translates, Alday's governing metaphor is theatrical. He compares man's "scope" to "a 
pageant to begin, / Most like a Theater" which "as with Tulley's work" presents "a Glasse 
whereon to looke."200 That is, following Cicero's precepts, Alday offers his translation as 
a mirror which enables readers to examine their own performance of morality.  
 To an extent, the Theatrum Mundi explicitly articulates a set of cultural premises 
which Shakespeare's late romances implicitly model. As the following sections will 
show, The Tempest and The Winter's Tale literalize—in the same sense that the Globe's 
name and shape literalize—the comparison between theater and the world, creating a 
dense matrix of reference which significantly alters the social ramifications of what was 
even then a hoary commonplace. The problematic representations of characters such as 
Prospero and Leontes model a reaction to theatrical artifice, functioning as a "Rule, circle 
or compasse" which provides an "anotamie or foreshewing" of the audience's own 
morality. Yet unlike the use of this model in Boaistuau and Alday, this on-stage 
embodiment transforms social authority into a performance, one ostensibly open to the 
discernment of audiences.   
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II: Sight, Accommodating Performance, and The Winter's Tale 
At the beginning of The Tempest, Ariel fails to persuade a nearly archetypical patriarch 
using conventional oratory, provoking rage and threats after reminding Prospero about 
his promise of freedom. He then transitions to using music and visual proofs, both closely 
associated with theater, successfully inducing a performance of reformation from his 
audience. Although the resemblance has not been much remarked upon, in this respect, 
Ariel parallels another figure from Shakespeare's late romances: Paulina from The 
Winter's Tale. Both The Tempest and the earlier romance have obvious affinities, their 
genre for one, but both also explore the limitations of learning, inviting questions about 
the capacity for reformation, and about which forms of eloquence accomplish ethical 
instruction most effectively. Like The Tempest, the first half of The Winter's Tale depicts 
rhetorical failure. Leontes, as this section highlights, fixates on the visual while also 
suffering from an inability to correctly accommodate verbal arguments or ocular proofs 
within their proper context. In their way, the judicial orations spoken to Leontes’ court by 
Hermione and Paulina testify to the power of eloquence (3.2.21-200).201 The two women 
invent near-perfect arguments, paradigms of Ciceronian forensic oratory, yet the 
surprising efficacy of Mariana's language in Pericles, a tragicomic-romance which 
portrays rhetoric generating an almost magically efficacious response, meets its sinister 
reflection in The Winter's Tale. Techniques which, in theory, should succeed, fail utterly.  
But how closely does Hermione and Paulina’s oratory conform to classical and 
contemporary models? Quentin Skinner, writing about The Winter’s Tale in his recently 
published book on Shakespeare and forensic rhetoric, claims that “Hermione appears 
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entirely ignorant” in regards to the advice of classical orators on how to respond to a 
hostile judge. According to Skinner, Hermione “mounts three speeches in her own 
defense, but she largely contents herself with making an appeal to heaven while adding 
swelling protestations about her loyalty and her willingness to die.”202 Contra Skinner, 
Hermione only speaks a single oration at her trial, an apology that makes a remarkable 
case for her innocence through the invention of several different proofs. Leontes 
interrupts her three times, but the contours of her argument clearly follow classical 
precedent. Her protest that it does not matter how she defends herself because:  
Since what I am to say must be but that  
Which Contradicts my accusation, and  
The testimony on my part no other  
But what comes from myself, it shall scarce boot me 
To say ‘not guilty.’ Mine integrity  
Being counted falsehood shall as I express it, 
Be so received. (3.2 20-6)    
 
serves as her exordium, one that establishes that the accusations made against her stem 
from a predetermined belief about her character and not from any external evidence or 
enthymematic reasoning (categories which Aristotle refers to as extrinsic or intrinsic 
proofs). Her appeal to heaven about her innocence allows her to invent a narratio with 
what Cicero refers to as “weight,” “gravitate” (3.2.26-29). Cicero identifies two kinds of 
narrations, one based on events and one based on character, “personis.” Hermione clearly 
adopts the latter kind, “a “form of narrative…of such a sort that it can be seen not only in 
events but also the conversation and mental attitude of the characters.”203 The three 
points of her divisio consist of 1) her description about her faultless past conduct (3.2.30-
5), which alongside her background, descent, education, and her defiance in the face of 
death substantiates her “honour” and establishes her ethos both as a speaker and as a 
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defendant (3.2.35-40); 2) her reminder that she only fraternized with Polixines because 
Leontes commanded her to do so; and 3) her assertion that she has no idea why Camillo, 
whom she affirms as honest, fled the court (3.2.57-74). Her final claim not to fear 
Leontes’ judgment and her recounting of her sorrows and her forced separation from her 
children confirms her innocence and acts as her conclusio (3.2.89-114). Taken altogether, 
Hermione strongly defends herself, especially given that her opponent, who wields 
absolute power over her person, offers no rational proofs incriminating her in any way. 
Hermione, unfortunately, does not use the strategies recommended by early modern 
rhetorical manuals to specifically respond to tyrants. She does not, for instance, resort to 
philophronesis, the assuaging, gentle mode of speech which Henry Peacham recommends 
for such a situation.204 Nevertheless, the structure of her argument accords with several 
teachings from both classical and early modern rhetorical manuals.  
The first part of her divisio, for example, closely follows Peacham’s advice by 
using peristasis, the accumulation of personal detail, to amplify on her individual 
circumstances.205 Peacham recommends certain subjects as useful for this figure: 
“parentage, nation, countrie, kinde, age, education, difcipline, habite of bodie, fortune, 
condition, nature of the minde, ftudie, foredeeds, name, etc.”206 She follows Peacham’s 
list nearly to the letter. Hermione only fails because Leontes, his ratio corrupted, cannot 
fall under the influence of oratio. The King's diseased wit causes him to act under the 
mistaken belief that the visions he sees require no interpretation, that "cogitation" maps 
on perfectly to sight. Stated differently, Leontes makes no distinction between thought 
and the external world he witnesses with his eyes: 
 Ha' not you seen… 
 But that's past doubt: you have, or your eye-glass 
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 Is thicker than a cuckold's horn—or heard,— 
 For to a vision so apparent rumour 
 Cannot be mute—or thought—for cogitation 
 Resides not in that man that does not think— 
 My wife is slippery? (1.2.269-75) 
 
Unfortunately, the King denies the importance of accommodation where he needs it 
most: in his interactions with people of differing statuses and power, his communication 
with women, children, and subordinates. Leontes fails to recognize the profoundly 
overdetermined nature of reception, the reality that he de-facto mediates the objects of his 
senses through his own already socially situated perspective. When he asks the 
beleaguered Camillo if he "Ha' not seen," he uses the term in the sense of "understood" or 
"recognize," but the King confusedly transitions from the analogy between cognition and 
sight to referencing literal seeing in less than a sentence, in the space of a parenthetical 
dash. Acting like a cancer of the imagination, the deranged King's "sight" practically 
subsumes his other perceptions. Although Leontes remains unconscious of his 
preoccupation, he once again inadvertently indicts his vision at Hermione's trial: 
 There may be in the cup 
 A spider steeped, and one may drink, depart, 
 And yet partake no venom, for his knowledge 
 Is not infected; but if one present 
 Th' abhorred ingredient to his eye, make known 
 How he hath drunk, he cracks his gorge, his sides, 
 With violent hefts. I have drunk, and seen the spider. (2.1.41-7) 
 
Leontes presumably refers to witnessing signs of Hermione's infidelity and how this 
affects his mental state, but the nightmarish potency of the analogy, itself a vivid example 
of enargeia, paints vision in its entirety as a deadly poison.  
Ironically, the same susceptibility to visual influence which introduces tragedy 
into Sicilia opens the door for comedy in Bohemia. As with Prospero in The Tempest, 
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however, this performance of redemption depends upon a susceptibility to theatrical 
performance. From its Sicilian opening onward, The Winter’s Tale connects ethical 
reformation, performance, and sight. Leontes only realizes the destruction wrought by his 
unjust actions after the death of Mamillius and the apparent death of Hermione, but an 
earlier spectacle bridging religious ritual and theatrical display prepares the King to 
receive this epiphany. Moments before the trial, Apollo’s oracle, warning about the 
consequences of Leontes’ actions and judgements, enters the stage with attendants and 
officers, an arrival which probably resembled a procession in its original staging. 
Hermione's "death" itself functions as a kind of performance, one that transforms a trial 
into a tragedy, a courtroom into a stage. Bracketing off the possibility that Hermione 
actually perishes and is later resurrected as unlikely, the Queen either fakes her own 
demise or else Paulina, the figure who informs the court about Hermione’s “death,” 
creates an impromptu drama adapting a fainting spell into something more potent. The 
final turn—in which Paulina uses a "statue" of Hermione to stage a tableau of 
resurrection and reconciliation, developing this into an argument for the morality of 
theater, "an art," Leontes refers to as "magic," but a magic as "Lawful as eating" (5.3.110-
11)—extends a logic which originates from much earlier in the play.  
 On a superficial level, with its allusions to Giulio Romano and its famous living 
statue, the conclusion of The Winter's Tale unmistakably intervenes in the paragon 
debates, the traditional dispute between the word (poetry) and the image (the visual arts) 
concerning which mode of representation holds primacy, which medium has the greatest 
sway over the human mind. Yet just asserting that The Winter's Tale portrays theatrical 
performance as combining the best elements from both forms of mimesis only touches 
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the surface of the tragicomic-romance’s content. Like Prospero learning from Ariel in 
The Tempest, Leontes learns from Paulina how to perform as a virtuous actor on the 
world stage. More specifically, Paulina teaches Leontes how to act out certain cultural 
scripts, cultural habits which, when performed in an actual theater, double as literal 
scripts. Paulina teaches remorse, using ritual and display to cause the King of Sicilia to 
assume the role of a repentant sinner. Ashamed of his earlier crimes, the Leontes of The 
Winter's Tale's second half plays the part of the wayfaring and erring penitent. The 
Sicilian courtiers even directly frame this behavior as ethical role-playing: exhorting the 
still-grieving monarch to forgive himself and remarry, Cleomenes tells Leontes, "Sir you 
have done enough, and have performed / A saint-like sorrow" (5.1.1-2).207 This reference 
offhandedly linking performance and sanctity points to Paulina’s immersion of Leontes 
within a program of visual re-education, a theatrical curriculum drawing on a secularized 
form of religious discourse. To be more exact, The Winter’s Tale uses a set of topoi 
closely associated with Augustine’s and Erasmus’ interpretations of Paul, an 
understanding of the Saint as—to use Kathy Eden’s words—a “master-rhetorician and 
advocate for accommodation.”208  Suitably enough given that her name suggests she is a 
female version of the apostle, Paulina teaches more than the performance of faith; she 
teaches the practice of interpreting the objects of sight through an accommodating 
perspective. 
 As in Othello, another play about masculine paranoia over spousal fidelity, The 
Winter's Tale secularizes faith in God by identifying religious belief with faith in a loved 
one. The tragicomic-romance, nonetheless, pushes things further than the tragedy by 
closely associating religious belief with faith in theatrical illusion.209 The earlier work 
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codifies Othello's betrayal of Desdemona, his willingness to accept "ocular proof" at the 
expense of the less tangible, less visible, faith in female virtue, as a conversion away 
from Christianity, as a fall from and rejection of divine grace.210 Something similar 
occurs in The Winter's Tale. Both plays work off different aspects of Hebrews 11:1's 
assertion that "faith is the grounde of things which are hoped for, and the euidence of 
things which are not fene."211 This famous outline of Pauline faith stands in stark 
opposition to both Leontes' and Othello's obsession with the supposedly self-evident 
character of visual example. Hebrews, after all, compares relying on ocular proofs in 
matters of belief to heresy. The very next verse, for example, states that faith helps the 
saved recognize that God created the world ex nihilo, "fo that the things which we fe, are 
not made of things which did appeare," associating a focus on sight with the 
orthodoxically condemned belief that God shaped creation out of previously existing, 
eternal matter.212 Yet unlike in Othello, The Winter’s Tale suggests that certain forms of 
visual immersion possess redemptive qualities. Significantly, the success of these modes 
of persuasion depend upon the already alluded to Pauline/Augustinian understanding of 
proper accommodation: the idea that correct interpretation should be rooted in a spirit of 
generosity and faith—an ethos closely associated with the self-evaluative performance 
instilled in Leontes by Hermione.       
Structurally, The Winter's Tale resembles a narrative of conversion, even 
comparing in certain respects to a morality play, a representation of an individual's 
spiritual regeneration within the body of Christ. But the play’s romance elements, the 
references to pagan oracles, pastoral conventions, and impossible geographies strongly 
clash with the many references to providence and faith. Dismissing all these secular 
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narrative conventions as so much inessential outward show, as the external covering of a 
spiritual lesson, provides an easy solution to this dissonance. The effect of Paulina's 
exhortation to "awaken your faith," however, does not accrue power for any specific 
Church, whether Anglican, Protestant, Catholic, or otherwise. Instead, the play acquires 
influence for itself, encouraging audiences to fall under the affects of theater, to suspend 
disbelief, to lose oneself in the world of a fiction. The Winter's Tale's implausible turns, 
Bohemian coastlines, sudden bear attacks, and living statues repeatedly dare auditors to 
reject the play's enchantments while simultaneously using a form of persuasion based on 
the appropriation of religious topoi to discourage this response.  
 Nevertheless, the ambiguity between the religious and dramatic, between belief 
and performativity, spills over into the play's depiction of an attribute historically 
associated with the Reformation’s embrace of Augustinian theology: the Protestant focus 
on individual interiority. Despite containing a handful of the most vivid depictions of 
cognition in Shakespeare's canon, as both The Winter's Tale and The Tempest progress, 
the distinction between performing a role and the “authentic” expression of inner states 
first distorts and then collapses entirely. As my next few sections will show, in The 
Tempest, the audience's inability to access the genuineness of Prospero's conversion, 
whether his character has been changed by his experience on the island, and whether this 
even matters given his treatment of inferiors, causes the play's final resolution to seem 
equivocal. Likewise, The Tempest's audience lacks access to Antonio's interior state; his 
troubling silence when faced with Prospero's offer of forgiveness remains a loose end as 
the play finishes. The Winter's Tale's denouement features a similar tonal ambiguity. The 
avowed performativity of Leontes' reformation invites inquiries about the relationship 
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between his behavior and inner character. And in a reversal of The Tempest, Hermione, 
the wronged party, remains silent when pressed for forgiveness by her husband. Gestures 
bridge these silences in many staged productions of both plays, but leaving audiences 
without clear access to Antonio’s and Hermione's thoughts actually fits well with the 
tensions that animate these tragicomic-romances’ final moments. Both denouements 
trouble the concept of authenticity, reducing the distinction between the performance of 
behavior and inward motivation. Consequently, they also trouble the distinction between 
faith and outward show. 
Starting with Jacques' quasi-parodic evocation in his mock oration on the "seven 
ages of man," moving onto the many references that hold together both Hamlet the play 
and Hamlet the character, and finishing with Macbeth's "poor player / That struts and 
frets his hour on the stage," a reader could trace a small history of an idea by examining 
the theatrum mundi conceit’s relationship to Shakespearean interiority.213 Simply stated, 
when Shakespeare's characters demonstrate self-reflection, they often express 
psychological development or thought through this commonplace. But if the locus could 
express interiority, early modern readers also knew it could dangerously blur the line 
between seeming and being, between outside states and public roles, and between 
appearance and substance. Citing Petronius, Montaigne asserts: 
Most of our vacations [occupations] are like playes. Mundus universus exercet 
histrioniam. All the world doth practise stage-playing; we must play our parts 
duly, but as the part of a borrowed personage; we must not make real essence of a 
mask and outward appearance; nor of a strange person, our own; we cannot 
distinguish the skin from the shirt: ‘tis enough to meal the face, without mealing 
the breast. I see some who transform and transubstantiate themselves into as many 
new shapes and new beings as they undertake new employments; and who strut 
and fume even to the heart and liver, and carry their state along with them even to 
the close-stool: I cannot make them distinguish the salutations made to 
themselves from those made to their commission, their train, or their mule.214 
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The Winter's Tale second half takes this cultural anxiety to its logical conclusion by 
withholding many of the markers of psychological detail so prominent in its early acts. 
The “redeemed” Leontes of the play's Bohemian setting fails to provide a speech half as 
revealing as his earlier harangue on seeing "the spider." This may, in part, be a function 
of venue. Lorna Hutson links the London stage’s creation of the illusion of interiority to 
“a forensic conception of narrative which helps produce the complex temporal effects of 
different characterological ‘points of view.”215 Because of the close association between 
persona and forensic rhetoric, it makes a kind of sense that the focus on Leontes’ 
motivations and thought processes decrease once the scene shifts away from courtroom 
drama to pastoral reconciliation. In The Winter’s Tale’s second half, instead of being 
provided with the verbal accoutrements which create the illusion of characters possessing 
individual psychologies, audiences witness Leontes’ behavior, see him comport himself 
as the repentant sinner, and observe his response to the statue trick. This emphasis on 
visual example does not necessarily invalidate his conversion, but it forces onlookers to 
wonder about the events depicted on stage. Leontes, after all, initially stumbles due to an 
overreliance on sight, and this closing focus on ocular representation raises the possibility 
that audiences, too, could be misled by their senses.   
This loose end arises, I suggest, because Shakespeare’s play moves away from 
depicting ethical transformation as a product of discernable interior changes in favor of 
portraying alterations in behavior resulting from an actor critiquing his or her own moral 
performance. Because of this shift in emphasis, the tragicomic-romance troubles ethical 
justifications based on the expression of interior states while simultaneously reinforcing 
the efficacy of theatrical ritual. Stated differently, although The Winter’s Tale 
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interrogates the “authenticity” of Leontes’ motivations, this lack of closure only 
underscores how dramatic artifice ensures the play’s comedic ending. As the romance 
ends, while audiences may have warrantable doubts about Leontes’ integrity, they have 
little cause to question his receptivity to dramatic persuasion.  
 
III: Ariel’s Speaking Picture   
More overtly than The Winter's Tale, The Tempest’s representation of oratory and 
theatrical artifice takes place amid a crisis of authority, an interrogation of political 
legitimacy exemplified by the repetition of usurpations and attempted usurpations that 
structure the play's plot and its prehistory. In the romance's opening scene, the danger 
wrought by Prospero’s storm reveals hierarchy to be a social construction, a creation 
whose efficacy has contextual limitations. The boatswain’s question to Gonzalo, “What 
care these roarers for the name of king” (1.1.15-6), haunts all five acts of the play. 
Responding to the spirit underlying this question, Prospero represents himself as an 
enlightened humanist ruler unjustly deposed by his wicked brother, but the information 
provided to the audience about his reign muddies this legitimizing narrative. Explaining 
his past, Prospero boasts that he was reputed "for the liberal arts / Without a parallel" 
(1.2.73-4) while also admitting that instead of ruling wisely, he neglected "worldly ends, 
all dedicated/ To closeness and bettering of my mind" (1.2.89-90). As many 
commentators have noted, Prospero, a bad humanist, reverses the ideal of vita activa by 
using his public position as a foundation for the contemplative life.216 Still, like any 
proponent of the liberal arts, he uses eloquence to achieve his goals. His recital of his 
history before Miranda, his pageant-like attempts to control the men and women around 
115 
him, all point to a kind of pedagogy, a manipulative, controlling, even domineering 
method of teaching. His lesson to Miranda repeats a variation of "mark me" or "obey me" 
seven times in just over a hundred lines (1.2.56-185). His relations with servants are 
likewise fraught not only with abusive language but with the threat of violence.  
 Caliban's presence proves particularly irksome. Miranda and her father both 
depend upon his labor for survival, but the monster-servant's protestations present a 
counter-narrative to Prospero's attempts to extol his right to rule. Caliban portrays 
Prospero as another usurper, one in a long line of figures to illegitimately dominate the 
island. More than that, the monster asserts ownership over the island for himself, a claim 
based on his descent from his mother, Sycorax. The articulation of this narrative within 
the play does not imply audiences should entirely accept Caliban’s claims or that The 
Tempest depicts him as a noble figure; Caliban inadvertently confesses that his mother 
only assumed ruler-ship after having been banished from Algiers. A colonizer herself, 
Sycorax's history exactly parallels Prospero's: both magic-users conquered the island 
after having been banished from their homeland, and both used coercion to control the 
island's original inhabitants. Caliban's claims have the advantage of precedence, but the 
play does not portray this argument as any more valid than Prospero's humanist 
justifications. Instead of validating either claim, The Tempest muddies the difference 
between the various usurpers. The romance's web-like network of parallelisms ironize 
pretensions to right of rule. In the end, only Prospero's decision to give up the island 
separates magician from witch. 
 Ariel, a figure with a stronger claim to priority on the island than either Sycorax 
or Prospero, poses a different set of challenges. Because of his apparent submission to 
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Prospero, traditional—i.e. humanist or romantic—readings of The Tempest tend to regard 
the spirit as an extension of his master, as either a quasi-allegoric or even an entirely 
allegoric representation of the imaginative faculty. This traditionalist reading defines 
Ariel as an attribute of Prospero. Recent postcolonial readings, on the other hand, define 
the spirit in opposition to the more overtly rebellious Caliban.217 Ariel’s actions 
throughout The Tempest, however, play a more determinative role in the tragicomedy’s 
plot than either approach generally acknowledges. While not as obviously rebellious as 
Caliban, Ariel successfully influences Prospero at key junctures. If the romance's 
conclusion gestures toward a measure of redemption, this is effected, not through the 
discourse of self-mastery that Prospero invokes to justify his control over the Island, nor 
through Caliban's activity, but through an acceptance of limitations engendered by Ariel's 
skillful manipulation of visual performance. Paralleling Paulina’s use of theatrical 
manipulation to turn Leontes away from paranoia and toward repentance in The Winter’s 
Tale, Ariel uses artifice to convince Prospero to eschew revenge and abdicate power. In 
many respects, Ariel’s “speaking pictures” hold the plot of Shakespeare’s romance 
together, dominating events and influencing characters. While the spirit diligently fulfills 
Prospero's commands, he also uses his songs and pageants to speak not just for Prospero 
but to him. His famous song to Ferdinand, for instance, one of the most familiar passages 
from the play, presents the prince with the image of his father's decaying corpse, 
convincing the young man that his father is dead, but the song also works to persuade 
Prospero, who is, after all, observing Ferdinand's reaction as an invisible spectator, to 
come to terms with the inevitability of his own eventual demise (1.2.399-405).  
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The wedding masque that Ariel stages as a demonstration of Prospero's abilities 
functions similarly. As Stephen Orgel long ago pointed out in a classic study, The 
Tempest’s representation of the wedding masque moves through different seasons and 
ends with the threat of death in the form of Caliban's uprising.218 Prospero intends to use 
this masque to restore order to the play-world, to facilitate an end to the disruption of 
hierarchy that has been ubiquitous throughout The Tempest since its first scene. The 
storm at sea, the storm rocking the ship of state, and the storm in Prospero's mind are all 
connected at this moment as the entertainment Prospero thinks he controls veers off 
course when it unexpectedly causes him to recognize his own mortality. Faced with 
Ferdinand and Miranda’s disquieted response to his sudden eruption of anger, Prospero 
acknowledges his "vexed" mental state, asking Ferdinand to "Bear with my weakness. 
My old brain is troubled. / Be not disturbed with my infirmity" (4.1.160-163). The exiled 
Duke begins to realize that the control he exhibits over the external storm does not 
necessarily extend to his own internal tempest. More crucially, the masque inaugurates a 
conceptual shift. Prospero begins comforting Ferdinand by assuring the prince that what 
he witnessed was accomplished by "our actors," but eventually comes to include himself 
in the performance, transitioning from describing actors as something he owns to 
admitting that "We are such stuff / as dreams are made on" (4.1.156-7). In including 
himself as an actor in the world's theater, Prospero begins to evaluate his own ethical 
role-playing through the theatrum mundi analogy.   
With his master reflecting on his moral performance, Ariel brings the image of the 
innocent but distressed Gonzalo before Prospero's already vexed inward sense: "His tears 
run down his beard like winter's drops / From eaves of reeds. Your charm so strongly 
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works 'em / That if you now beheld them, your affections / Would become tender" 
(5.1.20-5). Ariel's enargeiac language ironically succeeds in allowing Prospero to behold 
Gonzalo, performing the very feat discussed only in the subjunctive sense. The references 
to the councilor's beard, the wintry mix of his tears, and the comparison between his face 
and a reed roof, all calculatingly highlight the age and fragility of the man Prospero 
recognizes as saving both his and Miranda’s life after Antonio’s coup. When Prospero 
inquires whether Ariel sincerely believes his passions would be triggered by the sight of 
the enchanted Gonzalo, the spirit replies, "Mine would, sir, were I human" (5.1.26). The 
spirit's qualification forces Prospero to evaluate his actions from the standpoint of the 
human community; to do otherwise would be to undermine the distinction between spirit 
and human, servant and master, that justifies the wizard’s rule in the first place. 
Prospero's positive response," And mine shall," pointedly acknowledges the power of 
Ariel's discourse. As Leah Whittington notes, by "Ventriloquizing the suffering of the 
Italian lords, and making them into independent epicenters of feeling, Ariel is given 
a…voice to stir Prospero’s compassion. Thorough Ariel’s mediation, Prospero comes 
near to the point of identification with his enemies."219 More than a representation of 
persuasion, this penultimate exchange between Prospero and Ariel serves as The 
Tempest's denouement. Prospero announces his preference for forgiveness over revenge 
(5.1.34-7) and then "abjures" his magic in a long monologue imitating Ovid's Medea, the 
recounting of his otherworldly feats acting as an exorcism of the specter that has loomed 
over his character since Act One: the possibility of becoming another Sycorax (5.1.42-
67). Including the romance's epilogue, the final moments of the play enact a final attempt 
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at performing forgiveness and reconciliation, a performance which, while not entirely 
convincing, serves as a last embrace of the theatrum mundi commonplace.   
In the end, Prospero condemns and forgives his traitorous brother in one breath, 
an unconvincing staging of reconciliation. Antonio, for his part, only responds to his 
brother's efforts with an uncomfortable silence. The problems of authority and 
legitimation that The Tempest foregrounds remain unsolved by the play's conclusion. As 
Harry Berger observes, Prospero wants to narrate a story about redemption and 
forgiveness, and all the elements for this story are in place, but the play can just as easily 
be read as being about a lack of empathy and reconciliation.220 Far from masterminding 
and controlling the events of The Tempest like a playwright orchestrating a drama, the 
wizard loses control of his inventio. Prospero attempts to stage a courtly pageant as a 
reaffirmation of his power and status, but Ariel converts this into something decidedly 
more popular, achieving his goals through the application of a set of persuasive practices 
closely aligned both with commercial theater and with a romance tradition famous for 
incorporating smaller texts, such as songs, lyric poems, digressive stories, and ekphrastic 
descriptions, within a larger narrative. 
 
IV: Romance, Interiority, and the Performance of Power 
Shakespeare’s late romances, then, depict the theatrum mundi commonplace encouraging 
ethical evaluation, but the knowing fictionality of The Winter’s Tale and The Tempest, 
the artificiality of the invention displayed, also point toward the unnaturalness of social 
formations as portrayed in these plays. These texts problematize interiority, moving 
beyond the examination of individual subjectivities into something considerably broader, 
something more performative and less directly connected with the emergence of the 
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liberal subject than descriptions of Shakespearean interiority often allow for. Victoria 
Kahn has recently shown that early modern writers could conceptualize political and 
legal theories as profoundly similar to poetics. Certain sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
intellectuals turned away from essentialist validations for authority—from transcendental 
justifications of the state—in favor of a epistemic and ontological break, one more radical 
than the later (more decisive) rupture from older forms of legitimation made in the 
eighteenth century.221 Kahn describes this break, manifested among other places in the 
contract theory of Hobbes and the creative power to shape experience modeled in 
Machiavelli, as a linguistic turn toward understanding social formations as poiesis, a form 
of “making” with the power to bring new social artifacts into existence.222 This rupture 
lacked the staying power of the eighteenth-century enlightenment, but persisted as a point 
of contention, becoming relevant again, according to Kahn, because of the current crisis 
in liberalism.223 One argument made in this chapter is that The Winter’s Tale and The 
Tempest, in reworking of the theatrum mundi commonplace, participate in this early 
modern break from forms of legitimation which rationalize social structures as “natural” 
or divinely inspired. At the same time, the equivocality of the motions toward 
reformation made by Leontes and Prospero partially arises because the fantasy enacted in 
each romance fails to truly settle the problems of the play-world, problems resulting from 
patriarchal authority, class exploitation, and from the competing demands of society. 
Modeling ethicality and sovereignty as a form of performance creates room to 
reconceptualize and even interrogate conditions, but this depiction offers no obvious 
solution to conflict beyond the conceptual power of performative evaluation and the 
transformative sway of theatrical influence.  
121 
That, however, serves as the scope, to return to a term favored by both Sidney and 
Alday, of Shakespeare’s late turn to tragicomic-romance. Both The Winter’s Tale and The 
Tempest portray popular drama, embodied in theatrical devices and the conventions of 
romance, as a force which facilitates evenhanded and efficacious exchanges between 
socially unequal speakers and auditors. These tragicomic-romances draw upon a cultural 
stratification which identified a receptivity to romance with nonelite audiences—with 
women, servants, the uneducated, and the young.224 Even The Winter's Tale's title 
suggests an association with women and with popular culture: a "winter's tale" being 
effectively synonymous with "old wives’ tale." Yet, however ostensibly popular, both 
tragicomic-romances are careful not to ostracize elites. These plays were probably first 
performed in the Blackfriars theater, the King’s Men’s winter playhouse, which based on 
its prices—sixpence for an inexpensive seat—catered to audiences of a higher social class 
than those that frequented the Globe.225 Simon Forman’s diary, conversely, records a 
performance of The Winter’s Tale at the larger venue on May 15th 1611.226 Although no 
record of its performance exists, the metatheatrical allusions to the popular theater’s 
shape strongly suggest that The Tempest, too, was staged at the Globe.227 Apart from 
these performances, both tragicomic-romances were performed for the Court at Whitehall 
during the festivities for Princess Elizabeth's marriage to Frederick V of the Palatine in 
1613.228 Located in an increasingly cosmopolitan city, at a time of increasing social 
mobility, and catering to a heterogeneous audience, Shakespeare’s plays appealed to men 
and woman from all the social strata—a spectrum which included everyone from nobility 
to merchants, from housewives to lawyers, and from royalty to servants. As seen in 
antitheatrical discourse, this position as a space in which classes and genders mingled 
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created a stigma depriving playacting of cultural prestige. Antithetically, this peripheral 
situation also afforded possibilities, opportunities for identification which Shakespeare’s 
theater fully exploited. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
“NOT MUCH TO BE MARKED, AND LESS RESISTED”: MARY WROTH’S 
URANIA, ORDINARY SPEECH, AND THE END OF EARLY MODERN 
ROMANCE 
 
Although it has not been much remarked upon, the representation of oratory stands 
among the earliest generic conventions disrupted in Mary Wroth’s Urania. This 
dissertation has shown that English romances following Sidney portray oratory as 
inefficacious, morally dubious, or as both inefficacious and morally dubious. While 
portraying oratory negatively, Sidnean romance simultaneously models poetic discourse 
successfully mediating between characters of different statuses and genders. I now want 
to suggest that The Countess of Montgomery’s Urania breaks this pattern by portraying 
particular forms of persuasion as both ethical and effective. This upending of convention 
becomes evident in the text’s opening tableau when Urania, the romance’s eponymous 
heroine, counsels the beleaguered Perissus to abandon despair and attempt to rescue his 
mistress, Limena, from her abusive and tyrannical husband, Philargus. Before the events 
of the narrative, Perissus and Limena had fallen into a chaste love, a relationship which 
remained unconsummated due to the presence of Philargus. Unfortunately, Philargus 
grew suspicious of his wife and—with Perissus off fighting in a military campaign—
tortured her, attempting to force Limena to betray her lover while also threatening the 
princess with death. Desperate to limit the harm caused by Philargus’ wraith, Limena 
clandestinely composed and sent a letter to Perissus alerting him to her impending demise 
and requesting that he not seek revenge for her murder, a request he fulfilled by retreating 
into the cave-like hermitage where Urania discovers him lamenting his misfortune. Upon 
hearing his tale of woe, Urania devises a complex argument based upon the possibility of 
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Limena still being alive and the necessity of avenging her if she has been murdered. 
Following Urania’s counsel, Perissus will ultimately rescue his, very much alive, 
mistress. Significantly, in a romance marked by betrayal and infidelity, Perissus and 
Limena will go on to have one of the few stable and happy marriages within the text.   
This positive representation of persuasion establishes the Urania as a new kind of 
romance, one with a different relationship to rhetoric than the previous works discussed 
in this dissertation. Unlike Sidney’s Arcadia, Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, or 
Shakespeare’s late tragicomic-romances, Wroth’s Urania does not contrast oratory with 
poetic conceits in order to justify or legitimate fiction. Instead of making an argument 
about poetics and rhetoric, Wroth highlights discourses which efficaciously bridge the 
chasm between personal expression and public utility.229 Suggestively, Wroth opens her 
romance with an affirmative display of aristocratic, female eloquence; she begins the 
Urania by modeling a noblewoman successfully intervening in an ethical controversy 
containing both personal and public dimensions. More precisely, Urania’s language 
convinces Perissus to resume the active life, the vita active, the traditional goal of 
humanist persuasion. Yet while the text clearly juxtaposes Perissus’ initial malaise with 
the ideal of vita active, answering the question of how Urania’s discourse fits into 
humanist conceptions of eloquence poses a set of difficulties which will occupy my 
argument throughout most of this chapter. The heroine’s speech, while broadly 
recognizable as deliberative oratory—in the sense that she persuades someone to take an 
action—bears little resemblance to many of the traditional canons of classical rhetoric. 
While Urania uses inventio to create a series of proofs to convince Perissus, deploying 
tropes and figures to bolster the efficacy of her argument, she does not structure her 
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“oration” to conform to any kind of classical model. Even a Ramist conception of 
rhetoric, with its heavy emphasis on elocutio, would be too focused, too systematic and 
theoretical, to include this representation of oratory under its banner.230 Wroth, of course, 
knew rhetorical conventions and the proper structure for an oration. She grew up in 
Penshurst Place, an important center of learning, and was extraordinarily well-educated 
thanks to the services of a series of tutors. 231 Nevertheless, Urania’s speech to Perissus 
does not follow the usual precepts—for example, structuring a speech into the six parts of 
an oration as recommended in the Rhetorica ad Herennium.232 Wroth instead depicts 
Urania as persuading Perissus using ordinary speech, non-technical language marked by 
clearness (disertus)  and intelligence but which authorities such as Cicero had 
characterized as distinct from “true” eloquence.233 As a concept described by its contrast 
with persuasion as a system, providing an ostensive definition of this delimited form of 
argument can be difficult, but in general I follow the interlocuter Antonius in Cicero’s De 
Oratore by using the term as a form of everyday praxis devoid of theoretical 
justifications. Placed back in the context of Wroth’s narrative, the casualness of the 
romance’s representation of oratory ensures that Urania’s intervention does not accrue 
authority for rhetorical theory, or even for a form of rhetorical-poetics. Instead of 
accruing authority for either rhetoric or poetry, the romance localizes the effect created 
by this portrayal, encouraging readers to accept the entrance of a female author of secular 
texts into the public space created by the circulation of fiction.  
The medium of Urania’s delivery plays an important role in the romance’s 
representation of female ordinary speech; Wroth takes a significant risk in modeling 
discursive efficacy through direct interpersonal communication, a risk she turns to her 
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advantage. Authorities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries frequently and 
disdainfully codified female writing as analogous to the female voice—and even to the 
female body. As Mary Ellen Lamb points out, “There is, in fact…evidence of the blurring 
of speaking and writing as distinct activities,” a perception of the physical presence of a 
text as linked to the physical presence of the author which “was probably possible only in 
a recently literate society in which writing still bore traces of orality.”234 Far from 
distancing the Urania from the body of its author, however, this representation of 
persuasion embraces the connection between the circulation of romance and the 
perception of the female voice. The Urania, in this section of its narrative, executes a 
reversal within the network of associations which generally limited expressive possibility 
for early modern women. Extending and enlarging the loci available for female discourse, 
the success of Wroth’s portrayal of Urania’s persuasion relies on a troika of ordinary 
speech, gendered embodiment, and a manipulation of romance convention, all of which 
will be traced throughout the course of this chapter.         
As the following sections will show, Wroth’s depiction of successful ordinary 
speech contests the traditional connection between efficacious discourse and moral 
“virtue,” a quality traditionally codified as a civic expression of masculinity, something 
Wroth embodies throughout this episode, although in very different forms, through both 
Perissus and Philargus. The representation of Urania’s speech to Perissus responds to and 
critiques the fantasy—traced throughout this dissertation—of poetry allowing ethical 
exchanges across the social strata. But rather than entirely undermining the idea of a form 
of language capable of mediating between speakers of different genders and ranks, Wroth 
creates a permutation on Sidnean rhetorical-poetics, substituting an argument about poetic 
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efficacy for something both more localized and centered on narrative. The exchange 
between Urania and Perissus does not accrue authority for women, as a category, to enter 
into public discourse; instead of opening a door, this moment cracks it ajar slightly, just 
wide enough to allow particular figures to enter. Urania, according to the logic of this 
episode, can speak to Perissus because of her personal excellencies, naturalized, although 
with a tincture of irony, as inherent to members of her place in the social hierarchy. This 
restriction limits the feminist potential of this subversion by failing to make an argument 
for female capacity in toto. Instead of making an argument about the worth of female 
speech as a class, this constraint represents persuasion’s efficacy as contingent upon 
circumstances, the ethos of a speaker, and the ability to take advantage of the determinative 
opportunity offered by the propriety of a given moment, the kairos of the instant.235 While 
Wroth does not blatantly advocate for female equality, in rejecting high ideals, she still 
presents a pragmatic model of efficacious exchange in specific circumstances between 
speakers of different genders. 
This persuasive strategy pushes outward, creating an opening for forms of elite 
female discourse. Yet, although privileged and contingent, the public, civically-oriented 
nature of Urania’s intervention challenges the notion that Wroth figures the preconditions 
of female authorship as a contained space. Arguments about self-reflexivity abound 
throughout Wroth scholarship, but these readings generally assume a model of female 
authorship focused on private spaces, emblematic locations allowing discursively rich but 
politically circumscribed expressions of female interiority. Concentrating on Pamphilia, 
often identified as an exact surrogate for Wroth, twentieth- and twenty-first century readers 
have looked toward the locked cabinet containing the heroine’s poetry as emblematic of 
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the isolation of female writing from society.236 Conventionally seen, Philip Sidney models 
romance as political intervention; his niece, on the other hand, uses the genre to express 
subjective experiences. Bucking this tendency, I want to argue that Wroth, through the 
exchange between Urania and Perissus, manipulates and inverts familiar narrative patterns 
in romance in order to establish a social role for select forms of female discourse. Aside 
from broadening the scope of our understanding of Wroth’s project, this focus on a Uranian 
political intervention pushes back against a gendered division figuring female authors and 
readers as concerned with emotional responses and masculine writers and audiences as 
concerned with more conventionally intellectual content, a form of marginalization which 
emerged in the early modern period and which still colors our reception both of romance 
and female discourse today. Wroth’s exploration of convention repeatedly highlights how 
control over stories enables female speakers to enter into public discourse in order to 
promote the social good. The Urania, like the Arcadia and moments in Book Five of The 
Faerie Queene, models a form of exemplarity possessing social power.  
The opening section of this chapter begins to trace this exemplarity by examining 
how both Perissus and Philargus serve as different embodiments of fallen virtue, paradigms 
of masculinity challenged by Urania’s own personification of the chivalric ideal. My 
second section demonstrates how Urania’s personification advocates for a form of 
liminality—closely associated with romance as a genre—which the text codifies as 
redemptive of erotic desire. I next explain how Urania’s “ordinary speech” responds to the 
crises of the 1620s, how informal persuasion in the Urania bridges private expression and 
political action. This chapter concludes by placing the opening of the Urania within the 
romance’s larger representation of persuasion; in this final section, I argue that throughout 
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her text, Wroth links discursive efficacy with the ability to negotiate complex and 
potentially vexed social situations via the use of fictional or semi-fictional narratives, a 
claim based on Urania’s persuasion and an example of narratological failure spoken by 
Pamphilia’s rival, Antissia, much later in the text. I end my chapter by suggesting how 
Wroth’s representation of social navigation as narrative anticipates elements of novelistic 
realism. 
 
I: Perissus’ Chauvinism and Urania’s Embodiment  
A concern with female communication and masculine prerogatives both foregrounds and 
forecloses Urania’s encounter with Perissus. When the despairing lover first notices 
Urania intruding upon his hermitage, he disparages her due to her gender, first mistaking 
the woman for one of the furies and then, upon realizing her humanity, dismissing the 
shepherdess. “Now I see you are a woman,” he tells her when she asks about his sorrow, 
“and therefore not much to be marked, and lesse resisted” (4.27-28).237 Seen against the 
circumstances of his adversity, a situation caused by Philargus’ distrust of women and by 
a dynastic conception of marriage which forbids Limena from pursuing the object of her 
desire, Perissus’ casual misogyny ultimately implicates him in his own misfortune. More 
crucially, when Perissus initially belittles Urania for daring to speak, the moment 
emblematically raises questions about the decorum of a female author publishing a 
secular work of literature. Perissus, at this juncture, simulates readers skeptical or hostile 
to the Urania itself. Faced with a woman intruding upon a male space and making an 
unsolicited statement, the knight articulates an objection to the propriety of female 
language-use, one which clearly has resonances extending toward Wroth’s own 
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circulation of her romance and even toward her entering the world of print. If Perissus 
expresses a sentiment hostile to the possibility of female authorship, Urania’s response, in 
turn, serves as a refutatio countering this objection.       
 Urania, instead of outright challenging Perissus’ characterization of her 
unworthiness, builds a bridge to the Sicilian prince by telling him of her own distress 
stemming from her lack of knowledge about the identity of her biological parents (4.35-
42). Explaining to Perissus that she herself entered the hermitage to find ease in 
solitariness establishes her ethos as someone who has also experienced troubles, a 
construction which enables the knight to look past his misgivings about Urania’s gender. 
Met with this adaptation, Perissus explicitly rationalizes his decision to tell his tale of 
woe based upon this shared affinity between speaker and listener: “because you are, or 
seem to be afflicted, I will not refuse to satisfie your demaund” (5.2-3). Urania’s gesture 
sets the pattern for what follows while also revealing the limitations of this approach. 
Modeling a responsiveness to circumstances, she quickly evaluates Perissus’ character 
and then invents a strategy which would appeal to his person. Her pragmatic response 
creates the opportunity to persuade the prince but does not substantially alter his opinion 
about female worthiness. Even after accepting the soundness of Urania’s advice, he 
attributes her level-headedness to her class position: “too much judgement I finde in you, 
to be directly, as you seem, a mere Shepherdesse, nor is that beauty sutable to that 
apparell” (16.1-3). Upon learning that Urania does not know her lineage, Perissus 
responds by exclaiming, “This doe I well credit…for more like a Princesse, then a 
Shepherdesse doe you appeare, and so much doe I reverence your wisdome” (16.11-13). 
Perissus’ statements only superficially contradict each other: Urania seems “like a mere 
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Shepherdesse” but she appears “like a Princesse.” The knight, however, refers in the first 
statement to Urania’s apparel and in the second to the quality of her mind. Urania’s 
beauty and speech validate her persuasive acts; for Perissus, they alter the propriety of a 
woman advising a man to take a particular course of action. By accommodating her 
speech toward her audience, Urania persuades despite his manifest chauvinism.  
In tandem with selecting proofs which directly address the knight’s situation and 
character, Urania also encourages the Sicilian by manipulating the chivalric conventions 
of romance which the despairing lover has internalized. Perissus’ stagnation results from 
his adherence to a code of conduct which requires him to obey his mistress, whom the 
knight describes as the “Commandresse of my soule” (14.13). Throughout the narration 
of his unhappy love, Perissus adopts the analogy comparing lovers to “servants,” a 
familiar comparison which has obvious sexual connotations but also points toward a 
genuine obligation to adhere to commands. Against this, Urania points to the imperative 
from the same chivalric tradition to perform great acts, feats of arms fought in honor of a 
beloved yet expressive of masculine virtue. Urania repeatedly genders Perissus’ 
inactivity, even codifying his protestations of woe as “woman-like complaints.” This 
description of Perissus’ lamentations does not necessarily prove that Urania accepts the 
knight’s judgements about her gender; Urania’s attitude at this moment is subtly but 
recognizably performative. To affect her audience, she becomes a mirror modeling 
Perissus’ ethos back to the forlorn prince, an example both of prosopopoeia, the imitation 
of a personage, and ethopoeia, the impersonation of character. Referring to Perissus’ 
honor, virtue, judgment, and discretion, she claims that “these [qualities] invite me, as 
from your self, to speake for your selfe” (15.16-7). In reflecting Perissus’ principles and 
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prejudices back toward him, Urania stresses martial valor over obedience. According to 
Urania, the knight’s retreat from the world is in “no way befitting the valiant Perissus, but 
like a brave Prince, if you know shee bee dead, revenge her death on her murderers; and 
after, if you will celibrate her funeralls with your owne life giving, that will be a famous 
act: so may you gain perpetuall glorie, and repay the honor to her dead, which could not 
bee but touched by her untimely end” (15.18-22). Urania calls Perissus to fulfill the 
masculine role he clearly identifies with; literally she calls him to rededicate his life to 
glory through feats of arms in honor of his beloved; more abstractly and less explicitly, 
she calls him to act as a figure of romance. Urania’s ethopoeia becomes a form of 
exemplification in which the heroine uses her imitation not to perform as a man but to 
figuratively embody a masculine ideal. Deeply affected, Perissus responds positively to 
Urania’s idealized impersonation of his own self-image. Once Urania further reconciles 
his desire for glory with his obligation to fulfill Limena’s command by surmising, with 
probable correctness, that Limena only requested he not attempt to avenge her out of a 
concern for his safety, he springs into action (15.29-40).                
 The text portrays Perissus’ recommitment to the chivalric code as a return to the 
active life. In his own words, “I againe put on those habites which of late I abandoned” 
(15.41-2). He then retrieves his armor, an emblem of masculine fortitude which he had 
left outside his cave hanging on a large holly tree, his resumption of his “habites” 
becoming physically embodied in steel, shield, and weapons. The Urania complicates 
this reassertion of masculine prerogative by having Perissus ascribe his activity to 
Urania’s agency. Referring to the power of Urania’s mind and argumentation, he asks, “Is 
Perissus the second time conquer’d?” before concluding that “I must obey that reason 
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which abounds in you; and to you, shall the glory of this attempt now belong” (15.39-41). 
This admission blurs the line between the efficacy of physical action and female speech. 
Urania’s “reason,” in a sense, becomes the cause efficient of chivalric action. More than 
that, much later in the romance, upon Limena’s liberation from Philargus’ tyranny, this 
narrative thread concludes in a second exhibition of female discourse, another example of 
female reasoning: Limena completes the narration which Perissus had only initiated with 
Urania, explaining to her beloved (and to the Urania’s readers) the events that befell her 
after the conclusion of Perissus’ tale (87.18-88.34). Limena, ultimately, has the final say. 
As Helen Hacket points out, “Limena’s…victory over Philargus is perhaps most marked 
by the fact that the episode ends with her voice, with her telling her own story.”238 In this 
case, the Urania’s portrayal of the active life cohabitates with and provides a space for 
Urania and Limena to gain a measure of control over the description of their lived 
experience.  
 The Urania achieves this cohabitation though a complex web of mediations, 
networks linking knightly accoutrements to the language spoken by female characters. As 
already alluded to, Perissus’ armor mediates between the prince and the outside world; he 
cannot resume his previous “habits” without first donning the coverings which protect his 
body and allow him to navigate a maze of dangerous social and martial situations. 
Perissus’ armor, in short, enables his private person to participate in public events. In a 
text marked with the threat of violence against female bodies—Philargus’ torture of 
Limena, for example—language develops into a tool which has a broadly similar use for 
well-speaking women. As Hackett observes, “narrative in the Urania…is a medium 
which lies between public and private, because it involves the representation of personal 
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experience to an audience.”239  This mediation, however, goes beyond the depiction of 
human psychology; like Perissus’ armor, it allows Urania and Limena to act publicly and 
to influence the men and women surrounding them without directly exposing their 
persons to hazard.  
In any case, the representation of and focus on female interiority, although often 
associated with the Urania, is hardly confined to Wroth’s permutation on romance. Helen 
Cooper, among many other scholars of the genre, has traced a focus throughout medieval 
and Renaissance romance on female subjectivity, a concern for women’s interiority 
linked to “the awakening of their sexuality.”240 The tradition in English romance 
inaugurated by the Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia further increased this emphasis, both 
through Sidney’s representation of Pamelia and Philoclea and, in Mary Ellen Lamb’s 
words, “by privileging a woman as its reader…its very title bestow[ing] a position as 
subject to a woman.”241 As Cooper points out, throughout romance’s history as a genre, 
“women’s sexuality is centrally regraded as positive, to the point where it is one of the 
key factors that enables the restoration of social and providential order.”242  This 
restoration, however, is conventionally effected through male activity inspired by desire 
for a beloved. In this long-established formulation, women serve as agents but not 
particularly forceful ones. 
The Urania transforms this pattern by substituting the passive desire for a female 
lover for the active impetus of female “reason,” a term which broadly suggests force of 
argumentation but more narrowly hints at Urania’s deployment of logos as a proof. Even 
Perissus comes close to acknowledging this substitution when he links Urania to Limena. 
“So much doe I reverence your wisdome,” he tells the heroine, that “as next unto Limena, 
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I will still most honor you” (16.12-13). He then makes a vow to pursue Philargus, 
swearing upon Urania’s person as though she were indeed his beloved (16.14-16).  
Traditionally composed by men but strongly associated with a female audience,243 
romances—especially instances of the genre descended from Arthurian legend and the 
chansons de gestes tradition—move between representations of socially permissible, 
masculine violence and portrayals of both male and female interiorities.244 Wroth’s 
depiction of Urania’s persuasion operates within the spaces created by this inheritance, 
taking advantage of romance’s alternation between and codification of masculine and 
feminine ethos. Performing as Perissus’ better self, at once both male and female, Urania 
textually inhabits romance conventions to participate in the humanist project of 
deliberating on how men and women should live and act in the world.  
 
II: The Urania on the Boundary 
Urania’s impersonation of the chivalric ideal fits into a pattern featured throughout 
Limena’s narrative, a focus on liminality, a fixation on the way that thresholds and mixed 
states enable desiring subjects to push against social conventions. This emphasis on 
liminality becomes a form of resistance codified in the text as moral and even 
redemptive. Initially, Perissus’ cave serves as a liminal area, something between a private 
room and the wilds of the island. Within the confines of this hermitage, identities shift 
and fluctuate. At first, the Urania portrays this vacillation in identity as threatening. As 
the romance opens, with her origins occluded, Urania finds herself in a full-blown crisis 
in self-conception as she enters the cave. Confronted with Limena’s potential demise, 
Perissus’ self-concept, both as a warrior and a lover, had earlier collapsed, resulting in his 
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initial stagnation. More than any other figure in the text, Limena, whose name 
etymologically connects her to the concept, evokes identity at a threshold; caught 
between love for Perissus and duty to Philargus, her situation dramatizes a split produced 
by the demands of gendered expectation and personal desire.245 In a conceptually 
capacious sense, the whole episode associates liminality in identity with social strain. But 
if one form of liminality results from conflict, another resolves it. The romance represents 
Urania’s verbal hybridity, her personification of aretaic striving for fame and praise, as 
productive. As she persuades Perissus, Urania convinces her audience by assuming a 
textual role conventionally understood as at odds with her gender.  
To some extent, this liminality reflects Wroth’s own position as an author; her 
text’s representation of persuasion acknowledges and accepts the charges of hybridity 
and hermaphroditism that critics would inevitably level at any woman circulating a self-
authored secular text. But the text transforms these potential attacks into something 
desirable, making disadvantage into advantage, deficit into virtue. This circuitous 
approach evidently appealed to readers and writers of female-authored romances, 
especially those written in imitation of Sidney: Mary Wroth was far from the only female 
author of romance in the seventeenth century to adopt this stance. The paratextual 
materials prefacing Anna Weamys’ Continuation of Sir Philip Sidney’s Arcadia, for 
instance, returned to the invention of authorial hermaphroditism as late as 1651. In a 
prefatory dedicatory poem, an unknown author, “Mistress F.W.,” justifies Weamy’s 
daring to complete Sidney’s fragment with a conceit explaining how Sidney’s spirit, 
through “metempsychosis,” coupled with Weamys’ body and mind in order to complete 
his unfinished text. Sidney, according to F.W., “breathes through Female Organs, yet 
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retains / His masculine vigour in Heroick strains. / Who hears’t may some Amazon seem 
to be / Not Mars but Mercury’s Champion, Zelmane.246 F.W’s comparison between 
Sidney’s coupling with Weamys and Pyrocles’ crossdressing as Zelmane tactfully ignores 
the moral ambiguity of the Arcadia’s representation of gender performance. Her conceit 
illustrates how certain narrative conventions from pastoral and heroic romance blur 
gendered expectations; these conventions, while often problematic, could create a space 
for female discourse in the right conditions, a set of circumstances personified in Urania’s 
attempt to embody the chivalric ethos for the benefit of the public good.247  
Significantly, the focus on female speech constructively deliberating on both 
public and private affairs justifies drawing upon the events of Wroth’s milieu and from 
contemporary political incident. The Urania’s emphasis on the active life points toward 
the romance’s function as a piece of persuasive writing, an underlining which calls into 
question readings that see Wroth’s text only as a kind of proto-roman à clef or as a 
stepping stone toward the novelistic representation of interior states.248 As my conclusion 
will show, the Urania unquestionably contains novelistic elements. Descriptions of the 
Urania as a roman à clef likewise have validity; the romance obviously overlays real life 
with fiction: even Limena’s and Perissus’ relationship functions as a happy mirror to 
Wroth’s own affair with William Herbert, with the relationship between Pamphilia and 
Amphilanthus acting as a second, darker and more ambiguous reflection of this liaison. 
But Wroth does not use a façade of narrative as a screen for gossip, or even merely to 
express her own feelings about her life in a fiction; while the Urania subverts and warps 
many of the conventions of Sidnean romance, it still retains the genre’s interest in 
exemplarity, in shaping the values held by readers, and in modeling certain forms of 
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social interaction as efficacious. Through its demonstration of successful female example, 
the portrayal of Urania’s “hermaphroditical” persuasion of Perissus indirectly supports 
and even defends the Urania’s own capacity to engage with events.249 
The tactic, in hindsight, evidently failed. Despite this built-in defense of Wroth’s 
liminality as an author, the circulation of the Urania still drew condemnation for its 
shadowing of contemporaries. Offended by the representation of Sirelius, whose fraught 
relationship with his daughter apparently resembled his own, Edward Denny, Baron of 
Waltham, satirized Wroth as a “Hermaphrodite in show, in deed a monster,” a response 
which Denny justified by claiming that Sirelius’ portrayal led to his slander at court.250 
This attack does not unequivocally prove that Wroth’s representation of Urania’s 
discursive efficacy lacked actual rhetorical efficacy. Based on the exchange of letters 
between Wroth and Denny following the circulation of Denny’s satire, it seems likely 
that the irate nobleman only encountered the portrayal of Sirelius via oral hearsay.251  In 
this instance, Wroth’s depiction of Urania’s speech may have proved ineffective precisely 
because Denny never actually encountered it. Even after decades of scholarship on 
Wroth, the exact composition of the Urania’s original audience remains unclear, but if 
the romance circulated before publication, it clearly did so only among a small cadre of 
Wroth’s friends and family members. As Hannay points out, the first part of the “Urania 
may not have circulated even in manuscript before its 1621 publication, since no 
manuscripts are extant, and since Denny complains of oral, rather than written, 
identification to the court.”252  Even lacking a record of contemporary reader-response, 
the episode featuring Urania’s persuasion can still be constructively read as Wroth 
anticipating a hostile response resembling Denny’s ire.  
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Much more importantly, the moment suggests how Wroth intended her romance 
to influence readers. I have been pushing against a view which sees the Urania as a text 
mostly invested in representing female interiority in the manner of a roman à clef. Seen 
as a progenitor of this genre, Wroth uses the trappings of fantasy to shadow 
contemporary figures, representing characters as ciphers for historically existing 
personages. In this view of the Urania, knowledge of proper context acts as a kind of key 
for deciphering the text’s allegories and correspondences. At the risk of understatement, 
the comparison between the Urania and a roman à clef has been neither erroneous nor 
unproductive: critics representing the romance in this fashion have explored female 
authorship in the early modern period; have highlighted Wroth’s depiction of female 
interiority; and have outright created a space for the Urania in the literary canon. But the 
comparison has also accidentally reinscribed a gendered division inherited from the 
original reception of early modern romance, a division which I think Wroth’s text works 
to undermine. When sixteenth- and seventeenth-century readers gendered romance, they 
associated female audiences with the expression of sexuality, often creating a binary in 
which male readers read for political insight, rhetorical expressiveness, and philosophical 
concerns whereas female audiences read for titillation and escapism. As Lamb explains, 
“when men were described as reading Sidney’s Arcadia, it was usually described as a 
work replete with political or moral precepts; when read by women, however, it was 
represented as dangerously…sexual.”253 Limiting Sidney’s successor, Mary Wroth, to the 
representation of desiring subjectivity extends early modern prejudices against romance’s 
supposedly feminine audiences to Wroth as an author, an extension which creates an 
inadvertent resemblance between the reading practices of twenty-first century readers and 
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Edward Denny. Seen within the tradition of Sidnean exemplarity, however, Wroth’s 
depiction of illicit yet redemptive extramarital love has both deliberative and epideictic 
elements. By interrogating the mores and values underlying male and female 
relationships, by exploring the psychological burdens created by dynastic marriages, and 
by portraying masculine possessiveness as destructive, the Urania’s modeling of desire 
outside the confines of marriage invites readers to consider alternatives to the restraints 
imposed by traditions and institutions. Spoken by a female character who shares her 
name with the title of Wroth’s romance, the Urania’s early—practically inaugurating—
representation of successful ordinary speech anchors an ambitious authorial scope.    
 
III: Ordinary Speech and Jacobean Politics  
Referencing Cicero’s De Oratore, I have been describing Urania’s persuasion as a form 
of ordinary speech; I now want to define what I mean by this, explain why I think this 
designation is useful, and then contextualize Wroth’s adaptation of ordinary speech 
within the Urania’s political commitments. Although this section may at first seem to 
move far afield from my reading of Urania’s interaction with Perissus, I intend this 
contextualization to demonstrate how the heroine’s speech relates to Wroth’s social 
context and toward a tradition of rhetorical-poetics the Urania both belongs to and 
challenges. 
First of all, I do not claim that Wroth had Cicero’s dialogue in mind when she 
wrote the exchange between Urania and Perissus. With that caveat acknowledged, Wroth 
indisputably had access to Cicero’s text. The Short Title Catalogue, after all, records that 
editions of De Oratore were published in England as far back as 1573.254 Earlier versions 
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of the dialogue, of course, disseminated widely on the continent well before that date. 
The 1665 catalogue of the Sidney family library in Penshurst Place lists several editions 
of De Oratore in the family’s possession, and although, in this instance, the catalogue 
does not provide dates of publication or purchase, the juvenile Mary Sidney almost 
certainly had access, not only to Cicero’s treatise, but to a number of different versions of 
this ever-popular text.255 Used for educational purposes and commonly referenced, 
Wroth clearly knew the dialogue. Yet no direct evidence, textual or otherwise, suggests 
that De Oratore influenced the Urania. Instead of suggesting a direct line of descent, I 
point to Cicero’s work, in part, because of its substantial authority within debates over the 
social significance of eloquence, and because Cicero’s dialogue demonstrates the fluidity, 
the contested character, of rhetorical constructs within Wroth’s period.256 The influence 
of De Oratore in humanist circles throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is, 
in fact, difficult to overstate. Intellectuals in the Tudor and Stuart eras commonly 
regarded Cicero’s dialogue as central to the theorization of language, and in one fashion 
or another, whether directly or indirectly, depictions of discourse and persuasion in the 
period respond to or react against the arguments made by Crassus and Antonius, the two 
most important speakers within Cicero’s dialogue.  
 The reception of De Oratore, unsurprisingly, significantly contributed to the 
Renaissance’s understanding of poetry’s potential to teach audiences.257 In E. 
Armstrong’s words, the dialogue helped “enact a deeply rhetorical mode of thinking 
embedded in the practical or prudential reasoning of civic life.”258 For humanists, the 
argument between Antonius’ unsystematic version of rhetoric as practice and Crassus’ 
presentation of eloquence as a cultural mode paralleled the debate over the scope of 
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poetry, and in some cases, even set the contours for this dispute. Cicero’s dialogue 
unquestionably had currency in the precise humanist milieus important for Wroth’s 
development. Prominently, members of the Sidney circle liberally used Ciceronian proofs 
as touchstones for determining the proper scope of poetics and eloquence, a pattern which 
includes Philip Sidney in his Defence of Poesy. Observing this influence on the 
Elizabethan and his immediate successors, E. Armstrong has attempted to establish that 
both Philip Sidney’s and Edmund Spenser’s poetics navigate the chasm between 
Antonius’ conservative, delimited view of discourse and Crassus’ more expansive view 
of eloquence as a foundational science with a tripartite duty to delight, move, and 
instruct. His recent monograph goes much further than I am willing to go in situating 
Sidney’s and Spenser’s self-reflexivity as direct responses to De Oratore, but I will admit 
that, as authors deeply invested in a poetics of efficacy, Sidney’s and Spenser’s writings 
unsurprisingly abound with inflections of Cicero’s Crassus—even in moments when 
these authors do not directly reference or allude to the dialogue.259 At the very least, 
Cicero’s authority throughout the period provides an important anchor into early modern 
conceptions of discursive efficacy.   
De Oratore, understood in this context, contributed a vocabulary for 
differentiating between persuasive speech and true eloquence, and by extension, 
differentiating between poetry as a pleasant distraction and poetry as an “architectonic 
science”—all of which make the dialogue useful for discussing Wroth’s representation of 
persuasion in the early moments of her romance. Wroth may not directly reference De 
Oratore, but the ancient text provides a useful—contextually plausible—lexicon for 
discussing the various gradations of early modern eloquence. In addition to placing 
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Wroth’s depiction of ordinary speech within Renaissance controversies over rhetorical 
theory, I invoke De Oratore because Cicero’s dialogue situates the Urania within a 
tradition of Sidnean rhetorical poetics often connected with early modern romance. The 
Urania’s engagement with this tradition, however, is far from uncomplicated, and the 
romance’s portrayal of its eponymous heroine’s oratory destabilizes a number of well-
established narrative patterns centered on the effect of discourse between speakers of 
different genders which had become convention within romance after Sidney. Unlike her 
famous predecessors, Wroth’s modeling of contingently efficacious discourse, her 
representation of Urania’s impersonation of Perissus’ ethos, invokes only to reverse the 
Crassus-like stance adopted by Scalinger, Sidney, Spenser, and others. And, as I have 
argued above, Wroth’s depiction of successful female persuasion favors everyday praxis, 
embodied in Urania’s responsiveness to circumstance, over theoretical eloquence. In the 
Urania, ordinary speech supports the active life, not the more orthodox Ciceronian ideal 
of “true eloquence.”  
Why should this be the case? I want to suggest that the Urania’s representation of 
oratory in this episode overturns convention because Wroth’s erotic romance models a 
different set of fantasies from its immediate precursors, a set of fantasies unconnected 
either to the paragon debates or to a desire for a form of eloquence capable of 
accommodating audiences across the social strata. The Urania contains as many self-
reflexive conceits as the other romances discussed in this dissertation, but unlike her 
predecessors, Wroth displays little interest in establishing an agonistic debate between 
poetry and oratory; in this moment of the Urania, the two branches of eloquence clearly 
support one another. As I have shown in previous chapters, Sidney, Spenser, and 
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Shakespeare center the agon between poetics and rhetoric around the question of which 
form of discourse most effectively and ethically mediates between speakers and auditors 
of different social statuses. The aftermath of the peasants’ revolt in the New Arcadia, 
Artegall’s debate with and murder of the Egalitarian Giant in Book Five of The Faerie 
Queene, and Shakespeare’s late tragicomic-romances all take an “intersectional” 
approach to class and gender. When I make this claim, I am not implying that 
Renaissance-era texts acknowledge the interconnectivity of social categorization.260 
Rather than making a statement about identity and marginalization, meta-poetic 
representations of oratory in romance after Sidney depict rhetoric failing to accommodate 
disparities between speakers and audiences of different classes, genders, and, at least in 
the case of Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Book Five of The Faerie Queene, races.261 At 
the same time, all of these texts model poetic conceits or devices facilitating exchanges 
between interlocutors of differing social statuses—with the actual audience of each text 
often, at least notionally, included within this dialogue. Within these romances, the 
capacity to address audiences of various distinctions becomes the scope of an 
“intersectional” poetics. Authors from Sidney’s time to Shakespeare’s modeled a form of 
poetry capable of addressing a heterogeneous audience, an audience often figured as 
containing auditors or readers with complex and multilayered identities. This fantasy 
operates according to a kind of cultural logic. In Sidney’s, Spenser’s, and Shakespeare’s 
lifetimes, emerging colonialism, religious conflict in the wake of the Reformation and 
Counterreformation, various forms of economic transformation, and an increasingly 
diversified and globalized marketplace made the fantasy of a form of eloquence capable 
145 
of reaching across social strata highly attractive both to sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century intellectuals and to the audiences which consumed their texts.             
This episode of the Urania, however, exclusively focuses on conversation 
between male and female interlocutors in isolation from the other components of identity. 
This representational pattern is typical throughout Wroth’s romance. With only a handful 
of exceptions, nearly every major character in the Urania is high born. Despite the 
genealogical connection between the Arcadia and the Urania, Wroth, writing between 
1615 and the early 1620s, obviously exists within a different cultural context from her 
late Tudor-era uncle, a circumstance reflected in her representation of rhetorical 
exchange. The late-Jacobean political settlement encouraged a focus on interpersonal 
relationships, an emphasis on the proper response to figures who abuse their authority, 
and a concentration on the situation of gender roles within a well-defined—courtly and 
aristocratic—system of social dynamics.262 To give an example of this tendency—one 
already alluded to in my introduction but worth reemphasizing due to its importance for 
this episode—the analogy between patriarch of family within a household and king as 
father within a state or commonwealth continuously hovers just beneath the surface of the 
Urania’s representation of female resistance to jealous husbands. This association 
occasionally becomes part of the text’s manifest content in moments that directly or 
indirectly relate to James I or to the relations between rulers and subjects, a set of 
correlations and analogies, in this instance, expressed though Philargus and Limena. 263  
The Urania’s tendency to link poor husbands with evil or ineffective monarchs 
becomes especially evident as Wroth’s text becomes self-reflexive or meta-poetic. Wroth 
comes close, in these self-reflexive moments, to inviting readers to consider the purposes 
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behind her shadowings of political circumstances. These tableaus call attention to the 
positions and stances modeled by the text as successful. The description of Urania’s 
speech to Perissus not only prepares readers to accept the circulation of a female author’s 
language, it provides a fantasy of a woman’s ordinary speech resisting unjust authority. 
Viewed from within the author’s cultural moment and literary lineage, Wroth’s 
engagement with Jacobean politics parallels Sidney’s engagement in the Arcadia with the 
issues raised by resistance theory during the late sixteenth century.264 Both authors use 
meta-poetic conceits to interrogate what a subject should do when confronted by a poor 
ruler or tyrant, or in the case of Wroth, a tyrannical or jealous husband.265 Sidney, 
however, carefully creates the tableau of a social contract frayed from within by rulers, 
subjects, aristocrats, and peasants all alike neglecting the obligations they owe to one 
another. Wroth, on the other hand, concentrates on a single social unit, extracting—
except on the emblematic or symbolic level—the triangle between husband, wife, and 
lover from connections to larger communal markers.  
A comparison between Sidney’s and Wroth’s handling of another well-worn 
pastoral convention further demonstrates the contrast between Arcadian and Uranian 
representations of class and discourse. In the New Arcadia, Sidney opens his romance 
with a depiction of a love triangle between two male shepherds, Strephon and Claius, and 
a shepherdess, Urania. The departure of the object of the shepherds’ desire (Urania 
herself never directly appears in the text) occasions a discursive and symbolic ascension 
in Strephon and Claius. Facing Urania’s absence, the two suitors adopt the stance of the 
Petrarchan lover, complete with the use of neo-platonic conceits and the suggestion that 
love has provided access to a higher reality which enables the two rustics to express their 
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desire in a supra-refined, eloquent, and complex literary style.266 The presence of 
Petrarchan and Platonic conceits in the mouths of shepherds would seem like convention, 
if only Sidney followed his predecessors in making Strephon and Clais hidden royalty. 
Instead of following precedent, Sidney subverts expectations by having authentic rustics 
use language conventionally seen as decorous only for gentlepeople and aristocrats.267 In 
the New Arcadia, encountering eros allows pastoral suitors to assume verbal markers 
characteristic of members of a higher class. Tellingly, desire and love, the same forces 
that power Strephon’s and Claius’ ascension, also prompt Pyrocles and Musidorus to 
perform, respectively, as a woman and a shepherd. The Arcadia, almost systematically, 
interrogates the often-permeable border between status and discourse. In Sidney’s wake, 
this interrogation becomes a feature of self-reflexive romance. When contrasted to 
Sidney’s and his imitators’ intense focus on crossing social boundaries, Wroth’s 
exclusion of lower-class characters from the Urania, her return to disguising lost 
aristocrats as lovelorn rustics, seems like a premeditated and calculated response to 
generic reversals executed by her uncle and precursor.  
But Wroth’s bracketing of class and hierarchy also demonstrates the author’s use 
of chivalric motifs to address concerns specific to her own class and gender at her 
particular historical juncture.268 This moment echoes both Wroth’s personal 
circumstances and an increasingly unstable set of conditions associated with James I’s 
court: the fact that the Urania does not depict class does not mean the text aims at 
escapism. Despite the romance’s apolitical reputation, the Urania directly intervenes in 
several political debates, often with an explicitness surpassing Sidney’s in the New 
Arcadia. In particular, Urania’s merging of the chivalric conventions of romance with the 
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humanist concern for praxis, the heroine encouraging the enervated Perissus to return to 
the active life, intersects with several of the commonplaces used by subjects who urged 
James I to adopt a more muscular foreign policy in protection of Continental 
Protestantism. In a long-ago study, Francis Yates charted how Protestant authors 
responded to the 1613 marriage between Fredrick V—Count Palatine of the Rhine—and 
Elizabeth Stuart—James I’s daughter—with an outpouring of courtly entertainments and 
emblematic literature centered around chivalric motifs.269 The events of the next several 
years following the royal wedding, however, changed these celebrations first into cries of 
mourning and then into calls to action on behalf of a union which had become a focal 
point for Protestant hopes on the Continent. After Protestants in Bohemia rebelled against 
their devoutly Catholic ruler, Ferdinand, Frederick assumed the crown of Bohemia 
without consulting his father-in-law on the English throne. Fredrick and Elizbeth were 
crowned as King and Queen of Bohemia in early November of 1619, destabilizing the 
balance of power established by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, only to be themselves 
expelled by Catholic imperial forces in November of the following year—a chain of 
events which, of course, famously set off the Thirty Years War and earned Fredrick and 
Elizabeth the sobriquet of “The Winter King and Queen of Bohemia.” The cautious and 
pragmatic James choose not to involve Scotland and England in the ensuing conflict, 
saving his kingdoms an expense of blood and treasure while also causing chagrin among 
Protestant factions hoping England would play a greater role in central Europe.270  
Faced with Fredrick’s failure and James’ unwillingness to act, Wroth constructed 
a narrative which Josephine Roberts describes as “a countermyth within the Urania,” the 
romance’s description of Amphilanthus’ creation of an international coalition, a group of 
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allies assembled after the Prince of Naples was offered the title of “King of the 
Romans.”271 This later episode depicting Amphilanthus’ diplomatic maneuvering clearly 
comments on the Thirty Years War; the depiction of Urania’s eloquence, conversely, is 
more elliptical in its relation to topical events, but the fantasy of an initially inactive ruler 
prompted to defend a loved one’s rights after receiving good counsel probably resonated 
strongly in courtly circles still smarting from the events of 1620—a milieu which 
remained deeply invested in a monarchy grounded in the consent of magistrates and 
advisors despite any discontent with James.272  
Beyond the Bohemian controversy, the Urania’s original readers likely 
recognized the depiction of Perissus’ revival as related to a host of urgent contemporary 
issues and political crises. Although varied in subject matter and importance, all of this 
moment’s historical echoes connect in one way or another to James’ personality and 
governance. Like the resonances linking Perissus’ and James’ inactivity, the Urania’s 
depiction of efficacious female counsel reflects—and even perhaps responds to—both the 
exclusion of women from court after Queen Anne’s death in 1619 and the increasing 
realization by members of Wroth’s station of how little James valued parliament and the 
advice of his councilors: Wroth wrote the first half of the Urania in a decade in which 
James essentially ruled the English government alone.273 Perissus’ willingness to 
eventually heed Urania’s counsel establishes his justness as a ruler, his effectiveness as a 
military figure, and his worthiness for Limena’s hand. It would be a step too far to claim 
that, through Perissus, Wroth expresses her hope for James and his successors. Aspects of 
the fictional king nevertheless mirror and comment on the historical ruler and his legacy. 
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 But the strongest resonances of this narrative, though political, are more 
theoretical than topical. The opening of the Urania turns upon the analogy between 
political and marital subjugation. As Mellissa Sanchez has shown, early modern authors 
often understood politics in sexual terms; in erotic romances after Sidney, analyses of 
desire double as examinations of power; the dividing line between the two reflections 
frequently blurs to the point of indistinction.274 Across the Urania, Wroth satirizes the 
convention of literary victims perversely enjoying the suffering imposed by their 
oppressors, the narratives of martyrdom exemplified in this episode both by Perissus and 
Limena but which can also be found in different forms throughout nearly the entirety of  
the romance. In Sanchez’s words, “The First Episode of the Urania employs the 
discourse of martyrdom to offer an interpretive rubric for the erotic suffering that fills the 
romance.”275 Seen in this light, Perissus’ reception of Urania’s speech plausibly models 
how to read the other narratives of erotic or familial subjugation found in the text. But I 
think we can go beyond describing this moment as an interpretive rubric. This depiction 
of reading not only models interpretation; it models a specific response, a pragmatic 
rejoinder to Perissus’ initial inaction and Limena’s acquiescence to her own subjugation. 
Wroth portrays a gendered permutation of ordinary speech having effects in the world. 
All in all, this section of the Urania is as much invested in exploring how 
language and narratives constitute the world as in depicting the political dynamics of 
erotic or familial oppression. Perissus first speaks, acts, and justifies himself via the 
conventions of one narrative; Urania then persuades the prince using the conventions of a 
different, yet closely related, form of story. Both narratio and exemplification, in this 
instance, interrogate the correspondence between gender, virtue, and discourse.276 
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Urania, a woman, uses language to personify a masculine ideal. At the same time, she 
cuts away at the correlation between eloquence and masculinity, a correspondence as old 
as the representation of heroic eloquence in Homer. Even the famously urbane Cicero’s 
many depictions of the rhetorician as cultural hero fit within an agonistic, restlessly 
competitive, conception of persuasion. Urania’s informal persuasion removes rhetoric 
from this context: the framework of what Crassus in De Oratore refers to as “true 
eloquence.”277 Yet Urania’s persuasion still provides a paradigm for discourse making a 
political intervention, a differently gendered form of speech separate from conventional 
rhetorical theory which still pragmatically influences audiences. Unlike the troublesome 
representations of oratory discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, this representation of 
persuasion does not directly compete with other forms of discourse, and it does not 
feature meta-poetic devices demarcating between poetry and oratory. The Urania instead 
responds to earlier fantasies of poetic efficacy: Wroth’s romance “sends up” negative 
depictions of oratory within its own genre. Insofar as Wroth contrasts one form of poetics 
with another, she contrasts the treatment of erotic subjugation in the romance tradition 
with her own archly satiric perspective on discourse and power.  
In this depiction of persuasion, the efficacy of both poetics and rhetoric depends 
upon evaluating and taking advantage of contingent circumstances, in this instance, 
Urania’s appraisal of Perissus’ character (an ethos almost explicitly linked to romance) 
and her ability to respond effectively to his situation using the resources at her disposal. 
To an extent, all rhetoric deals with contingency. The wager staked by Crassus in De 
Oratore is that, while precise knowledge of oratory remains impossible because of 
constantly changing conditions, theorists can still abstract precepts about the art.278  
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Antonius, disdaining theory, disagrees, defining an orator as anyone who persuades a 
listener; to accomplish this, an orator merely needs “to accommodate in order to speak 
persuasively,” accommodate ad persuadendum possit dicere; to cultivate skill in this 
practice, a speaker should immerse himself in the common practice of the state’s life, in 
usu civitatum vulgari ac forensi.279 Urania’s impersonation of Perissus’ ideal self is an 
act of accommodation predicated upon a hermeneutics of the everyday. She correctly 
reads Perissus’ character and situation and then cogently responds to the state of affairs 
surrounding her. Spoken by the romance’s titular character, this representation of 
ordinary eloquence demonstrates a response to a set of circumstances which render it 
decorous for female interlocutors to circulate their discourse within the civitas, the social 
body of the community. This opening salvo of the Urania conditionally opens a place for 
female discourse within the still-developing, still embryonic, public sphere. In this 
moment, Wroth constructs an argument for a poetics of liminality and civic engagement.      
 
IV: Uranian Narratives           
The persuasion in this episode both is and is not characteristic of the treatment of 
eloquence throughout the Urania. Throughout the course of her text, Wroth portrays 
rhetoric as efficacious more often than Sidney or Spenser, but the Urania’s many 
depictions of persuasion rarely if ever explicitly emblematize anything obviously or 
unambiguously related to romance. Several continuities, however, exist between this 
early depiction of persuasion and later episodes. While Wroth does not frequently 
emblematize poetic discourse through the representation of rhetorical exchange, her 
characters almost habitually use narratives and exempla to interrogate the ethicality and 
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efficaciousness of language and storytelling. The representations of rhetorical exchange 
throughout the text—almost consistently—explore how discourse works within different 
environments, interrogating both the decorum of stories which shadow real events and 
the propriety of counterfactual narratives. Just as Urania persuades Perissus by inhabiting 
the conventions of chivalric writing, characters throughout both halves of the romance 
use stories to navigate social situations, to influence others, and to achieve particular 
effects in the world.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the Urania’s strong focus on interpersonal 
relationships between men and women, characters often use stories to generate empathy 
and reciprocity in the subjects of their affections. For example, trapped in an escalating 
verbal combat over the favors of Amphilanthus, Pamphilia and Antissia exchange stories 
in an attempt to frame their experiences with love and desire. Antissia, in particular, tries 
to fashion a narrative which will maneuver the King into sympathizing with her own 
misunderstandings of their previous interactions. Never a strong interpreter of events, 
language, or people, Antissia mistakenly believes Amphilanthus previously wooed her 
affection only to later betray her by denying his earlier claims of adoration. Thinking 
herself deceived by Amphilanthus’ protestations of love, she reproved the King, an 
episode which led to his establishing a distance between himself and her person. While 
walking and speaking with her peers, the hapless Antissia improvises a tale which 
attempts to reflect these imagined circumstances: she deploys her exemplum based upon 
both a misreading of events and her own character. Speaking before Pamphilia and 
Amphilanthus, the deluded woman tells a story featuring a protagonist she refers to as the 
“Brittany lady,” a narrative of a potentially beneficial relationship run aground on the 
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rocks of misunderstanding and jealousy. Always a step behind her more self-aware rival, 
Pamphilia, Antissia deludes herself into believing she resides at the center of a romance 
far more conventional than the Urania. She imagines herself a protagonist in a narrative 
of betrayed love, something more akin to a plot point from Amadis of Gaul than Don 
Quixote. In the Urania’s version of reality, however, Antissia—at least at this juncture in 
the text—inhabits a satire on the delusions wrought by desire, not a serious portrayal of 
affection offered and then rescinded. Deluded by her own self-regard, she relates to 
Amphilanthis and Pamphilia how she met a lady from “Great Brittany” who, after 
originally spurning love and rejecting many suitors, was herself “conquered” by 
“respective love and neglective affection” (323.11-2).  In this tale, the lady revealed her 
affection to the object of her desire and the two began an affair, a dalliance which quickly 
evolved into a relationship held together by force of poetic example. The lady’s love 
found “expression in verse…for he loved verse, and any thing that worthy was or good, 
or goodnes loved him so much as she dwelt in him, and as from ancient Oracles the 
people tooke direction, so governd he the rest by his example or precept” (323.22-5). The 
references to oracles and precepts directly calls to mind Sidney’s language in the 
Defence, a series of allusions ironically pointing to this moment’s focus on the value of 
fiction. Imaginatively enriched by their affair, the Brittany Lady’s love found examples in 
the verse she created and he in turn became an example for his countrymen. The 
relationship persisted until the lady grew jealous of her love and then rebuked him for a 
perceived slight, whereupon he broke off their affair, a terminus which caused the lady 
distress even to the point in time when she (supposedly) meets and relates her tale to 
Antissia—who, of course, in turn relates the story to her own audience. 
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 Reaching this narrative juncture, Antissia slips; forgetting the device of the lady 
from Brittany, she brings the tale out of narrative time and into the present, the moment 
of exchange between herself and her auditors, exclaiming that “from that time, 
unfortunate I, lived but little happier then you see me now” (324.29-30). Severely 
embarrassed, Antissia attempts to pass off her slip into the first person as a performance. 
But Urania’s earlier essaying of the chivalric ideal works because she performs an ethos. 
Antissia, on the other hand, experiences an emotional outburst; far from using role-
playing to seem like something not herself, her language clearly reveals an authentic 
affective response to her misinterpreted circumstances. Antissia’s response—“Pray 
God….I doe not play the Brittaine Lady now”—only digs her further into a hole (324.32-
3). Seeing her rival embarrassed in front of Amphilanthus, “Pamphilia smild to hear her 
come to that” (324.31).  Pamphilia’s subtly triumphant response both points to the 
competitiveness of these exchanges and serves as an acknowledgment of her own skill as 
a poet and storyteller. Her ability to wield narratives and poetry provide her with a kind 
of status other characters, such as Antissia, struggle to obtain.   
Antissia cannot, in the end, challenge her rival because she cannot control the 
fictions which facilitate social navigation within the Urania. Instead of influencing 
others, the stories Antissia tells overwhelm and control their teller. Seen in this light, her 
failure is as much narratological as incorrectly demonstrative. Because she localizes her 
story around her own person and subjective experience, Antissia eliminates any kind of 
external efficacy from her tale. The overeager Antissia presumably attempts to influence 
Amphilanthus, to make the object of her affection regard her more favorably, to influence 
him into emphasizing with her feelings. Yet the clumsiness of her approach makes her 
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attempt at persuasion too obvious to have its desired effects.280 Instead of portraying 
herself as a victim, she reveals herself as awkwardly manipulative. Instead of creating 
sympathy for her plight, Antissia comes to exemplify how desire can mislead foolish men 
and women into adopting inappropriate but self-flattering fictions which both fail to 
represent their author’s situation to others and imprison their creator within an illusion, 
within a poorly constructed fiction. Her story becomes an example to her listeners, but 
not, unfortunately, the example intended by its inventor.                            
 Critics frequently read this episode as contrasting Pamphilia’s appropriately 
private, circumscribed expressions of poetic subjectivity with Antissia’s inability to stop 
the verbal expression of her desire from becoming public.281 But both Pamphilia and 
Antissia fashion their own experience into stories for the purposes of persuasion. More 
than that, Antissia directs the story of the unfortunate Brittany lady to a narrowly 
restricted collection of auditors: to Pamphilia, Amphilanthus, and any other unnamed 
interlocutors present as they converse among themselves as they walk. Antissia hardly 
broadcasts her story. Rather than violating the conventions of appropriate female 
discourse, her tale awkwardly reveals her motivations to her listeners. The idea of the 
danger Antissia falls prey to, exposing too much self-interest when inventing narrative 
proofs to influence audiences, arrived in poetics directly from rhetorical theory. 
According to several authoritative manuals, to be effective, exempla cannot be entirely 
personal; they must at least gesture toward universality. In practice, the contingency of 
rhetorical exchange prevents orators from reaching anything close to social 
comprehensiveness; in fact, theorists since Aristotle have advised directing paradigmatic 
stories towards specific audiences.282 At the same time, examples cannot seem obviously 
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self-interested or self-aggrandizing. The Rhetorica ad Herennium, for example, cites the 
precepts of Greek rhetoricians who warn against using personal testimony during trials 
concerned with a speaker’s self-interest, pointedly asking, Non igitur ridiculus sit si quis 
in lite aut in iudicio domesticis testimoniis pugnet? “Would a speaker not therefore be 
ridiculous if he justified his actions at a trial or domestic dispute by citing his own 
personal example as precedent?”283 Like the Rhetorica ad Herennium’s bad orator, the 
luckless Antissia invents a poorly chosen narrative which unintentionally reveals her as 
both guilelessly self-serving and almost miserably confounded by her own efforts. 
 Although nearly equal in rank to Pamphilia and theoretically able to achieve the 
same articulateness as her rival, Antissa fails to correctly evaluate and respond to 
circumstances. She proves herself a poor reader, and her flimsy shadowing of her 
personal situation compromises the efficacy of her narrative—a failure neither unique to 
Antissa nor to her gender throughout the Urania. In the course of Wroth’s romance, both 
male and female lovers fail or prosper depending upon their ability to wield stories either 
to their advantage or to achieve affects they consider desirable. The emphasis on 
narrative control throughout the text, then, is not confined to episodes featuring female 
speakers making public interventions. To cite just a single instance of narrative wielded 
by a male speaker, while living as a hermit, Dettareus, Lord of Ragusa, comforts 
Parselius and convinces the younger man to abandon despair after he felt remorse for his 
betrayal of Urania. Dettareus tells his own life story—a tragedy which reveals Dettareus 
to be responsible for his love’s demise—as a negative exemplum to encourage Parselius 
(175-180). This moment has several commonalities with the Urania’s opening tableau. 
Most obviously, like Urania persuading Perissus, Dettareus convinces Parselius to return 
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to the active life. But the two episodes additionally parallel one another by interweaving 
stories of betrayal and illicit desire with a concern with how men and women respond to 
adverse circumstance and personal failure. The representation of Urania’s speech to 
Perissus establishes a role for female discourse in shaping events and responding to 
conditions and social situations, but a concern with narrative efficacy permeates the 
whole of Wroth’s text. The Urania again and again returns to the subject of language’s 
power to alter the world, to reflect experience, to express desire, and even to effect 
political change. Deeply invested in a gendered politics of discourse, the Urania 
nevertheless remains capable of exploring several different areas as context requires. 
Wroth’s romance does not consistently locate its exploration of persuasion, narrative, and 
genre within either gender, but it also does not model female speech as confined or 
limited to the expression of the personal.    
 
Conclusion  
 I want to conclude this chapter firstly by reemphasizing both the political character of 
the Urania’s representation of discourse and secondarily by suggesting what this 
politicization implies for the interconnected histories of romance, rhetoric, and poetics as 
traced throughout this dissertation. The two strands—interventions into Jacobean policy, 
on the one hand, and inversions of erotic romance, on the other—unsurprisingly, are not 
separate and sometimes not even distinct throughout Wroth’s large and meandering text. 
Politics and individual history enfold one another throughout the Urania like vines 
creeping around the base of a marble column. The romance invests considerable energy 
in a fantasy of dynastic exchange—a  portrayal of aristocratic marriage held together by a 
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conceptualization of desire characteristic of the romance tradition—figured throughout 
the narrative as creating social stability.284 Very probably, as both Victor Stretkowicz and 
Josephine Roberts suggest, Wroth adapts romance convention to represent an idealized 
portrait of Protestant Europe united through intermarriage under the leadership of the 
author’s lover, William Herbert, a figure shadowed in the text by Amphilanthus.285 In 
line with this view of the Urania, Stretkowicz points out in his final, unfortunately 
unfinished, monograph that Wroth’s romance is “a brilliant tour de force in ambiguous 
autobiography, panegyric and utter condemnation of political and familial tyrants of both 
sexes.”286 Philargus, as I have suggested, is one such tyrant, and both his overthrow and 
Limena’s rescue respond to the age-old analogy between father of country and patriarch 
of household, an ancient commonplace given new life by autocratic rulers throughout the 
seventeenth century, including by James I. The opening of the Urania, then, provides a 
fictional example—a model—for how certain women can productively counter abuses 
rooted in the symbolic power accrued through the correspondence between husband and 
ruler. More precisely, this episode links this analogy to tyranny, and it provides a fantasy 
of a female interlocuter successfully countering oppression intended to silence women. 
This opening display of female speech suggests that the Urania itself replies to a set of 
conditions which limited the circulation of women’s speech and writing, a set of 
conditions which had both public and private—social and personal—dimensions (the 
same set of conditions also in play throughout the conflict between the two lovers and 
Philargus). By presenting readers with this fantasy, the Urania posits a role for female 
engagement in public life; it suggests how certain forms of discourse, uttered by 
specifically placed women, can fulfill humanist ideals of “eloquence” while at the same 
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time also challenging masculinist notions of rhetorical poetics in favor of a type of 
persuasion based in ordinary speech.     
 Significantly for the arc of this dissertation, Wroth portrays Urania accomplishing 
this feat by impersonating the ethos of chivalric and erotic romance. Yet, although this 
episode self-reflexively accumulates authority for the Urania, unlike the other moments 
discussed in my previous three chapters, this tableau does not transfer authority from 
rhetoric to romance or even to any particular conception of poetics or rhetorical poetics. 
Rather than accruing power for poetics, even a Uranian poetics, the impersonation of a 
fictional ethos justifies the circulation of female language; the text models an audience 
benefiting by attending to female persuasion, and it represents the result of this attending 
producing familial and social stability as emblematized through the successful union of 
Perissus and Limena. The text adapts the logic of exemplarity for the benefit of a female 
author; it manipulates the conventional justification offered by romance’s—and 
poetry’s—defenders—for a new context. If, as suggested in all defenses of poetry 
throughout the period, the audience of Renaissance romance learned by using the action 
and ethos of heroes and heroines as moral precepts, as fabulae, and as models, then the 
Urania suggests how a female author could embody these examples. The text models the 
representation of a rhetorical exchange—it demonstrates to readers, through Perissus’ 
response to Urania, how the Urania should influence us as we follow its baroque and 
winding narrative.         
This episode differs from the other texts discussed in this dissertation in several 
ways. By not participating in an agon with oratory, this moment reverses expectations 
and situates Wroth’s text in a specific relationship to the romance narratives the author 
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draws upon and uses as raw materials from which to construct her Urania. The success of 
Urania’s speech upends a long history of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century romance 
portraying oratory as inefficacious or unethical (or as both inefficacious and unethical). 
Wroth’s romance, of course, has a vastly different scope, a different goal, from the earlier 
works discussed in previous chapters. As the most recent text discussed in this 
dissertation, and as the only work examined at length here composed by a woman, the 
Urania exists in relation to a different set of social conditions, and a revised set of 
political concerns, from earlier romances in the tradition of Sidney’s Arcadia, a fact 
which holds true even as the text clearly and self-consciously positions itself as belonging 
and responding to this tradition. Stated slightly differently, Wroth uses this moment not 
just to carve a space for discourse spoken by women of her class but also to speak back to 
her precursors both in the romance genre and in Sidnean rhetorical poetics more 
specifically. Throughout the Urania, and particularly throughout this initial episode, 
Wroth challenges and then reconfigures the fantasy of a form of discourse capable of 
accommodating diverse audiences. As she does so, she creates a text almost devoid of 
conventional idealism which nevertheless remains a genuine inheritor of the romance 
tradition.       
Wroth’s imitation of her precursors, then, is both multilayered and tonally 
complex. While the influence of Cervantes’ Don Quixote permeates Wroth’s narrative, 
and while the Urania frequently satirizes elements of romance, nevertheless, the fantasies 
offered by the text at this early juncture—political, erotic, and familial—all depend upon 
the genre’s investment in the positive portrayal of desire and its association with a 
feminine audience. The fact that Urania’s persuasion heavily relies upon her imitation of 
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a heroic code of conduct closely associated with chivalric tales further demonstrates the 
importance of enacting as well as representing the topoi of romance for the Urania. As in 
several important moments from Sidney’s Arcadia and Spenser’s Faerie Queene, this 
episode of Wroth’s narrative roots the self-reflexive conceits which justify its fiction 
firmly within generic convention. Yet despite these similarities, the appropriation of 
rhetoric’s cultural centrality for the promotion of poetics has fallen away from the picture 
painted in previous chapters. Rather than justifying fiction by portraying poetic conceits 
as accommodating female audiences at the expense of oratory, the first female author of a 
romance in English uses the conceits characteristic of the genre to justify her own 
discourse. Seen from this angle, the difference between Sidney and Wroth is the 
difference between the fantasy of an exchange between interlocutors of different statuses 
and an attempt to use romance to facilitate an actual exchange, the exchange between a 
female author and her readers.                 
This difference in Wroth’s and Sidney’s portrayal also highlights how the cultural 
status of secular fiction had fundamentally altered by the 1620s. Despite her vulnerability 
as a female author, Wroth could use romance as a channel for her voice because 
philhellene romance, in light of Sidney’s example, had attained noticeable prestige within 
several important milieus both within England287 and on the continent: in humanist 
circles, in courtly settings, and even in the parlors of an emerging middle class.288  
Sidney’s precedent provided the genre with an aristocratic and genteel veneer (European 
authors’ since before Ariosto’s time had composed important works within the genre, but 
the popularity of the Arcadia certainly made humanist romance familiar to a vernacular 
audience in England). The tension between romance as a popular form and elite tastes 
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had simply slackened by the time Wroth composed her voluminous manuscript. Of 
course, moralists and religious writers continued to denounce the genre for its feminine 
and popular associations up until it was replaced with the novel, but to a significant 
extent, the genre had become respectable. This respectability, however, came with a cost: 
the affirmation of romance by elite audiences ensured that the genre could no longer 
comfortably function as a vehicle to demonstrate the popular accessibility of rhetorical 
poetics.  
In one sense, the status of poetics, particularly the relation between poetry and 
oratory and between poetry and other forms of eloquence, remained profoundly contested 
in English literature throughout the seventeenth century. John Milton’s Paradise Lost and 
Paradise Regained, for example, continued to juxtapose oratory with Milton’s biblically 
inspired poetics. In Paradise Regained, Satan literally offers full knowledge of rhetorical 
theory, and the eloquence that follows this instruction—the very scope of humanist 
studies—as his final temptation of Christ during the Son’s sojourn in the desert. Christ 
ultimately must reject oratory in order to serve as an example for Paradise Regained’s 
readers. Milton’s earlier epic, too, directly uses oratory as a touchstone for poetic 
exchange. Stanley Fish, to cite a well-known interpreter of Milton, has shown in a classic 
study that Paradise Lost portrays Satan as an evil orator who tempts not only the poem’s 
characters, the fallen angels and Adam and Eve, but also provides the epic’s own 
audience with the simulacrum of a temptation in order to test, correct, and strengthen 
readers’ moral and hermeneutical concentration.289 Milton’s poetics, at least in Fish’s 
perspective, represent oratory in order to enact poetics—much as Sidney’s and Spenser’s 
great fictions had decades earlier. To this formulation I would add that Milton’s example, 
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at least up to a point, demonstrates the continuities late seventeenth-century poetics had 
inherited from earlier poetic theory—and from the epic-romance tradition as embodied 
by Sidney, Spenser, and Mary Wroth.290 
Viewed from a different perspective, Milton’s case shows how deeply imbedded 
self-reflexive episodes had become within English poetry by the mid-seventeenth 
century; by Milton’s time, negatively representing oratory to bolster fiction had long 
since escaped the orbit of romance. Somewhat paradoxically, the beginnings of this 
trajectory away from the genre are already visible in Wroth’s Urania, at least when seen 
from the hindsight of later fiction and poetry.291 In the conclusion to my first chapter, I 
suggested that Sidney’s conception of poetic efficacy eventually metamorphized into the 
supposedly inviolable interiority of nineteenth century lyric. I now want to suggest that 
Sidney’s and Wroth’s poetics likewise participate in the emerging conception of the 
novel as a medium capable of expressing social “realism.” Neither the Arcadia nor the 
Urania are novels, of course, but elements of both texts—particularly elements of the 
Urania—are novelistic. Although the concept of the prose novel did not yet exist, 
elements of these narrative works feel novelistic to post-Renaissance readers.  Broadly 
applied to Sidnean romance, this is hardly a new suggestion. Long ago, Virginia Woolf 
commented that “In the Arcadia, as in some luminous globe, all the seeds of English 
fiction lie latent. We can trace infinite possibilities: it may take any one of many different 
directions.” For Woolf, this myriad of possibilities “present,” albeit in a latent form, 
within Sidney’s text include “romance and realism, poetry and psychology.”292 I argue 
the same triad of latent possibility also exists in Wroth’s Urania, although of course, the 
later work leans more strongly in the direction of some possibilities than others. In 
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particular, I think the Urania actually bends closer to novelistic realism than the Arcadia. 
Wroth uses the conventions of romance, but she deploys these conventions at a distance, 
often arguably an affectionate distance, and very often to satirize desire or male/female 
relationships. Urania’s speech to Perissus, for instance, uses the commonplaces of 
romance as a persuasive strategy; this episode participates in the traditions of the genre, 
but it does so through a simulacrum of convention, not by straightforwardly committing 
to the topoi of romance. 
The Urania, as a matter of course for a prose text written in the early seventeenth 
century, does not provide readers with a constructed “totality,” in Georg Lukacs’ sense of 
the term.293 In avoiding the representation of class and economic exchange nearly 
entirely, Wroth’s baroque narrative cannot directly mirror her society in any complete 
sense. The Urania fails even to gesture toward a social whole. But the text does reveal, 
and even depict, a genuine site of cultural contention regarding the difference between 
the representation versus the actual expression of female discourse within the romance 
tradition and, by extension, within the spaces available for female authorship in the 
seventeenth century. Moreover, the text exemplifies a “categorical instability” which 
“negates romance idealism,” a condition which literary historians such as Michael 
McKeon have linked to the emergence of the novel in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries.294 Many scholars have accepted that by the 1680s, Aphra Behn’s 
Oroonoko could use the conventions of romance in ways that are recognizably 
novelistic.295 The example of the Urania shows that the transformation from prose 
romance to novel, although more clearly defined in later texts such as Oroonoko, 
occurred in a continuum between the two generic categories throughout the seventeenth 
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century, that the novel partially emerged from within the conventions of romance as 
much as it developed as a negative response to the earlier genre. The representation of 
Urania’s persuasion of Perissus, moreover, reveals that this gradual transformation 
occurred, in part, in relation to a long tradition of rhetorical poetics justifying itself 
through a fantasy of fiction mediating between interlocutors of different social statuses, 
including speakers and listeners of varying genders. By rejecting idealism while 
preserving both the illusion of psychological realism and the representation of social 
conflict, the Urania takes Sidnean romance to the point where it approaches modern 
fiction. Fittingly for the course of this dissertation, Mary Wroth’s complex representation 
of gender, speech, and romance links the development of the novel to older traditions of 
socially adaptive fiction. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
THE ROMANCE OF SOCIAL STRUGGLE 
 
We’re moving right along through the seventeenth century. 
The later part is fine, much more modern  
Than the earlier part… 
It’s good to be modern if you can stand it. 
    —John Ashbery, “Commotion of the Birds”              
 
My chapters have explored four tableaus of social struggle, violence, and persuasion, 
each of which invites questions about which form of discourse most efficaciously 
addresses audiences of differing social statuses. As my chapters have shown, authors as 
varied as Philip Sidney, Edmund Spenser, and William Shakespeare all used the 
conventions of romance to depict an agon between poesis and oratory. These authors 
portrayed formal oratory either as unethical or inefficacious while simultaneously 
depicting poetical or theatrical devices or conceits productively intervening between 
audiences and speakers of diverse social statuses. Of the authors discussed here, only 
Mary Wroth failed to use the conventions of romance to bolster the status of poetry at the 
expense of oratory; even Wroth, however, used a portrayal of persuasion to emblematize 
a fantasy of poetic efficacy. As this dissertation has shown, these exemplary episodes 
enacted a fantasy of fiction successfully mediating between different classes and genders, 
a fantasy which participated in the complex symbolic process of constructing a cultural 
demarcation between poetry and competing forms of eloquence. This trend contributed to 
the emergence of the poetical from the rhetorical, and, obviously, from the rhetorical-
poetical, but this emergence itself was rooted within historical circumstances and material 
conditions.  
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The repeated depiction of accommodating poesis throughout self-reflexive 
romances suggests that modern ideas of secular “literariness” developed, not as hermetic 
and self-contained intellectual progressions, but as responses to a set of rapidly changing 
circumstances. This background partly explains the ambiguity and moral complexity of 
much early modern literature: the fantasy of accommodating texts inviting audience 
participation answered needs created by social discord throughout the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, but meeting this need required acknowledging and portraying the 
intractability of conflict.  
At its most theoretical, this fantasy served as a justification for secular fiction, as 
well as a model for audience interaction with poetic or theatrical discourse. As praxis, 
accommodating problemata often functioned as a form of commodification, an appeal 
which sold prose, verse, and dramatic literature to customers who valued the chance to 
apply their discernment to fictional and dramatic works. Early modern romance—
understood by contemporaries as existing within an accommodating tradition extending 
from narratives like Homer’s Odyssey and Heliodorus’ Ethiopia in antiquity to works like 
Ariosto’s Orlando furioso in the early modern period—paved the way for later 
understandings of literature and fiction as cultural categories. Because the generally 
unstated beliefs which constitute our own understanding of how literature works 
developed from and through past formations, even now, these texts call out, inviting 
readers and theatergoers to exercise judgement. Answering this invitation at once 
implicates us within and provides an anchor into our own modernity.                    
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13 Jeffery Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 9.  
14 The following is a summary of Rhetorica ad Herennium, ed. by Harry Caplan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). I.5-25. 
15 On Rhetoric, 1355a-1358a  
16 Cicero gets around the problem in the de Inventione by distinguishing proofs from 
premises. See I. xxxviii.67.  
17 For a broad overview of how the study of style provides an anchor into Renaissance 
literature, see the essays in Renaissance Figures of Speech, Ed. Sylvia Adamson, Gavin 
Alexander, and Katrin Ettenhuber (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
However, most modern surveys of Renaissance rhetoric concentrate on this element. As 
early as 1970, Brian Vickers wrote a book in which he argued the importance of the 
figures in the expression of psychological states in the literature of the period; as late as 
2012, Jenny Mann wrote a study arguing that the importation of the figures from classical 
languages into the vernacular contributed to the formation both of English identity and 
emerging conceptualizations of nationhood and empire. See Brian Vickers, Classical 
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Rhetoric in English Poetry (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1970) and Jenny C. Mann. Outlaw Rhetoric: Figuring Vernacular Eloquence in 
Shakespeare’s England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).  
18 For a survey on the topic and a wonderful collection of primary sources, see William 
E. Engel, Rory Loughnane, and Grant William, The Memory Arts in Renaissance 
England: A Critical Anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).   
19 This system is still commonly used today by competitors in memory sports.   
20 Helmut Schanze, “Problems and Trends in German Rhetoric to 1500,” in Renaissance 
Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Renaissance Rhetoric, ed. James 
Murphy (Berkley: University of California Press, 1983), 108. 
21 My claims here paraphrase Heinreich F. Platt, “The Place and Function of Style in 
Renaissance Poetics,” in Renaissance Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of 
Renaissance Rhetoric, Ed. James Murphy (Berkley: University of California Press, 
1983), 357. 
22 See Walter J. Ong, S.J, Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958) for a still useful summary of Ramist doctrine. Of course, 
Ong’s thesis about the cognition of specialization has been heavily critiqued. Ong’s 
claims about the broad influence of Ramus on rhetorical theory have also been strongly 
questioned. See, for instance, Brian Vickers, Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 40-44. 
23 Again, see Ong’s Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue. 
24 Andrew Hadfield, Edmund Spenser: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
60.  
25 E. Armstrong argues that Tudor poets and rhetoricians responded to Ramism as a 
challenge to poetry’s cultural status. He sees The Shepheardes Calender, for instance, as 
confronting this imposition by representing Ramist critiques in the form of E.K.’s 
commentary, a critique which ultimately undermines itself in favor of a more expansive, 
ultimately Ciceronian, conception of rhetorical poetics. See E. Armstrong, A Ciceronian 
Sunburn: A Tudor Dialogue on Humanist Rhetoric and Civic Poetics (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2006), 94-115. 
26 This, of course, is a vastly simplified description of this process. For a study which 
challenges aspects of this narrative, see Anthony Grafton’s Defenders of the Text: The 
Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1991). As Grafton points out, the lines between Renaissance humanism 
and the New Science were more blurred than is now acknowledged. The account, 
originally promoted by figures such as Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon, which 
separated the literary nature of humanism from the scientific inquiry characteristic of 
institutions such as the Royal Society obscures the fact that the two forces were in 
constant dialogue with one another.    
27 See my first chapter for a more detailed account of the influence both of Plato and his 
early modern descendants. 
28 Although often attributed to Horace, the ut pictura poesis commonplace is actually 
much older. See, for example, Cicero, De Inventione. De Optimo Genere Oratorum. 
Topica, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 349. 
Tradition often ascribes the commonplace to Simonides of Ceos, but his description only 
survives in later paraphrases.  
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29 Aristotle’s Rhetoric did not widely disseminate in England throughout the period, but 
many authors knew of its existence: Sidney may have attempted to translate the text 
while a student (again, see Chapter One). Scaliger repeatedly attacked Erasmus during 
the Ciceronian debates, but the role of both scholars within this controversy highlights the 
centrality of rhetoric to humanist programs.      
30 See, for example, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the 
Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).  
31 See Robert Stillman, Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Renaissance Cosmopolitism 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) and Lorna Hutson, The Invention of Suspicion: Law and 
Mimesis in Shakespeare and Renaissance Drama (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
32 Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 2. Gondin does acknowledge the existence of 
the hermeneutica sacra, the hermeneutica profana, and the hermeneutica juris in the 
Renaissance, but does not substantially engage with these traditions. 
33 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, Ed. and 
Trans. Sander L. Gilman, et al (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). This volume is 
an edition of the philosopher’s “Lecture Notes on Rhetoric.” 
34 See Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 90-100. 
35 See Gary Remer, Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration (University Park: Penn 
State University Press, 1996), 80-2. 
36 See Jessica Wolfe, “Homer, Erasmus, and the Problem of Strife,” 57-111. 
37 Ibid., 59. 
38 Rosemond Tuve, “The Criterion of Rhetorical Efficacy” and “The Criterion of 
Decorum,” in Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1947), 180-1991 and 192-247. Of course, looking at Tuve’s claims about 
seventeenth-century poetry from a distance, many of her arguments about the supposed 
universality of decorous poetry are overstated.  
39 Theodor Adorno, “79: Intellectus sacrificium intellectus,” in Minima Moralia: 
Reflections from a Damaged Life, Trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso Books, 2005), 
122. 
40 In a still influential reading, Stephen Greenblatt directly questions, "Why should 
Sidney, sensitive, generous, and idealistic, choose to depict the heroes of his romance in 
this grotesque and lurid light?" See "Murdering Peasants: Status, Genre, and the 
Representation of Rebellion," in Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture 
(New York: Routledge Press, 1990), 154. 
41 For discussions on Sidney's attitude toward popular resistance see Rosemary Kegl, 
“’Altogether like a falling steeple'. The Politics of Sidney's Rebellions," in The Rhetoric 
of Concealment: Figuring Gender and Class in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca: Cornel 
University Press, 1994), 43-75; Richard McCoy, Sir Philip Sidney: Rebellion in Arcadia 
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University press, 1979); Irving Ribner, "Sir Philip Sidney on 
Civil Insurrection," Journal of the History of Ideas. 13.2 (1952), 257-65, Tracy 
Sedinger,"Sidney's New Arcadia and the Decay of Protestant Republicanism," SEL 47. I 
(2007), 57-77; Susanne Woods, "Freedom and Tyranny in Sydney's Arcadia," in Sir 
Phillip Sidney 's Achievement, ed. by Arthur F, Kinney, et al (New York: AMS Press, 
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1990), 165-76: and Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Sir Philip Sidney's “Arcadia” 
and Elizabethan Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). 
42 When questioned about the causes of the revolt by Pyrocles, the peasants, unable to 
achieve a consensus, all provide different justifications for their actions. Obviously, this 
fits into the early modern stereotype of the "many-headed multitude," but it also 
underscores the importance of Clinias' oratory in fomenting the rebellion. 
43 Greenblatt interprets the princes' disguises as devices permitting Sidney to mock the 
impoverished artisans, assuaging anxiety over the possibility of lower-class revolt 
without compromising the ethos of the Arcadia’s protagonists. This reading, however, 
entirely brackets off the hypocrisy of the oratory that frames the uprising, taking for 
granted that Sidney speaks through Pyrocles: "Murdering Peasants," 132-75. 
44 Arthur F. Kinney has shown the centrality of the humanist-rhetorical tradition to 
Sidney's project in the Arcadia and the author's interest in rhetoric's failures and 
limitations. See Humanist Poetics: Thought Rhetoric and Fiction in Sixteenth Century 
England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 233. 
45 See Gavin Alexander's introduction to William Scott, The Model of Poesy, ed. Gavin 
Alexander (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), xxxviii-li for a more 
accurate assessment of the relationship between rhetoric and poetics in the period. For 
rhetorical poetics in the Italian Renaissance, see Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary 
Criticism in the Italian Renaissance. Vols. I and II (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961). In particular, Weinberg's discussion of Julius Caesar Scaliger's poetics 
(743-50) helps contextualize Sidney on the relationship between poetry and its sister/rival 
form of discourse. 
46 Don Paul Abbot, "Reading, Writing, and Rhetoric in the Renaissance,"157. 
47 See Page DuBois, History, Rhetorical Description, and the Epic: From Homer to 
Spenser (Cambridge: D.S. Brewer, 1982), 3. Elizabeth Bearden, The Emblematic of the 
Self: Ekphrasis and Identity in Renaissance Imitations of Greek Romance (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2012), 13 on the other hand, argues that Greek romance uses 
ekphrasis to handle marginalized figures; as such, ekphrasis ironically has potential as a 
form of communication for the lower-class painter. 
48  Sir Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, ed. Victor Skretkowicz 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 281. Further quotations cited parenthetically in the text. 
Although both versions of the Arcadia contain the peasants' revolt, I cite those from New 
Arcadia because of its greater engagement with politics and larger scope. 
49 For an examination of how Sidney's theory of enargia evolves from Melanchthon's 
innate notitiae, see Robert Stillman, Philip Sidney and the Poetics of Renaissance 
Cosmopolitanism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). Stillman's monograph also contains the 
best glossing of Sidney's use of the rhetorical term scope. 
50 See Judith Dundas, Pencils Rhetorique: Renaissance Poets and the Art of Painting 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), 15-53 for a discussion of Sidney's 
relationship to visual art. All citations from the Defence are from Sir Philip Sidney, "The 
Defence of Poesy," in The Major Works, ed. Katherine Duncan Jones (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 212-50 
51 DuBois, History, Rhetorical Description, and the Epic, 3. 
52 As in Shakespeare's "plagiarism" of Plutarch in his description of Cleopatra's barge, 
Renaissance-era readers would have considered this an example of the wildly practiced 
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and accepted technique of imitatio. Dundas, Pencils Rhetorique, 116 points out that the 
artist is punished because of his literal-mindedness, for not understanding "that his art is 
essentially an art of fiction." 
53 Statius, 8.551-2. The translation is my own, but I use the text from Thebaid Vol. II, ed. 
D.R. Shakleton Bailey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
54  Sidney carefully avoids directly claiming that theology is subordinate to poetics, but 
he also insinuates that poets mediate access to the godhead in ways impossible for 
divines. Sola Scriptura, after all, takes on a different meaning if you consider the Bible as 
poetry. 
55 Stillman, Philip Sidney, 119. Sidney syncretically uses "Ideas" to refer to Platonic 
forms and notitiae simultaneously. 
56 "Learned discretion" and "divine consideration" obviously allude to poetical and 
rhetorical decorum, a term defined as the fitness of a style to a topic but which also 
includes the appropriateness of subject matter and argument to a particular audience or 
exigency. Interpretive accommodation originally developed as a form of meta-analysis 
useful for teaching orators how to respond to particular rhetorical contexts prior to being 
adopted first by theology and then by hermeneutics before finally becoming the backbone 
of Sidney's poetic theory. See Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition: 
Chapters in the Ancient Legacy and its Humanist Reception (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998) for the definitive account of this transition. 
57 "Antidosis" in Isocrates II: On the Peace. Areopagiticus. Against the Sophists. 
Antidosis. Panathenaicus ed. George Norlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1929), 253-6. 
58 Moreover, in the tradition of rhetorical poetics, vivid imagery itself invites 
participation with narratives. Paraphrasing Quintilian, Inst. 4.2.65, Lorna Hutson points 
out that enargeia (evidentia) is inherently forensic: it "resembles the 'judicatory act of 
grasping together' that defines the intelligibility of narrative, and is particularly related to 
making what is fictive seem plainly true." Enargeia, then, both makes fiction persuasive 
through description while encouraging a form of accommodation that encourages readers 
to evaluate critically the scenarios they encounter though reading or in aural 
communication. See The Invention of Suspicion, 126. 
59 Abbot, "Reading, Writing, and Rhetoric in the Renaissance," 157. 
60 William Scott, The Model of Poesy, 6, 30. 
61  See Wayne Rebhorn, The Emperor of Men's Minds: Literature and the Renaissance 
Discourse of Rhetoric (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 1 for an overview of 
rhetoric's centrality to Renaissance education and the literary disciplines. 
62 Ovid, Metamorphosis, Vol. 4, trans. Frank Justice Miller and G.P. Goold (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1916), xii, 11. 210-592. 
63 Ovid, Metamorphosis, Vol. 4, 210-592. Victor Skretkowicz's commentary shows that 
Sidney borrowed from Ovid: Victor Skretkowicz, ed., Philip Sidney, The Countess of 
Pembroke's Arcadia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 555. 
64 Elizabethans figured Caeneus as a knight-errant, as a convention from romance. After 
his transformation into a man, Arthur Golding's translation states he "in feates of 
chevalrye from that tyme spent his lyfe": Ovid's Metamorphoses: The Arthur Golding 
Translation (1567), ed. John Frederick Nims (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), 
xii: 235. 
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65 Henry Peacham, The Garden of Eloquence (London: British Library, Historical Print 
Editions, 2011), 96-7. This is a facsimile of the 1593 second edition. The Garden of 
Eloquence was first published in 1577, only a few years before Sidney is thought to have 
begun work on the Arcadia. While Sidney likely drew on Latin rhetorics, Peacham's 
explication of the figure highlights the ambiguities of philophronesis for Sidney's 
contemporaries. 
66 Peacham, Garden of Eloquence, 230. The italics are mine. 
67 Helen Cooper, The English Romance in Time: Transforming Motifs from Geoffrey of 
Monmouth to the Death of Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 258. 
68 Philip Melanchthon, "The Praise of Eloquence," in Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric, 
ed. and trans. by Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 100. 
69 William Scott, The Model of Poesy, 32. 
70 Melanchthon, "The Praise of Eloquence," 100. 
71 Melanchthon, "The Praise of Eloquence," 100. 
72 Often attributed to Horace, this commonplace originates from a much older time. For 
example, Cicero refers to the commonplace: see Cicero, De inventione. De optimo genere 
oratorum. Topica, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 
349. Aristotle's discussion of the three forms of proof as logos, ethos, and pathos in his 
Rhetoric (1356a.3-7) might be the original source of the division of eloquence's purposes 
into moving, teaching, and delighting, with docere, delectare, and movere roughly 
deriving from logos, ethos and pathos respectively. See Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 37-9. 
73  Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 275d. All my citations from Plato are taken from this 
edition. 
74 Plato, Phaedrus, 275d-e. 
75 Plato, Sophist, 234c. 
76 Scott, Model of Poesy, 6. 
77 Alan Stewart, Philip Sidney: A Double Life (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 54. 
78 Arthur Kinney, Humanist Poetics, 236 points out, however, that "Sidney continues to 
insist on Pyrocles as a fallen hero in his manipulative speech to the Helot Rebels (2.26) 
and in his percipient speech to the rebels." 
79 See Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative , Vol. I, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 72-74. Ricoeur is returning to 
Aristotle's conception of mimesis, but his proposal accords very well with Renaissance 
definitions of the term, including Sidney's, which construct poetry, i.e. fiction, as a form 
of making. 
80 Actually, Shklovsky cites Aristotle's dictum that "poetic language must appear strange 
and wonderful” as an example of defamilarization in his famous essay. Although 
Aristotle's Poetics was not widely available in the early modern period, the Russian 
formalist is still drawing upon a set of concepts that would not have been entirely alien to 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century readers. See Viktor Shklovsky, "Art as Technique," in 
Literary Theory: An Anthology, ed by Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing. 1998), 19.   
81 Defamilarization and accommodation may seem to be etymologically opposed, with 
one making something unfamiliar, bringing something out of the family, and the other 
bringing something back into the home. Yet this is somewhat misleading: 
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defamilarization largely refers to how the text affects the interpreter. Just because the 
metaphors are oppositional doesn't mean the concepts are actually in conflict.  
82 My citations from Spenser’s epic are taken from The Faerie Queene, ed.by A.C. 
Hamilton et al (New York: Routledge, 2013). Further quotations cited parenthetically in 
the text. 
83 Michael O’Connell, in “Giant with the Scales,” in Spenser Encyclopedia, ed. By A.C. 
Hamilton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 331-2 makes the connection 
between these conflicts and the Giant’s political goals. 
84 Stephen Greenblatt, “Status, Genre, and the Representation of Rebellion,” 164. 
According to Greenblatt’s Foucauldian reading, the episteme—the historical conditions 
underlying the discourse in which this episode is situated—limits Spenser’s depiction of 
the Giant’s radicalism: ultimately, the Giant’s threat is contained just as surely as it is 
represented. 
85 Michael Dixon, The Polliticke Courtier: Spenser’s “The Faerie Queene” as a Rhetoric 
of Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 111. 
86 Dixon’s interpretation has the advantage of explaining both the affect this episode 
generates in Spenser’s reader and the similarity between the Giant and Knight, but it is 
not interested in the relationship between Artegall’s rhetoric and the violence that 
follows. In fact, Dixon does not register an awareness of the Giant’s execution at all, let 
alone attempt to relate it to the events that precede it. Greenblatt’s reading, on the other 
hand, while conscious of how this episode is embedded within its social and historical 
contexts, forces Spenser’s narrative into a predictable scheme of subversion and 
containment through a comparison with the rhetoric of Albrecht Dürer’s Monument to the 
Vanquished Peasants, a resemblance which is very broad and based on an assumption 
that the unbuilt monument (a sketch of a memorial) and the poem generate the same 
affective response in their audiences. 
87 Carol Kaske sees the Giant as a kind of neo-Platonic “double” emblem wherein 
Artegall represents the idea or reality of justice whereas his opponent only represents a 
copy or the appearance of the concept—similar to how Duessa doubles Una or 
Archimago doubles the Hermit in Book One. However, this scheme fits better in the first 
three books of The Faerie Queene than in the books added in the second edition. While 
the Giant clearly is a double of the Knight, contra Kaske, he is substantially more 
dangerous than a figure like Archimago: the wizard threatens the journey and 
development of Book One’s protagonist, the Red Cross Knight; the Giant, on the other 
hand, threatens to undermine the entire conceptual scheme underlying all of Book Five. 
See Carol Kaske, Spenser and Biblical Poetics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 
35. 
88 I am taking Spenser’s “Letter to Raleigh” at face value here in order to point out its 
inadequacies as an interpretive key to Spenser’s poem: I do not actually consider the 
letter to be an authoritative guide to The Faerie Queene, particularly to the books added 
in the second edition. Like many Spenserians, I suspect that Spenser’s purposes for 
writing his epic changed between the first edition of 1590 and the second edition of 1596.  
But this is a contested issue: see Jane Grogan, Exemplary Spenser: Visual and Poetic 
Pedagogy in “The Faerie Queen” (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009) for an argument to the 
contrary. According to Grogan, the “Letter to Ralegh” functions as a satisfactory 
explicator for the poetics of The Faerie Queene—or at least the first five books of the 
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epic. She sees the poem’s purpose as the fashioning of a gentleman, a fashioning which 
Spenser accomplishes through his use of images and narrative to shape his reader. 
Grogan is at pains to distinguish the differences between Spenserian and Sidneian 
poetics, even as she admits they have much in common. Rather than presenting virtuous 
protagonists to be emulated by readers, Spenser has “a Plutarchan appreciation for the 
discriminatory techniques to be learnt from the representation of vice,” 16.  
89 Accommodation in interpretation is often figured as a kind of bringing home or 
making familiar. See Kathy Eden, Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, 26-50.  
90 Both “decorum” and “accommodation” etymologically imply a homecoming, and the 
metaphor of a journey back home was never abandoned in theories of rhetorical 
hermeneutics until the eighteenth century.  
91 For an argument that The Faerie Queene defers meaning in a manner which resembles 
poststructuralist thought, particularly Derridian deconstructionism, see Jonathan 
Goldberg, Endlesse Worke: Spenser and the Structures of Discourse (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1981).  
92 Ciaran Brady, “Spenser’s Irish Crisis: Humanism and Experience in the 1590s,” Past 
and Present 111 (1986), 18. 
93 Most forcibly Annabel Patterson; she views the episode as “destabilizing and 
problematizing the usually unexamined vocabulary we use to conceive justice—as 
weighing right against wrong, truth against falsehood. The reader finds herself, along 
with the Giant...struggling to make sense of an incoherent sign system, and therefore, 
experiences frustration rather than satisfaction when Artegall and Talus break the rules of 
the debate and solve the intellectual problem by using brute force.” See Annabel 
Patterson, “The Egalitarian Giant: Representations of Justice in History and Literature,” 
Journal of British Studies 31:2 (1992), 113.  
94 See Andrew Hadfield, “The Death of the Knight with the Scales and the Question of 
Justice in The Faerie Queene,” Essays in Criticism 65.1 (2015), 13. Hadfield’s essay is a 
corrective against the majority of readings which have “invariably assumed that the giant 
must be wrong and that Spenser is supporting his knight’s reading of the situation 
because he is an apologist for absolute power,” 16.   
95 Andrew Hadfield, Edmund Spenser: A Life, 220. Hadfield’s biography does admit that 
the Giant’s claim “that the universe should be based on more equitable principles has 
generally received short shrift from commentators,” 373-75; more still, as the above 
footnote suggests, his 2015 essay, “The Death of the Knight with the Scales and the 
Question of Justice in The Faerie Queene,” provides a more nuanced reading of this 
episode. Hadfield’s earlier work, Spenser’s Irish Experience: Wilde Fruit and Salvage 
Soyl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), has shown how deeply the allegory of 
Book Five is immersed in the Tudor colonial project in Ireland.  
96 Artegall’s role in The Faerie Queene fluctuates depending upon narrative context and 
rhetorical (and allegorical) purpose.  
97 In short, I find Patterson’s description of how Artegall’s conceptual and physical 
conflict with the Giant destabilizes the verbal signifiers of justice to be persuasive, but I 
also think this moment has significance for understanding how Spenser constructs the 
role of a poet within an ethically murky and complex national and religious conflict. 
98 Artegall’s and the Giant’s speeches rest somewhere on the border between deliberative 
and forensic oratory, with the location of the divide depending on if the debate’s stasis is 
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concerned with whether the Giant should enact his program of reforms or whether the 
Knight and Titan are discussing if the cosmos has changed since creation. Since all of the 
arguments and proofs presented by both speakers pertain to the latter issue, I treat the 
debate as an example of forensic oratory.  
99 Literarily the debate is a declamatory contest, but this contest is more than an oratorical 
display. Because of Book Five’s concern with justice, because the episode ends with an 
execution, and because the rhetoric used by Artegall and the Giant is forensic, the 
appropriate analogue is to a trial.  
100 Terry Eagleton famously calls for a renewed emphasis on rhetoric because of its 
traditional focus on “speaking and writing not merely as textual objects, to be 
aesthetically contemplated or endlessly deconstructed, but of forms of activity 
inseparable from the wider social relations between writers and readers, orators and 
audiences, and as a largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in 
which they were embedded.” See Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 206. 
101 This includes female readers: The Faerie Queene, after all, had an important reader in 
Queen Elizabeth whom the narrator frequently addresses, despite the “Letter to 
Raleigh’s” assertions about fashioning a gentleman, and, unsurprisingly, many of the 
poem’s earliest readers were women. 
102 See Walter Oakshott, “Carew Ralegh’s Copy of Spenser,” The Library 26 (1971), 1-
21. The 1617 folio was discovered in November 1966 when it went to auction at 
Christie’s. 
103 See Jeffrey B. Morris, “To (Re)fashion a Gentleman: Ralegh’s Disgrace in Spenser’s 
Legend of Courtesy,” Modern Philology 94:1 (1997), 38-58 for an examination of how 
Ralegh’s life shadows Book VI of The Faerie Queene. 
104 A bemused Andrew Hadfield observes that this marginalia actually reveals that 
Elizabeth “knew little of her husband’s interaction with Spenser beyond rumor and 
hearsay.” See Edmund Spenser: A Life, 232.  
105 Ibid., 232.  
106 Oakshott, “Carew Ralegh’s Copy of Spenser,” 10. 
107 Andrew Zurcher, Edmund Spenser’s “The Faerie Queene”: A Reader’s Guide 
(Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2011), 199.  
108 See Quintilian, 15.11.17-18.  
109 Oakshott, “Carew Ralegh’s Copy of Spenser,” 10. 
110 Ibid., 10. 
111 I think a number of critics misrepresent this marginalia because they see it through the 
lens of the one clear mistake in the paratext. Yet even Elizabeth’s admittedly bizarre 
claim to be Colin’s mistress in Colin Clouts come home againe might not be what it first 
seems. She simply may have thought that Colin’s interactions with the first of the maids 
had some kind of special relevance for her life or that the maid’s description resembled 
her own in some way.  
112 Edmund Spenser, A View of the State of Ireland: from the first printed edition (1633), 
ed. Andrew Hadfield and Willy Maley (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 75-6.  
Irenaeus claims that “these Irish Bardes are for the most part of another minde, and so 
farre from instructing yong men in morall disipline, that they themselves doe more 
deserve to be sharpely disciplined; for they seldome use to choose unto themselves the 
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doings of good men for the arguments of their poems, but whomsoever they finde to be 
the most licentious of life, most bolde and lawlesse in his doings, most dangerous and 
desperate in all parts of disobedience and rebellious disposition, him they set up and 
glorifie in their rithmes, him they praise to the people, and to yong men make an example 
to follow.”  
113 See John N. King, “‘The Faerie Leveller’: a 1648 Royalist Reading of The Faerie 
Queene,” Huntington Library Quarterly 48:3 (1985), 297-308. King tentatively identifies 
the editor as Samuel Sheppard, a figure involved in a number of Royalist publications 
including the Mercurius Elencticus.  
114 Ibid., 307-08. King’s article helpfully reprints the editor’s preface and key.  
115 Ibid., 308. 
116 The Egalitarian Giant actually has much more in common with the Diggers, 
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253 Mary Ellen Lamb, Gender and Authorship in the Sidney Circle, 8.  
254 M.T. Ciceronis de Oratore. 80. J Kyngstonus, 1573. L. HN. 
255 See William R. Bowen, Germaine Warkentin, and Joseph Black, The Library of the 
Sidneys of Penshurst Place (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 114.  
256 For the centrality of De Oratore to theories of discourse, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, 
“Rhetoric in Medieval and Renaissance Culture,” in Renaissance Eloquence, ed. James J. 
Murphy (Berkley: University of California Press, 1983), 3. John O. Ward likewise shows 
that Cicero’s mature works such as De Oratore were neglected in the medieval period 
and early Renaissance in favor of the Rhetoircia Ad Herennium and De invention, but 
they increasingly became a focal point for humanist commentary throughout the sixteenth 
century. See “Commentators on Ciceronian Rhetoric,” in Renaissance Eloquence, ed. by 
James J. Murphy (Berkley: University of California Press, 1983), 126-45.   
257 Arthur F. Kinney both points out how Cicero’s De Oratore influenced the humanist 
classroom and served as a model for writers of fiction. See Humanist Poetics, 125-30.   
258 E. Armstrong. A Ciceronian Sunburn, 5. 
259 Armstrong’s monograph, unfortunately, does not discuss Wroth. 
260 Specifically, the overlapping and interdependent networks of identity—race, class, 
and gender—which create disparities, disadvantages, and marginalization for groups of 
men and women. This concept of intersectionality gained wide currency from Kimberlee 
Williams Crenshaws’ work throughout the 1980s and 1900s. See, for example, Kimberlee 
Williams Crenshaws, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist 
Politics.” University of Chicago Legal Forum 140 (1989), 139-67.  Both the term and 
concept, however, go back many decades before Crenshaws’ intervention. 
261 These concepts, of course, were unstable in the early modern period, and the 
emerging modern conception of race was particularly embryonic.  
262 See Hannay, Lady Mary Wroth, 230. 
263 In the introduction to her edition of the Urania, Josephine Roberts points out that the 
King of Candia clearly shadows James. See 1ii. 
264 For the much-combed over relationship between the Arcadia and resistance theory, 
see Endnote 37. 
265 Sidney’s depiction of Basilius invites comparison to the Urania’s many jealous 
husbands. While the father of Pamela and Philoclea is not overtly evil, he withdraws from 
the active life and sequesters his daughters away from society, both of which Sidney 
represents as forms of bad ruler-ship.  
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266 I refer to the conventions of pastoral romance, not to the conventions of the pastoral 
lyric. The two genres are obviously intrinsically related, but the commonplace of the lost 
royal scion living among rustics is deeply rooted in romance tradition.  
267 I specify the New Arcadia intentionally. In the Old Arcadia, Strephon and Claius are 
nobles disguised as shepherds. In general, the unrevised version of Sidney’s romance 
contains much less interest both in social mobility and in interrogating hierarchical 
stratification.     
268 Fundamentally, a near explicit identification between heroic behavior and upper-class 
prerogative animates this moment of the Urania. Without a doubt, removing class from 
the other components of identity serves as the precondition for Urania’s success in 
persuading Perissus. Urania can only convince the Sicilian once he ascertains her status 
as high born, upon realizing that she is not, as she first “seems,” a mere shepherdess, a 
detail which highlights how strongly the scope of Wroth’s romance relates to the elite 
preoccupation with the vita activa. Unlike Sidnean accommodation, Wroth’s ordinary 
speech makes no pretense at mediating between speakers of different social statuses 
(beyond interlocutors of different genders). This moment of the Urania addresses a set of 
concerns about the relationship between gendered subjugation and the autonomy of 
desiring agents, but Perissus’ ability to champion Limena’s agency depends upon his 
adherence to the chivalric code, an ethos only available to aristocrats. Urania’s ethopoeia, 
her impersonation and performance of heroic masculine behavior, succeeds due to the 
presence of an audience receptive to this form of role playing.  
269 See Frances Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (London: Routledge, 1972; New 
York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1996), 1-15. Yates, of course, overstates the extent that 
the wedding between Fredrick and Elizabeth prompted a hermetic revival, but I suspect 
the chivalric motifs she identifies as centralizing around the royal wedding are at least 
tangentially and imaginatively related to the avocation of the active life in the early 
moments of the Urania. 
270 Yates traces some of the response to James’ unwillingness to support a more muscular 
advocacy of continental Protestantism. See Yates, The Rosicrucian Enlightenment, 15-30. 
271 See Josephine Roberts, introduction to The first part of The Countess of Montgomery's 
Urania, xlii. 
272 These tensions would, several decades later, contribute to the English Civil War. 
273 See, for example the discussion in Christopher Durston, “James I and his 
parliaments,” in James I (New York: Routledge, 1993), 34-44.  
274 See Mellissa Sanchez, introduction to Erotic Subjects: The Sexuality of Politics in 
Early Modern English Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3-10. Sanchez 
notes that Romance “constitutes an alternative tradition of political theory that stresses a 
perverse component of sovereignty, one that disrupts more conventional accounts of 
politics as driven by rational choice, false consciousness, or brute force,” 4.        
275 See Mellissa Sanchez, “Political Masochism in the Urania,” in Erotic Subjects, 127. 
276 “Virtue,” of course, etymologically descends from the Latin virtus, manliness. The 
connection between masculinity and virtue adheres, at least distantly, to all uses of the 
term which depend upon classical definitions, including all contexts involving rhetorical 
theory.    
277 Cicero, De Oratore, Book I.xxi.95. 
278 Ibid., Book I.xxxiii.108-110.    
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279 Ibid., Book I.lxi.260. The translation is mine. I gender orators as male following 
Antonius in the text.    
280 In rhetorical theory after Aristotle and Isocrates, precepts warn that audiences should 
not be alerted to the fact that they are being persuaded. This advice generally pertains to 
the canon of electio, to discussions of style. Rhetoricians, including Aristotle, Isocrates, 
Cicero, and Quintilian, all maintain that orators should not inappropriately call attention 
to tropes and figures. The focus on alerting audiences to persuasive affects, however, 
suggests that this concern extends beyond the canon of style. Of course, Antissia’s slip 
into the first person, among many other issues, is obviously also a blunder in electio.         
281 See, for example, Helen Hacket, “Yet Tell Me Some Such Fiction,” 56. 
282 Aristotle is famous for the voluminous detail in his discussion of adapting to diverse 
audiences. See Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 2.12-17. The philosopher does consider certain 
proofs, such as those pertaining to happiness, to be universally applicable.     
283 See Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV 2. The anonymous author (Pseudo-Cicero) 
ventriloquizes detractors who might object to citing his own writing to make points about 
style. While he argues for the appropriateness of citing his old works, he does not affirm 
citing one’s own authority to justify past conduct when the appropriateness of one’s own 
conduct is at issue.      
284 For a discussion of how romance codifies desire as socially redemptive, see Helen 
Cooper, “Desirable Desire: ‘I am wholly given over unto thee,” in The English Romance 
in Time, 218-68.   
285  Victor Stretkowicz, European Erotic Romance: Philhellene Protestantism, 
Renaissance Translation and English Literary Politics (Manchester: Manchester 
University Pres, 2010), 271-335. See also, Roberts, introduction to The first part of The 
Countess of Montgomery's Urania, xlii. 
286 Stretkowicz, European Erotic Romance, 6.    
287 It is tempting to ascribe this primarily to the influence of Sidney’s Arcadia, but as 
Gavin Alexander points out, Sidney’s influence did not lead to his brand of epic prose 
romance becoming the dominant literary form: “For much of the seventeenth century the 
Arcadia enjoyed a sort of unchallenged preeminence. The major literary figures wrote 
epic poems and plays, and not prose fiction.” Nevertheless, in various mediums, romance 
remained a dominant genre throughout the seventeenth century, even if these texts did not 
always imitate Sidney. See Writing After Sidney: The Literary Response to Sir Philip 
Sidney 1586-1640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 262.   
288 The fact that a young woman of comparatively low status such as Anna Weamys 
could write a completion of Sidney’s Arcadia shows that the text was seen as available to 
an emerging middle class. See the information on Weamys’ background found in 
Colburn’s Introduction to his edition of her text, xvii-xxx.  
289 See Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967). 
290 I am unaware of any evidence that Milton read the Urania, but he clearly was 
influenced by Spenser (see Chapter Two) and was familiar enough with Sidney to 
recognize plagiarizations of the Arcadia in Eikon Basilike. See Barbara K. Lewalski, The 
Life of John Milton (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 248. 
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291 Self-reflexive devices are also common in popular theater in the English Renaissance. 
Many, but no means all, of these devices are either in staged tragicomic-romance or are 
reactions to romance.  
292 Virginia Woolf, “The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia,” in The Common Reader, 
Second Series (London: Hogarth Press, 1935), 49-50.    
293 See Georg Lukacs, “From the Historical Novel,” in Theory of the Novel: A Historical 
Approach, ed. by Michael McKeon (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
2000), 219-64.  
294 See Michael McKeon, “Generic Transformation and Social Change: Rethinking the 
Rise of the Novel,” in Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach, ed. by Michael 
McKeon (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2000), 382-399.  
295 See, for example, William C. Spengemann, “The Earliest American Novel: Aphra 
Behn’s Oroonoko.” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 38.4 (1984), 384-414, https://www-jstor-
org.silk.library.umass.edu/stable/3044746.  I could, of course, cite many more examples 
of readers treating Oroonoko as a novel despite its familiar romance elements. 
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